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Abstract
This dissertation tackles crucial issues of web browser security. Web browsers
are now a central part of the trusted code base of any end-user computer sys-
tem, as more and more usage shifts to services provided by web sites that
are accessed through those browsers. Towards this goal we identify three key
aspects of web browser security: (i) the machine-to-user communication, (ii)
internal browser security concerns and (iii) machine-to-machine communi-
cation.
We address aspects (i) and (ii) by developing a methodology that creates
a formal model of a web browser and analyzes that model. We showcase
this on the graphical user interface of both Internet Explorer and the Illinois
Browser Operating System (IBOS) web browsers. Internal security aspects
are addressed in the IBOS browser for the same origin policy.
For aspect (iii) we look at the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols,
independent of any particular browser. We focus on the formal analysis of
protocols modulo algebraic properties of their cryptographic functions, since
it is well-known the protocol verification methods that ignore such algebraic
properties using a standard Dolev-Yao model can verify as correct proto-
cols that can be in fact broken using the algebraic properties. We adopt a
symbolic approach and use the Maude-NPA cryptographic protocol analysis
tool, which has extended unification capabilities modulo theories based on
the new narrowing strategy we developed. We present case studies showing
that appropriate protocols can be analyzed so that either attacks are found,
or the absence of attacks can be proven.
Keywords: browser security, visual invariants, same origin policy, seman-
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A current trend in computing is to move applications to the web, i.e., instead
of having an application installed on one’s computer for a specific task, one
goes to a website that offers that functionality as a service. Some popular
examples are e-mail (Google Mail and others), banking and tax filing (Turbo-
Tax and others), and electronic commerce. These applications are obviously
quite security critical as confidentiality of the information is supremely im-
portant. With these applications migrating to the web and being run as
services, the web browser that is used to access these applications becomes
a crucial part of the chain of trust for these services.
In some sense, the browser is becoming the operating system of the fu-
ture. In the past the operating system was the most security critical com-
ponent, with any breach of it potentially leading to disaster, but now the
web browser has to be included in that critical set of code. However, most
browsers have been developed with a limited emphasis on security. Browsers
are historically built on top of prior browser versions and thus tend to be
monolithic constructions and therefore quite large and complex. The chain
of trust for services like those mentioned above can therefore be significantly
strengthened by efforts aimed at improving browser security.
Browser security can be considered to have three aspects: (i) the machine-
to-user communication, (ii) internal browser security concerns and (iii) the
machine-to-machine communication.
In this dissertation we formally model and analyze two web browsers:
Internet Explorer (IE) and the Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS)
with respect to security aspects (i) for IE and IBOS and (ii) for IBOS. We
also present new contributions to the security aspect (iii) in a way that
is browser generic by focusing on the formal analysis of the cryptographic
protocols used to secure machine-to-machine communication.
For the machine-to-user communication, trusted visual cues need to in-
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deed be (proven) trustworthy. Specifically, we analyze the correctness of the
address bar with respect to the content of the current page in both Internet
Explorer (IE) and the Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS). In IE we
find a number of possible attacks while we can show that IBOS is safe. In IE
we go still further and analyze the status bar for static HTML as well. For
the status bar of IE we find a number of potential attacks, but we also show
how to make IE safe against them.
Address bar correctness is a very important property to help prevent
certain kinds of phishing attacks, or at least make phishing more difficult.
Phishing is the process in which an attacker tries to steal a user’s credentials
for any kind of service. To this end, the attacker prepares a website that
looks exactly like the website of a real service, e.g., a bank’s website. Then
the attacker will send out a massive number of e-mails, asking users to log
into the service at his copy of the website. If a user falls for this deception,
the attacker gains access to that user’s credentials, can manipulate his/her
account, and potentially steal the user’s money. With a correct address bar,
the user has some defense, as it is possible to spot that the address bar shows
some string that is not the URL of the web page expected. This of course
only helps those users that are diligent in checking such indicators. Now,
the status bar correctness of IE is relevant as well, as Outlook Express (an
e-mail reader app) at the time used the same logic for showing the URL of
a target link in an e-mail. So, if both the address bar and status bar can
be manipulated, this leads to a perfect spoofing chain for the attacker, going
from the e-mail, where checking the mouse-over link produces the right URL,
to the website, which looks perfect, as it is a straight copy of the real one,
to the address bar, which shows the same URL.
For internal browser security concerns we look at the same origin policy
(SOP) and check it in IBOS. The SOP essentially states that one website
cannot get information from another website through the browser, see [115]
for more detail. A number of properties, taken together, is sufficient for SOP
to hold. Some further properties are also considered.
For the machine-to-machine communication the underlying cryptographic
protocols need to be secure. Even though the chain of trust for machine-to-
machine communication uses cryptographic protocols in a ubiquitous fashion,
the formal analysis of the security of cryptographic protocols is mostly based
on the Dolev-Yao model [39]. It is a formal model in which legitimate partic-
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ipants are trying to execute a protocol together. There is also an adversary
trying to learn all possible secrets to which it should not have access. The
adversary is active, meaning it can send and receive messages as if it were
a normal participant. However, it also controls the network, i.e., the adver-
sary can read all messages, can drop messages that are inconvenient for its
nefarious purposes, and can add messages to the network that look like they
are from any one legitimate participant chosen by the adversary. The only
limit placed on the adversary is that the underlying cryptography is perfect
and thus the model treats it as a black box. The adversary cannot read the
contents of encrypted messages or create encrypted messages, unless it knows
the required key for that message.
In practice, though, the protocol functions will have some inherent alge-
braic properties that need to be accounted for. If the algebraic properties
are not taken into account in the verification, then even a ‘proven-secure’
(according to the Dolev-Yao model) protocol can have exploitable vulnera-
bilities based on those properties [110]. For formal verification to be able to
deal with such algebraic properties, the properties need to be explicitly mod-
eled as part of the cryptographic protocol specification. So we are using an
extension of the Dolev-Yao model in which some of the algebraic properties
are explicitly modeled.
To improve on the state-of-the-art for the above-mentioned protocol secu-
rity issues, two things are needed: (i) cryptographic protocol analysis meth-
ods and tools that can take those algebraic properties into account; and (ii)
ways to actually deal with different algebraic properties, which for symbolic
analysis purposes boils down to being able to perform unification modulo the
relevant algebraic theories.
This dissertation develops a formal specification and verification method-
ology, based on rewriting logic and implemented in Maude, capable of analyz-
ing and verifying, as well as finding bugs (i.e., counter-examples), in models of
browser software and of cryptographic protocols used for machine-to-machine
communication. Specifically, it addresses the three different aspects (i), (ii)
and (iii) of browser security mentioned above as follows:
• Browser to user connection by GUI. We analyze GUI security
(correctness!) aspects of both IE and IBOS.
• Internal browser security. We prove the same origin policy for
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IBOS.
• Machine-to-machine connection by cryptographic protocols.
We extend the cryptographic protocol analysis tool Maude-NPA with
a new generic unification algorithm based on a new version of nar-
rowing and show case studies on cryptographic protocols that are an-
alyzed modulo their algebraic properties using our generic unification
algorithm.
Web browser security is highly important as more and more applications
are moved from the traditional desktop application framework to on-demand
online versions (often called services) which are usually accessed through
a web browser. The web browser is thus mutating to a kind of operating
system for services. We consider security aspects first of a commercial off-
the-shelf web browser (Internet Explorer (IE)) and the effects its graphical
user interface (GUI) design can have on security. For IE we exclusively look
at GUI properties. Then we turn to analyze the design of a new, state-of-
the-art and secure-by-design web browser which is tightly integrated into a
(proven) secure operating system microkernel (IBOS [117]). For IBOS we
look at both GUI properties and internal browser security considerations.
This methodology consists of two steps: (i) creating a formal model out
of given source code and code developer comments1 and (ii) formal analysis
of the model created in step (i).
Overall the analysis is based on browser models which have been extracted
from the source code, with developer interaction to get at the intent.2 This
modeling process by itself has found many unknown types of attacks in IE
and some bugs directly in IBOS, whenever code reading and developer intent
did not match up as they should. The models of the browsers are given in
rewriting logic and can thus be executed and analyzed using the Maude tool.
Browser to user connection by GUI. For the GUI analysis work the
1This step, by being a passage from an informal description to a formal model, is
not itself amenable to formal verification; however, the executable nature of the formal
specification so obtained makes it amenable to thorough testing to ensure that the right
formal model has been captured.
2In the case of Internet Explorer, since the source code is proprietary, we relied on one
of our collaborators in that work (Shuo Chen) to first extract pseudocode models from
IE’s source code, and based our Maude models on such pseudocode. Instead, in the case
of the IBOS browser we were able to directly study the source code and to have extensive
discussions with the developers.
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particular concern was the browser’s address bar, which should always be
guaranteed to truthfully tell the user what website is currently being viewed.
The address bar has been analyzed for both IE and IBOS. The status bar is
also of interest whenever navigation to a new page is considered and should
be a good indicator of what the contents of the next web page (and address
bar) should be. The status bar has only been analyzed for IE.
Internal browser security. In the analysis of the newly developed
IBOS browser we looked at the same origin policy (SOP) that says that
a website cannot get user information from another website through the
browser. This is necessary so one web page cannot steal login information or
any other credentials that the user is presenting to a different web page. The
SOP can be broken down into a set of properties that taken together imply
SOP. We have done that and we show all the components and how they are
verified. We conclude that IBOS fulfills SOP. As already stated above, the
address bar in IBOS has also been under scrutiny.
Protocol analysis. For the analysis of cryptographic protocols we de-
velop new unification methods. This is to improve the capabilities of a crypt-
analysis tool, the Maude-NPA [48], which we apply to case-studies. The
analysis of cryptographic protocols we are interested in takes into account
underlying algebraic properties of the protocol to be analyzed and is not
restricted to just the Dolev-Yao model, for which the whole cryptography
is a black box. This requires a modeling framework, as well as tool sup-
port, that is capable of handling these algebraic properties of interest. This
deeper level of analysis is needed in practice as protocols shown secure under
Dolev-Yao have been broken using the algebraic properties of their crypto-
graphic operations [110]. In this dissertation we focus on two aspects of this:
to be able to do protocol analysis modulo algebraic properties, we develop
a generic algorithm for unification modulo theories which is based on nar-
rowing, and second, we show some case studies on protocols for which our
new generic unification algorithm is needed for the analysis, since the proto-
cols in question could not be analyzed properly before. Development of the
above-mentioned unification modulo a theory has been integrated into the
Maude-NPA cryptographic protocol analysis tool, which is used in the case
study carried out subsequently.
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1.1 Summary of Contributions
This dissertation contributes to several ongoing research efforts within the
areas of formal methods, web browser security, and cryptographic protocol
analysis. This list highlights the main contributions of the dissertation:
1. A methodology for web browser formal modeling and analysis which
is effective in finding real-life bugs that allow attacks, while increasing
confidence in the absence of attacks.
2. In the Internet Explorer browser graphical user interface we find 9
attacks in the form of HTML tree types for status bar spoofing, and 4
actual attack types for address bar spoofing.
3. In the IBOS browser we verify the same origin policy and the consis-
tency of the address bar. We also find a bug in the display memory
management leading to browser tabs being unusable.
4. A new generic method for the effective computation of unifiers modulo
equational theories, based on narrowing modulo axioms, called folding
variant narrowing.
5. An automatic method to check whether a given equational theory has
the finite variant property.
6. Applications of folding variant narrowing in the cryptographic protocol
analysis tool Maude-NPA. This very generic way of obtaining finitary
equational unification algorithms by narrowing and folding variant nar-
rowing has further automated deduction applications.
7. A case study for cryptographic protocol analysis modulo exclusive-or
and other cryptographic equational properties. Attacks are found in
insecure protocols, while secure protocols can be proved to be so by
our methods.
1.2 Organization
The dissertation is organized into chapters as follows:
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• Chapter 1. Identifies problems this thesis is addressing and motivates
at a high-level the approach being used.
• Chapter 2. Discusses technical preliminaries required for the rest of the
dissertation.
• Chapter 3. Looks at the Internet Explorer graphical user interface,
models the status bar and address bar and analyzes their properties.
Finds multiple attacks on both and proposes fixes.
• Chapter 4. In this chapter IBOS is motivated, described, and modeled.
In a number of case studies security properties of IBOS are proven and
bugs are exposed.
• Chapter 5. Considers narrowing strategies and optimal variant termi-
nation before introducing folding variant narrowing. The finite variant
property is explained and automatic checking is considered. This leads
to equational unification algorithms based on variants.
• Chapter 6. Analyzes protocols modulo the combination of some theo-
ries. In particular, introduces specification and analysis of a protocol
in the Maude-NPA and the unification algorithm based on the prior
chapter. Three protocols are analyzed and attacks in them are found,
one of the protocols is then fixed and shown that no further attacks
remain.
• Chapter 7. This chapter presents the conclusions of the dissertation
and discusses future research directions.
Noting that (i), (ii) and (iii) are quite different in nature we are presenting
the related work as it is appropriate in each Chapter of this dissertation. See




In this thesis, we follow the classical notation and terminology from [119] for
term rewriting, and from [89] for rewriting logic and order-sorted notions.
We assume an order-sorted signature Σ = (S,≤,Σ) with poset of sorts (S,≤)
and such that for each sort s ∈ S the connected component of s in (S,≤) has
a top sort, denoted [s], and all f : s1 · · · sn → s with n ≥ 1 have a top
sort overloading f : [s1] · · · [sn] → [s]. We also assume an S-sorted family
X = {Xs}s∈S of disjoint variable sets with each Xs countably infinite. TΣ(X )s
is the set of terms of sort s, and TΣ,s is the set of ground terms of sort s. We
write TΣ(X ) and TΣ for the corresponding order-sorted term algebras. For a
term t, Var(t) denotes the set of all variables in t.
Positions are represented by sequences of natural numbers denoting an
access path in the term when viewed as a tree. The top or root position
is denoted by the empty sequence Λ. We define the relation p ≤ q between
positions as p ≤ p for any p; and p ≤ p.q for any p and q. Given U ⊆ Σ∪X ,
PosU(t) denotes the set of positions of a term t that are rooted by symbols
or variables in U . The set of positions of a term t is written Pos(t), and the
set of non-variable positions PosΣ(t). The subterm of t at position p is t|p
and t[u]p is the term t where t|p is replaced by u.
A substitution σ ∈ Subst(Σ,X ) is a sorted mapping from a finite subset
of X to TΣ(X ). Substitutions are written as σ = {X1 7→ t1, . . . , Xn 7→ tn}
where the domain of σ is Dom(σ) = {X1, . . . , Xn} and the set of variables
introduced by terms t1, . . . , tn is written Ran(σ). The identity substitution is
id. Substitutions are homomorphically extended to TΣ(X ). The application
of a substitution σ to a term t is denoted by tσ. For simplicity, we assume
that every substitution is idempotent, i.e., σ satisfies Dom(σ)∩Ran(σ) = ∅.
Substitution idempotency ensures tσ = (tσ)σ. The restriction of σ to a
set of variables V is σ|V ; sometimes we write σ|t1,...,tn to denote σ|V where
V = Var(t1) ∪ · · · ∪ Var(tn). Composition of two substitutions is denoted
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by σσ′. Combination of two substitutions is denoted by σ ∪ σ′. We call an
idempotent substitution σ a variable renaming if there is another idempotent
substitution σ−1 such that (σσ−1)|Dom(σ) = id.
A Σ-equation is an unoriented pair t = t′, where t, t′ ∈ TΣ(X )s for some
sort s ∈ S. Given Σ and a set E of Σ-equations, order-sorted equational
logic induces a congruence relation =E on terms t, t′ ∈ TΣ(X ) (see [90]).
Throughout this thesis we assume that TΣ,s 6= ∅ for every sort s, because this
affords a simpler deduction system. An equational theory (Σ, E) is a pair
with Σ an order-sorted signature and E a set of Σ-equations.
The E-subsumption preorder vE (or just v if E is understood) holds
between t, t′ ∈ TΣ(X ), denoted t vE t′ (meaning that t′ is more general than
t modulo E), if there is a substitution σ such that t =E t′σ; such a substitution
σ is said to be an E-match from t to t′. The E-renaming equivalence t ≈E t′,
holds if there is a variable renaming θ such that tθ =E t′. We write t <E t′
if t vE t′ and t 6≈E t′. Relations ≈E and <E are extended to substitutions
in a similar way. For substitutions σ, ρ and a set of variables V we define
σ|V =E ρ|V if xσ =E xρ for all x ∈ V ; σ|V vE ρ|V if there is a substitution η
such that σ|V =E (ρη)|V ; and σ|V ≈E ρ|V if there is a renaming η such that
(ση)|V =E ρ|V . We write σ <E σ′ if σ vE σ′ and σ 6≈E σ′.
An E-unifier for a Σ-equation t = t′ is a substitution σ such that tσ =E
t′σ. For Var(t)∪Var(t′) ⊆ W , a set of substitutions CSUWE (t = t′) is said to
be a complete set of unifiers for the equation t = t′ modulo E away from W
iff: (i) each σ ∈ CSUWE (t = t′) is an E-unifier of t = t′; (ii) for any E-unifier
ρ of t = t′ there is a σ ∈ CSUWE (t = t′) such that ρ|W vE σ|W ; (iii) for all
σ ∈ CSUWE (t = t′), Dom(σ) ⊆ (Var(t) ∪ Var(t′)) and Ran(σ) ∩W = ∅. If
the set of variables W is irrelevant or is understood from the context, we
write CSUE(t = t′) instead of CSUWE (t = t
′). An E-unification algorithm is
complete if for any equation t = t′ it generates a complete set of E-unifiers.
Note that this set needs not be finite. A unification algorithm is said to be
finitary and complete if it always terminates after generating a finite and
complete set of solutions. A unification algorithm is said to be minimal if it
always provides a maximal (w.r.t. vE) set of unifiers, i.e., for any two unifiers
ρ1, ρ2 ∈ CSUWE (t = t′) such that ρ1|W 6=E ρ2|W , we have that ρ1|W 6vE ρ2|W
and ρ2|W 6vE ρ1|W .
A rewrite rule is an oriented pair l → r, where Var(r) ⊆ Var(l) and
l, r ∈ TΣ(X )s for some sort s ∈ S. An (unconditional) order-sorted rewrite
9
theory is a triple (Σ, Ax,R) with Σ an order-sorted signature, Ax a set of
Σ-equations, and R a set of rewrite rules. The rewriting relation on TΣ(X ),
written t→R t′ or t→p,R t′ holds between t and t′ iff there exist p ∈ PosΣ(t),
l → r ∈ R and a substitution σ, such that t|p = lσ, and t′ = t[rσ]p. The
subterm t|p is called a redex. The relation→R/Ax on TΣ(X ) is =Ax;→R; =Ax.
Note that →R/Ax on TΣ(X ) induces a relation →R/Ax on the free (Σ, Ax)-
algebra TΣ/Ax(X ) by [t]Ax →R/Ax [t′]Ax iff t →R/Ax t′. The transitive (resp.
transitive and reflexive) closure of →R/Ax is denoted →+R/Ax (resp. →∗R/Ax).
We say that a term t is→R/Ax-irreducible (or just R/Ax-irreducible) if there
is no term t′ such that t→R/Ax t′.
For a rewrite rule l → r, we say that it is sort-decreasing if for each
substitution σ, we have rσ ∈ TΣ(X )s implies lσ ∈ TΣ(X )s. We say a rewrite
theory (Σ, Ax,R) is sort-decreasing if all rules in R are. For a Σ-equation
t = t′, we say that it is regular if Var(t) = Var(t′), and it is sort-preserving if
for each substitution σ, we have tσ ∈ TΣ(X )s implies t′σ ∈ TΣ(X )s and vice
versa. We say an equational theory (Σ, E) is regular, resp. sort-preserving,
if all equations in E are.
For substitutions σ, ρ and a set of variables V we define σ|V →R/Ax ρ|V
if there is x ∈ V such that xσ →R/Ax xρ and for all other y ∈ V we have
yσ =Ax yρ. A substitution σ is called R/Ax-normalized (or normalized) if
xσ is R/Ax-irreducible for all x ∈ V .
We say that the relation →R/Ax is terminating if there is no infinite se-
quence t1 →R/Ax t2 →R/Ax · · · tn →R/Ax tn+1 · · · . We say that the relation
→R/Ax is confluent if whenever t →∗R/Ax t′ and t →∗R/Ax t′′, there exists a
term t′′′ such that t′ →∗R/Ax t′′′ and t′′ →∗R/Ax t′′′. An order-sorted rewrite
theory (Σ, Ax,R) is confluent (resp. terminating) if the relation →R/Ax is
confluent (resp. terminating). In a confluent, terminating, sort-decreasing,
order-sorted rewrite theory, for each term t ∈ TΣ(X ), there is a unique (up
to Ax-equivalence) R/Ax-irreducible term t′ obtained from t by rewriting
to canonical form, which is denoted by t →!R/Ax t′, or t↓R/Ax when t′ is not
relevant.
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2.1 The Maude Tool
The Maude tool [31] is a high-performance implementation of rewriting logic.
It allows equational specification in functional modules, corresponding to
equational theories (Σ, E∪Ax), and full rewrite theories R = (Σ, E∪Ax,R)
can be specified as system modules. In functional modules other modules can
be included, sorts and subsorts can be declared and operator symbols can
be defined, possibly with equational attributes (called axioms) like associa-
tivity, commutativity and/or identity. Sorts, subsorts, conditional equations
and memberships define the computations that are possible. Reasonable ex-
ecutability requirements are needed to make a module admissible (see [31],
Sections 4.6 and 6.3), including termination (modulo axioms), ground con-
fluence and sort-decreasingness. Then, Maude can execute the module by
equational simplification modulo the axioms, where the equations in E are
used as rules from left to right and Maude’s built-in matching for the axioms
Ax leads for each term t to its canonical form with a least sort. For func-
tional modules this yields an operational semantics, defined by the algebra
of canonical forms CanΣ/E∪Ax corresponding to the initial algebra semantics
given by TΣ/E∪Ax (see Sections 4.6-4.8 in [31]). Equational simplification
modulo axioms is executed by the reduce command in Maude.
In order to be admissible, a system module has to, in addition to its equa-
tional component being admissible, satisfy the ground coherence requirement
of its rules R with respect to equations in E and also needs to ensure that
all variables in rules can be instantiated by (incremental) matching. Such a
module can be executed in Maude by rewriting with the rules and oriented
equations modulo axioms Ax. This is exactly the mathematical semantics
of R. Rewrites in a system module are performed in Maude by the rewrite
command which is position-fair and rule-fair. There is also breadth-first
search available using the search command. A linear temporal logic (LTL)
model checker is built-in for safety and liveness properties.
2.2 Maude-NPA
The Maude-NPA [48] is a cryptographic protocol specification and analysis
engine based on rewriting logic and implemented in the Maude tool. It
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supports cryptographic protocol analysis dealing explicitly with algebraic
properties. See Chapters 5 and 6 for more details.
2.3 Internet Explorer
Internet Explorer (IE) is a widely used web browser created by Microsoft.
Because of its wide adoption, IE has been a prime target for security attacks,
leading to many well-known security violations. The analysis in this thesis
has been executed on IE version 6.5 and had a substantial impact on IE
version 7. The browser is written in a monolithic style in which just about
any component can interact with any other component, and in practice does
so, mostly for historical reasons.
2.4 Illinois Browser Operating System
The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) [117] is a modern, security-
conscious web browser designed at the University of Illinois and is integrated
into a secure operating system. The basic idea is to go away from the mono-
lithic approach and modularize the different processes of the browser. There
is only one truly trusted process, the kernel. All other processes, like, e.g.,
web page instances, network processes, storage, etc., are not trusted. Secu-
rity of all non-compromised components is desired, even with some compro-
mised components in the mix. For that reason, all communication has to go
through the kernel, which will allow or disallow it based on defined policies.
See Chapter 4 for more details.
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CHAPTER 3
GUI LOGIC ANALYSIS FOR IE
This chapter is based on joint work with Shuo Chen, Jose´ Meseguer, Helen
Wang and Yi-Min Wang and has been partially published in [23]. To achieve
end-to-end security, traditional machine-to-machine security measures are in-
sufficient if the integrity of the human-computer interface is compromised.
GUI logic flaws are a category of software vulnerabilities that result from
logic bugs in GUI design/implementation. Visual spoofing attacks that ex-
ploit these flaws can lure even security conscious users to perform unintended
actions. The focus of this chapter is to formulate the problem of GUI logic
flaws and to develop a methodology for uncovering them in software im-
plementations. Specifically, based on an in-depth study of key subsets of
Internet Explorer (IE) browser source code, we have developed in [23] a for-
mal model for the browser GUI logic and have applied formal reasoning to
uncover new spoofing scenarios, including nine for status bar spoofing and
four for address bar spoofing. The IE development team has confirmed all
these scenarios and has fixed most of them in their latest build. Through
this work, we demonstrate that a crucial subset of visual spoofing vulnerabil-
ities originate from GUI logic flaws, which have a well-defined mathematical
meaning allowing a systematic analysis.
Today, the trustworthiness of the web relies on the use of machine-to-
machine security protocols (e.g., SSL or TLS) to provide authentication over
the Internet to ensure that the client software (i.e., the browser) communi-
cates with the intended server. However, such trustworthiness can be easily
shattered by the last link between the client machine and its user. Indeed,
the user-interface trust should be considered as a part of the trusted path
problem in secure communications [45, 59, 128].
The exposure of the weakness between computer and human is not lim-
ited to non-technical social engineering attacks where naive users are fooled
into clicking on an arbitrary hyperlink and download malicious executables
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Figure 3.1: (a) Status Bar Spoofing - (b) Address Bar Spoofing
without any security awareness.
Even for a technology-savvy and security-conscious user, this last link
can be spoofed visually. As shown in Figure 3.1(a), even if a user examines
the status bar of the email client before she clicks on a hyperlink, she will
not be able to tell that the status bar is spoofed and she will navigate to an
unexpected web site, instead of https://www.paypal.com. Furthermore, as
shown in Figure 3.1(b), even if a user checks the correspondence between the
URL displayed in the browser address bar and the top level web page con-
tent, she will not realize that the address bar is spoofed and the page comes
from a malicious web site. Indeed, the combination of the email status bar
spoofing and the browser address bar spoofing can give a rather “authentic”
navigation experience to a faked PayPal page. Even SSL is not helpful - as
shown in Figure 3.1(b), the spoofed page contains a valid PayPal certificate.
Obviously, this can result in many bad consequences, such as identity theft
(e.g. phishing), malware installation, and spreading of faked news.
Visual spoofing attack is a generic term referring to any technique using
a misleading GUI to gain trust from the user. Design/implementation flaws
enabling such attacks are already a reality and have been sporadically discov-
ered in commodity browsers [18, 19, 20], including IE, Firefox, and Netscape
Navigator. This chapter focuses on a class of visual spoofing attacks that
exploit GUI logic flaws, which are bugs in the GUI’s design/implementation
that allow the attacker to present incorrect information in parts of the au-
thentic GUI that the user trusts, such as the email client status bar and
the browser address bar. Figure 3.1(a) and (b) are just two instances of
many such flaws that we discovered using the methodology described in this
chapter, which expands the ideas presented in [23].
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A second class of visual spoofing attack, which has been extensively dis-
cussed in previous research work [37, 59, 126, 128], is to exploit graphical
similarities. These attacks exploit picture-in-picture rendering [128] (i.e., a
faked browser window drawn inside a real browser window), chromeless win-
dow (e.g., a window without the address bar or the status bar [59, 128]),
popup window covering the address bar, and symbol similarity (e.g., “1” vs.
“l”, “vv” vs. “w” [37], and non- English vs. English characters). We do not
consider such attacks in this chapter, but in Section 3.4 we briefly discuss
how the graphical similarity problems are being addressed by researchers and
browser vendors.
Our goal is to formulate the GUI logic problem and to develop a system-
atic methodology for uncovering logic flaws in GUI implementations. This is
analogous to the body of work devoted to catching software implementation
flaws, such as buffer overruns, data races, and deadlocks, through the means
of static analysis or formal methods. Nevertheless, a unique challenge in
finding GUI logic flaws is that these flaws are about what the user sees —
user’s vision and actions are integral parts of the spoofing attacks. Thus, the
modeled system should include not only the GUI logic itself, but also how
the user interacts with it.
In a nutshell, our methodology first requires mapping a visual invariant,
such as “the URL that a user navigates to must be the same as that indi-
cated on the status bar when the mouse hovers over an element in a static
HTML page”, to a well-defined program invariant, which is a Boolean con-
dition about user state and software state. This mapping is done based on
an in-depth understanding of the source code of the software. Our goal is
then to discover all possible inputs to the software which can cause the visual
invariant to be violated. In the example of finding status bar spoofing scenar-
ios, we want to discover all HTML document tree structures that can cause
the inconsistency between the URL indicated on the status bar and the URL
that the browser is navigating to upon a click event; the resulting HTML
tree structures can be used to craft instances of status bar spoofing attacks.
To systematically derive these scenarios, we employ a formal reasoning tool
to reason about the well-defined program invariant.
The methodology is applied to discover two classes of important GUI
logic flaws in IE. The first class is the static-HTML-based status-bar spoof-
ing. Flaws of this class are critical because static-HTML pages (i.e., pages
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without scripts) are considered safe to be rendered in email clients (e.g., Out-
look1 and Outlook Express) and to be hosted on blogging sites and social
networking sites (e.g., myspace.com), and the status bar is the only trust-
worthy information source for the user to see the target of a hyperlink. The
second class of flaws we studied is address bar spoofing, which allows a ma-
licious web site to hide its true URL and pretend to be a benign site. In
both case studies, we use the Maude formal reasoning tool [29] to derive
these spoofing scenarios, taking as input the browser GUI logic, program
invariants, and user actions.
We have discovered nine canonical HTML tree structures leading to status
bar spoofing and four scenarios of address bar spoofing. The IE development
team has confirmed these scenarios and fixed eleven of them in the latest
build, and scheduled to fix the remaining two in the next version. In addition
to finding these flaws, we made the interesting observation that many classic
programming errors, such as semantic composition errors, atomicity errors
and race conditions are also manifested in the context of GUI implemen-
tation. More importantly, this chapter demonstrates that GUI logic flaws
can be expressed in well-defined Boolean invariants, so that finding these
flaws can be done by exhaustively searching for violations of the Boolean
invariants.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives an
overview of our methodology. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present case studies on
status bar spoofing and address bar spoofing with IE. Section 3.4 discusses
issues related to GUI security. Related work is discussed in Section 3.5.
3.1 Overview of Our Methodology
Figure 3.2 gives a big picture overview of our approach, based on formal
analysis techniques. Existing formal analysis techniques have been success-
fully applied to reasoning about program invariants, e.g., the impossibility of
buffer overrun in a program, guaranteed mutual exclusion in an algorithm,
deadlock freedom in a concurrent system, secrecy in a cryptographic proto-
1Outlook does not show the target URL on the status bar, but on a small yellow tooltip
near the mouse cursor. Because IE, Outlook and Outlook Express use the same HTML
engine, most status bar spoofing scenarios can be transformed to email format to spoof
Outlook tooltip and Outlook Express status bar.
16
Figure 3.2: Overview of Our Methodology
col, and so on. These program invariants have well-defined mathematical
meaning. Uncovering GUI logic flaws, on the other hand, requires reasoning
about what the user sees. The “invariant” in the user’s vision does not have
an immediately obvious mathematical meaning. For example, the visual in-
variant of the status bar is that if the user sees foo.com on the status bar
before a mouse click, then the click must navigate to the foo.com page. It is
important to map such a visual invariant to a program invariant in order to
apply formal reasoning, which is shown as step (a) in Figure 3.2.
The mapping between a visual invariant and a program invariant is de-
termined by the logic of the GUI implementation, e.g., a browser’s logic for
mouse handling and page loading. An in-depth understanding of the logic is
crucial in deriving the program invariant. Towards this goal, we conducted
an extensive study of the source code of the IE browser to extract pseudo
code to capture the logic (shown as step (b)) which was then specified as
a rewrite theory in Maude. In addition, we needed to explicitly specify the
“system state” (shown as step (c)), including both the browser’s internal
state and possibly what the user memorizes. Steps (d) and (e) depict the
formalization of the user’s action sequence and the execution context as the
inputs to the program logic. The user’s action sequence is an important com-
ponent in the GUI logic problem. For example, the user may move and click
the mouse, or open a new page. Each action can change the system state.
To capture this we need to make an abstraction of the user’s capabilities as
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well as be exhaustive w.r.t. the remaining possible user action combinations.
Another input to specify is the execution context of the system, e.g., a web
page is an execution context for the mouse handling logic — the same logic
and the same user action, when executed on different web pages, can produce
different results. Again some abstraction and then exhaustive generation is
required.
When the user action sequence, the execution context, the program logic,
the system state and the program invariant are formally specified on the
reasoning engine, formal reasoning is performed to check if the user action
sequence applied to the system running in the execution context violates
the program invariant. Each discovered violation is output as a potential
spoofing scenario, which consists of the user action sequence, the execution
context and the inference steps leading to the violation. Finally, we manually
map each potential spoofing scenario back to a real-world scenario (shown
as step (f)). This involves an effort to construct a malicious web page that
sets up the execution context and lures the user to perform the actions. The
mappings (a)(b)(f) between the real world and the formal model are currently
done manually, some of which require significant effort. In this chapter, our
contribution is mainly to formalize the GUI logic problem. Reducing the
manual effort is future work.
3.2 Case Study 1: Status Bar Spoofing Based on
Static HTML
Many web attacks, such as browser buffer overruns, cross-site scripting at-
tacks, browser crossframe attacks and phishing attacks, require the user to
navigate to a malicious URL. Therefore, it is important for the user to know
the target URL of a navigation, which is displayed on the status bar before
the user clicks the mouse. Status bar spoofing is damaging if it can be con-
structed using only static HTML (i.e., without any active content such as
JavaScript), because: (i) email clients, e.g., Outlook and Outlook Express,
render static HTML contents only, and email is an important media to prop-
agate malicious messages; (ii) blogging sites and social networking sites (e.g.,
myspace.com) usually sanitize user-posted contents to remove scripts, but
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Figure 3.3: DOM Tree and Layout of an HTML Page
allow static HTML contents.2
3.2.1 Background: Representation and Layout of an HTML
Page
Background knowledge about HTML representation is a prerequisite for this
case study. We give a brief tutorial here. An HTML page is represented
as a tree structure, namely a Document Object Model tree, or DOM tree.
Figure 3.3 shows an HTML source file, its DOM tree, and the layout of
the page. The mapping from the source file (Figure 3.3(a)) to the DOM
tree (Figure 3.3(c)) is straightforward — element A enclosing element B is
represented by A being the parent of B in the DOM tree. The tree root is
a <html> element, which has a <head> subtree and a <body> subtree. The
<body> subtree is rendered in the browser’s content area. Since status bar
spoof is caused by user interactions with the content area, we focus on the
<body> subtree in this case study.
2A status bar spoof using a script is not a major security concern — it gets into a
chicken-and-egg situation: a well-known site does not run an arbitrary script supplied
from an arbitrary source. If the victim user has already been lured to a malicious site, the
goal of the spoofing has been achieved.
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Figure 3.3(b) shows the layouts of elements from the user’s viewpoint.
In general, parent elements have larger layouts to contain children elements.
Conceptually, these elements are stacked upwards (toward the user), with
<body> sitting at the bottom (see Figure 3.3(d)). In HTML, <a> represents
an anchor, and <img> represents an image.
3.2.2 Program Logic of Mouse Handling and Status Bar
Behavior
Mouse handling logic plays an important role in status bar spoofs. We ex-
tracted the logic from the IE source code. It is presented here using pseudo
code, which will be formalized into a rewrite theory in Section 3.2.3.
Central Logic
The mouse device can generate several raw messages. When a user moves
the mouse onto an element and clicks on it, the sequence of raw messages
consists of several MOUSEMOVEs, an LBUTTONDOWN (i.e., left button
down), and then a LBUTTONUP (i.e., left button up).
The core functions for mouse handling are called OnMouseMessage and
SendMsgToElem, which dispatch mouse messages to appropriate elements.
Every element has its specific virtual functions HandleMessage, DoClick
and ClickAction to implement the element’s behaviors.
Each raw mouse message invokes an OnMouseMessage call (pseudo code
shown in Table 3.1). The parameter element is the HTML element that is
immediately under the mouse cursor. The parameter message is the type
of the message, which can be either MOUSEMOVE, or LBUTTONDOWN,
or LBUTTONUP. An OnMouseMessage call can potentially send three mes-
sages to HTML elements in the DOM tree: (i) if element is different from
elementLastMouseOver, which is the element immediately under the mouse
in the most recent OnMouseMessage call, then a MOUSELEAVE message is
sent to elementLastMouseOver; (ii) the raw message itself (i.e., message) is
sent to element; (iii) if element is different from elementLastMouseOver, a
MOUSEOVER message is sent to element.
In the function SendMsgToElem(), btn is the closest Button ancestor



















until BubbleCanceled or loopElement is the root
if (message == LBUTTONUP)
element->DoClick() //handle mouse single click
}
Table 3.1: OnMouseMessage and SendMsgToElem
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then element becomes the button btn. It essentially means that any click
on a descendant of a button is treated as a click on the button. Then, a
message bubbling loop begins - starting from element, the virtual function
HandleMessage of every element along the DOM tree path is invoked. Each
HandleMessage call can cancel or continue the bubble (i.e., break out of or
continue the loop) by setting a Boolean BubbleCanceled. After the bub-
bling loop, a mouse click is handled by calling the virtual function DoClick
of element, when message is LBUTTONUP.
HTML Element Behaviors
An object class is implemented for each type of HTML element, such as
Anchor, Form, Button, InputField, Label, Image, etc. These object classes
inherit from the AbstractElement base class. The three virtual functions
of AbstractElement, namely, HandleMessage, DoClick and ClickAction,
implement default behaviors of real HTML elements. Function DoClick of
AbstractElement, written AbstractElement::DoClick, implements a loop
to invoke ClickAction of each element along the DOM tree path, similar
to the bubbling in SendMsgToElem. HandleMessage and ClickAction of
AbstractElement are basically “placeholders” - they simply return in order
to continue the bubble.
Each HTML element class can override these virtual functions given
in AbstractElement to implement its specific behaviors. A subset of vir-
tual functions of the Anchor, Label and Image elements is shown in Ta-
ble 3.2. These examples demonstrate the complexity of the mouse han-
dling logic due to the intrinsic behavioral diversity of individual elements
and the possible compositions. For example, when the mouse is over an
anchor, the target URL of this anchor will be displayed on the status
bar by calling SetStatusBar, and the bubble continues, as indicated in
Anchor::HandleMessage. When an anchor is clicked, FollowHyperlink
is called to jump to the target URL, and the bubble is canceled, as indi-
cated in Anchor::ClickAction. When the mouse is over a label, there is no
SetStatusBar call, and the bubble is canceled. According to the HTML
specification, a label can be associated with another element in the page,
which is called “ForElement”. Clicking on the label is equivalent to clicking
on ForElement, as shown in Label::ClickAction. An image element can
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return true; //cancel bubble
case MOUSEOVER:
SetStatusBar(targetURL)






































be associated with a map, which associates different screen regions on the
image with different target URLs. When the mouse is over a region, the URL
of the region is set to the status bar, as indicated in Image::HandleMessage.
When the mouse clicks on the region, a FollowHyperlink call is made, as
indicated in Image::ClickAction. If an image is not associated with a map,
then the URL of the containing anchor of the image (i.e., the closest ancestor
anchor of the image on the DOM) determines the status bar text and the
hyperlink to follow.
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Figure 3.4: Function Level View of Status Bar Spoof
3.2.3 Formalization of Status Bar Spoofing
The visual invariant of the status bar is intuitively that the target URL of
a click must be identical to the URL displayed on the status bar when the
user stops the mouse movement. The negation of this invariant defines a
spoofing scenario (Figure 3.4): First, MOUSEMOVE messages on elements
O1, O2, ..., On invoke a sequence of OnMouseMessage calls. When the mouse
stops moving, the user inspects the status bar and memorizes benignURL.
Then, a LBUTTONDOWN and a LBUTTONUP message are received, re-
sulting in a FollowHyperlink(maliciousURL) call, where maliciousURL is
different from benignURL.
We now apply the approach described in Figure 3.2.
(1) Specifying system state and state transitions (Step (c) in Figure 3.2).
System State includes the browser state statusBar and the user state
memorizedURL. State transitions are triggered by the SetStatusBar action
and the user’s Inspection action as below, where AL is an arbitrary action
list.
op Inspection : -> Action .
op SetStatusBar : URL -> Action .
vars AL : ActionList . vars Url Url’ : URL .
rl [SetStatusBar(Url) ; AL ] statusBar(Url’)
=> [AL] statusBar(Url) .
rl [Inspection ; AL] statusBar(Url) memorizedURL(Url’)
=> [AL] statusBar(Url) memorizedURL(Url) .
The first rule specifies the semantics of SetStatusBar(Url): if the cur-
rent action list starts with a SetStatusBar(Url) action, and the status bar
displays Url’, then after this action is completed, it disappears from the
action list, and the status bar is updated to Url. The second rule specifies
the Inspection action: if statusBar displays Url, the memorizedURL is an
arbitrary value Url’, and the action list starts with Inspection, then after
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Table 3.3: Rules to specify HandleMessage and ClickAction of Anchor
ceq [AnchorHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL] *** equation 1
= [cancelBubble ; AL]
if M == LBUTTONUP or M == LBUTTONDOWN .
crl [AnchorHandleMessage(O,M); AL] <O |targetURL: Url , ...>
=> [SetStatusBar(Url) ; AL] < O | targetURL: Url , ...>
if M == MOUSEOVER . *** rule 2
ceq [AnchorHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL] *** equation 3
= [no-op ; AL]
if M =/= LBUTTONUP, LBUTTONDOWN or MOUSEOVER .
crl [AnchorClickAction(O) ; AL] < O | targetURL: Url , ... >
=> [FollowHyperlink(Url) ; cancelBubble ; AL]
< O | targetURL: Url , ... > . *** rule 4
the inspection is made, Inspection disappears from the action list, and the
URL on the status bar is copied to the user’s memory, i.e., memorizedURL.
(2) Modeling the program logic (Step (b) in Figure 3.2). Modeling the
functions shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 is straightforward using Maude,
e.g., HandleMessage and ClickAction of the Anchor element are specified
in Table 3.3. Other functions are modeled in a similar manner.
It is easy to verify that these rules and equations indeed faithfully specify
the behaviors of an anchor shown in Table 3.1: Equation 1 specifies that
if an action list starts with an AnchorHandleMessage(M,O) action, this ac-
tion should rewrite to a cancelBubble, if M is LBUTTONUP or LBUTTONDOWN.
Rule 2 specifies that AnchorHandleMessage(M,O) should indeed rewrite to
SetStatusBar(Url) when handling MOUSEOVER, where Url is the target URL
of the anchor. For any other type of message M, AnchorHandleMessage(M,O)
should rewrite to no-op to continue the bubble, which is specified by equa-
tion 3. Rule 4 rewrites AnchorClickAction(O) to the concatenation of
FollowHyperlink(Url) and cancelBubble, where Url is the target URL
of the anchor.
(3) Specifying the program invariant (Step (a) in Figure 3.2). A key
question is how to define the negation of the program invariant to find status
bar spoofs. It is specified as the pattern searched for in the search command:
ops maliciousUrl benignUrl empty : URL .




=>! [FollowHyperlink(maliciousUrl) ; AL]
statusBar(Url) memorizedUrl(benignUrl) X:StateMultiSet .
The command gives a well-defined mathematical meaning to status bar
spoofing scenarios: “the Maude initial term CanonicalActionSeq(O1,O2)
ExecutionContext statusBar(empty) memorizedUrl(empty) can be
rewritten to the term [FollowHyperlink (maliciousUrl) ; AL]
statusBar(Url) memorizedUrl(benignUrl), which indicates that the user
memorizes benignURL, but FollowHyperlink(maliciousUrl) is the next
action to be performed by the browser”.
Before going to the results there are two more things that we need to
discuss. The CanonicalActionSeq(O1,O2) above is the representation of
the generation of the user input, and ExecutionContext is the simplified
representation of the execution context currently considered. As such, in
some reading, both of these are not part of the state space exploration, but
rather they generate a (set of) initial states for that exploration.
(4) Specifying the user action sequence and the execution context (Steps
(d) and (e) in Figure 3.2). A challenging question is how the spoofing pos-
sibilities can be systematically explored, given that the web page can be
arbitrarily complex and the user’s action sequence can be arbitrarily long.
Canonicalization is a common form of abstraction used in formal reasoning
practice to handle a complex problem space. For this particular problem,
our goal is to map a set of user action sequences to a single canonical action
sequence, and map a set of web pages to a single canonical DOM tree. Be-
cause any instance in the original problem space only trivially differs from
its canonical form, we only need to explore the canonical state space to find
all “representative” instances.
(4.1) Canonicalization of the user action sequence. In general the user
action sequence consists of a number of mouse moves, followed by a status bar
inspection, followed by a mouse click (button down and up). In a canonical
action sequence, the number of mouse moves can be reduced to two. This
is because, although each MOUSEMOVE can potentially update the status
bar, the status bar is a memoryless object, which means: (i) upon every
mouse action, how to update the status bar does not depend on any previous
update, but only on the DOM tree branch corresponding to the current
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mouse coordinates; (ii) the whole sequence of status bar updates is equivalent
to the last update. Thus, a canonical action sequence from element O1 to
element O2 can be represented by the equation below, where the semicolon
denotes sequential composition, and the MOUSEOVER on O1 invokes the
last update of the status bar before the mouse arrives at O2 (O1 and O2 can
be identical).
op CanonicalActionSeq: Element Element -> ActionList .
eq CanonicalActionSeq (O1,O2)





Note here that we use an equation instead of a rule. The difference
between these is that an equation specifies a functional computation while a
rule specifies a (possibly nondeterministic) state transition.
(4.2) Canonicalization of the execution context (i.e., DOM trees). In gen-
eral a DOM tree may have arbitrarily many branches, but we can restrict the
number of branches of a canonical DOM tree to at most two. This is because
the canonical action sequence contains at most two MOUSEMOVEs — the
third branch of the DOM tree would be superfluous as it would not receive
any mouse message. Each HTML element in the DOM tree is represented
as an object with a unique identifier, a class, a parent attribute (specifying
the DOM tree structure) and possibly other attributes. We currently model
Anchor, Button, Form, Image, InputField and Label element classes, plus
a Body element always at the root. For example, the term
< O | class:anchor, parent:O’ >
represents anchor element O whose parent is O’. Our analysis is restricted to
canonical DOM trees of bounded size but sufficiently rich to uncover useful
scenarios.
We have analyzed all one- and two-branch DOM trees with at most six
elements. At the level of most elements in this analysis all resulting spoofs
were instances of simpler, smaller examples already. Also, keep in mind
there are only seven HTML elements being modeled, and we also specify the
generation rules so that all canonical DOM trees satisfy the required HTML
wellformedness restrictions. E.g., an anchor cannot be embedded in another
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of Scenario 1
anchor, an InputField can only be a leaf node, etc. The generation of all
these initial canonical execution contexts is done in the tool as part of the
search command shown above. Combined with the generation of canonical
user action sequences, one for each possible movement, i.e., one for each pair
of HTML elements, this initial state space generation creates the starting
point from which the execution of our model runs.
3.2.4 Scenarios Suggested by the Results
The scenarios are found by running the above-mentioned search command
which first generates the execution context and action sequence and then
executes the resulting system to completion.
We found nine combinations of canonical DOM trees and user action
sequences that resulted in violations of the program invariant. All were
due to unintended compositions of multiple HTML elements features. This
section presents four representative scenarios in detail.
Shown in Figure 3.5, Scenario 1 has an InputField embedded in an
anchor, and the anchor is embedded in a form.
When the mouse is over the InputField, the HandleMessage of each
element is called to handle the MOUSEOVER message that bubbles up to
the DOM tree root. Only the anchor’s HandleMessage writes its target
URL paypal.com to the status bar, but when the InputField is clicked,
its ClickAction method retrieves the target URL from the form element,
which is foo.com. This scenario indicates the flaw in message bubbling —
the MOUSEOVER bubbles up to the anchor, but the click is directly passed
from the InputField to the form, skipping the anchor.
Scenario 2 (Figure 3.6) is very different from Scenario 1: an img (i.e.,
image) associated with a map ppl is on top of a button. The target URL
of ppl is set to paypal.com. When img gets a MOUSEOVER, it sets the
status bar to paypal.com and cancels the bubble. When the mouse is clicked
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of Scenario 2
Figure 3.7: Illustration of (a) Scenario 3 and (b) Scenario 4
on img, because img is a child of button, the click is treated as a click on
the button, according to the implementation of SendMsgToElem(). The
button click, of course, leads to a navigation to foo.com. This scenario
indicates a design flaw — an element (e.g., button) can hijack the click from
its child, but it does not hijack the MOUSEOVER message, and thus causes
the inconsistency.
Scenario 3 contains a label embedded in an anchor (Figure 3.7(a)). When
the mouse is moved toward the label, it must first pass over the anchor,
and thus sets paypal.com on the status bar. When the label is clicked, the
page is navigated to foo.com, because the label is associated with an anchor
of foo.com. An opposite scenario shown as scenario 4 in Figure 3.7(b) seems
more surprising, which suggests an outward mouse movement from a child
to a parent. Such a movement makes it feasible to spoof the status bar using
an img sitting on top of a label. Note that, because HTML syntax only
allows an img to be a leaf node, such an outward mouse movement, which is
suggested by the Maude analysis, is critical in the spoofing attack.
We also derived several scenarios with two-branch DOM trees. They
demonstrate the varieties of DOM trees and layout arrangements that can
be utilized in spoofing, e.g., a spoof page places the two leafs side-by-side,
another page uses Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) [97] to set element positions,
etc.
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3.3 Case Study 2: Address Bar Spoofing
Address bar spoofing is another category of spoofing attack. It fools users
into trusting the current page when it comes from an untrusted source. The
combination of a status bar spoofing and an address bar spoofing gives an
end-to-end scenario to hide the identity of the malicious site, and thus is a
serious security threat. In this section, we first introduce the background
knowledge about the address bar logic, then present the Maude-based anal-
ysis technique and real spoofing scenarios uncovered by the analysis.
3.3.1 Background: Address Bar Basics
An IE process can create multiple browsers. Each one is implemented as
a thread. A browser, built on the OLE framework [98], is a container (in-
cluding the title bar, the address bar, the status bar, etc.) hosting a client
document in the content area. Many types of client documents can be hosted
in IE, such as HTML, Microsoft Word, Macromedia Flash and PDF. The ob-
ject used to represent an HTML document is called a renderer. A renderer
can host multiple frames, each displaying an HTML page downloaded from
a URL.
An HTML page is stored as a markup data structure. A markup con-
sists of the URL and the DOM tree of the content from the URL. The top
level frame, i.e., the one associated with the entire content area, is called the
primaryFrame of the renderer. Figure 3.8 shows a browser displaying a page
from http://MySite. The renderer has three frames — PrimaryFrame
from MySite, Frame1 from PayPal.com and Frame2 from MSN.com. Each
frame is associated with a current markup and, at the navigation time,
a pending markup. Upon navigation completion, the pending markup is
switched in and becomes the current markup.
Informally, the program invariant of the address bar correctness is that:
(1) the content area is rendered according to the current markup of prima-
ryFrame; and (2) the URL on the address bar is the URL of the current
markup of primaryFrame. In the example shown in Figure 3.8, the address
bar should display “http://MySite”.
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Figure 3.8: Browser, Renderer, Frames and Markups
3.3.2 Overview of the HTML Navigation Logic
HTML navigation consists of multiple tasks — loading HTML content, switch-
ing markup, completing navigation and rendering the page. A renderer has
an event queue to schedule these tasks. The event queue is a crucial mecha-
nism for handling events asynchronously, so that the browser is not blocked
to wait for the completion of the entire navigation. We studied three types
of navigation: (1) loading a page into the current renderer ; (2) traveling in
the history of the current renderer ; and (3) opening a page in a new ren-
derer. Figure 3.9 only illustrates a small subset of functions involved in the
navigations for better readability.
Figure 3.9(a) shows the event sequence of loading a page in the cur-
rent renderer. It is initiated by a FollowHyperlink, which posts a start
navigation event. Function PostMan is responsible for downloading the
new HTML content to a pending markup. Event ready is posted to invoke
SetInteractive, to make the downloaded contents effective.
SetInteractive first invokes SwitchMarkup to replace the current markup
with the pending markup, and calls NavigationComplete. If the downloaded
markup belongs to primaryFrame, function SetAddressBar is invoked to up-
date its address bar. An Ensure event is posted by SwitchMarkup, which
invokes EnsureView to construct a View structure containing element lay-
outs derived from the current markup of primaryFrame. The OS periodically
posts an OnPaint event to paint the content area by calling RenderView. Fig-
ure 3.9(b) shows the event sequence of a history travel. History Back and
Travel look up a history log to initialize the navigation. PostMan, in this
case, loads HTML contents from a persistent storage in the hard disk, rather
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Figure 3.9: Logic of HTML Navigations
than from the Internet. The remaining portion of the sequence is similar to
that of Figure 3.9(a).
Figure 3.9(c) shows the event sequence of loading a new page into a new
renderer. WindowOpen is the starting point. It calls the method
CreatePendingDocObject to create a new renderer and then calls
SetClientSite. SetClientSite prepares a number of Boolean flags as
the properties of the new renderer, and calls InitDocHost to associate the
renderer with the browser (i.e., the container). The new renderer at this
moment is still empty. The start-loading event invokes LoadDocument
which first calls SetAddressBar to set the address bar and then calls Load
which calls LoadFromInfo. CreateMarkup and SwitchMarkup are called from
LoadFromInfo before posting a download-content event to download the
actual content for the newly created markup. Function PostMan does the
downloading as above. The remainder of the sequence is similar to both
prior sequences.
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3.3.3 Formalization of the Navigations and the Address Bar
Behavior
(1) Modeling the system state (Step (c) in Figure 3.2). Because an address
bar spoofing is by definition the inconsistency between the address bar and
the content area of the same browser, “spoofability” is a property of the
logic of a single browser. This does not mean that only one browser is
allowed in a spoofing scenario — there can be other browsers that create a
hostile execution context to trigger a logic flaw in one particular browser.
Nevertheless, we only need to model the system as one browser and prove its
logical correctness (or uncover its flaws), and treat the overall effect of other
browsers as the context of this browser.
The system state of a browser includes the URL displayed in the ad-
dress bar, the URL of the View in the content area, a travel log and the
primary frame. The Maude specification defines a set of Frames and a set of
Markups. For example, if Markup m1 is downloaded from URL u1, and it is
the currentMarkup of Frame f1, we specify f1 and u1 as:
<f1 | currentMarkup: m1, pendingMarkup: ...>
<m1 | URL: u1, frame: f1, ...>
The system state also includes a function call queue and an event queue.
The function call queue is denoted as [call1 ; call2 ; ... ; calln],
and the event queue is denoted as {event1 ; eventn ; ... ; eventn}.
(2) Specifying the user action sequence (Step (d) in Figure 3.2). In the
scenario of an address bar spoofing, the user’s only action is to access an un-
trusted HTML page. The page contains a JavaScript calling navigation func-
tions FollowHyperlink, HistoryBack and/or WindowOpen. The behavior of
the JavaScript is modeled by a rule that conditionally appends a navigation
call to the function list. As explained in Figure 3.9, each navigation call gen-
erates a sequence of events. It is guaranteed that all possible interleavings of
event sequences are exhaustively searched, because Maude explores all viable
rewrite orders.
(3) Specifying the execution context (Step (e) in Figure 3.2). Many
Boolean conditions affect the execution path, e.g., conditions to return from
a function and conditions to create a new frame. These conditions consti-
tute the execution context of the system. We defined rules to explore both
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Rewrite Rule to Specify SetInteractive
var F : Frame . var M : Markup . var FQ : FunctionQueue .
rl [SetInteractive(M) ; FQ] < M | frame : F , ... >
=> [(if BOOLEXP1 != true
then SwitchMarkup(M,F) else noop fi) ;
(if BOOLEXP2 == true
then NavigationComplete(F) else noop fi) ; FQ]
< M | frame: F , ... > .
possible paths depending on the true and false values of these conditions.
Therefore the search command explores both paths at each branch in the
pseudo code. The assignments of the Boolean conditions, combined with the
function call sequence, constitute a potential spoofing scenario. These may
include false positive scenarios, in the sense that such Boolean values cannot
at the same time be attained by different variables, and thus, as shown in
Figure 3.2, mapping a potential scenario back to the real-world is important.
It is a manual effort guided by the formally derived potential scenarios. We
discuss this in Section 3.3.4.
(4) Modeling Function Calls and Events (Step (b) in Figure 3.2). There
are three types of actions shown in Figure 3.9: calling a function, invok-
ing an event handler and posting an event. A function call is implemented
as a term substitution in the function call queue. For example, the func-
tion call SetInteractive is specified by the following rule in Table 3.4,
where F is the frame of Markup M, and SetInteractive(M) can condi-
tionally rewrite to SwitchMarkup(M,F) (if BOOLEXP1 is false) followed by
NavigationComplete(F) (if BOOLEXP2 is true).
Posting of an event happens by appending the event to the event queue,
for example, FollowHyperlink is specified by removing itself from the func-
tion queue and adding a startNavigation event to the end of the event queue.
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var U : Url . var F : Frame .
var FQ : FunctionQueue . var EQ : EventQueue .
rl [FollowHyperlink(U, F) ; FQ] { EQ }
=> [FQ] { EQ ; startNavigation(U, F) } .
The third type of action is the invocation of an event handler. Any event
can only be invoked when its previous event handler returns. To model this
restriction, any rule of an event handler invocation specifies that the first
event in the event queue can be dequeued and translated into a function
call only when the function queue is empty. Below is the rule to specify the
handling of the ready event, which invokes the handler SetInteractive.
var EQ : EventQueue .
rl [empty] { ready(M) ; EQ }
=> [SetInteractive(M)] { EQ } .
5) Specifying the program invariant of address bar correctness (Step (a)
in Figure 3.2). A good state is a state where the URL on the address bar
matches the URL of the View and is also the URL of the content that is
painted on the screen. In addition to that, the URL is the URL of the
currentMarkup of the primaryFrame. Therefore the program invariant is
defined by the following goodState predicate:
var U: URL . var F : Frame . var M : Markup .
equation goodState (addressBar(U) urlOfView(U)
urlPaintedOnScreen(U) primaryFrame(F)
< F | currentMarkup: M , ...> < M | url: U , ...>)
= true .
It is also important to specify the initial state for the search command.
In the initial state, both the event queue and the function call queue are
empty. The primaryFrame is f1. The currentMarkup of f1 is m0. The
pendingMarkup of f1 is uninitialized. m0 is downloaded from URL0. The
address bar displays URL0, the View is derived from URL0, and the View is
painted on the screen. The following equation specifies initialState:
const f1:Frame m0:Markup url0:URL empty:EventQueue
equation initialState
= { empty } [ empty ] primaryFrame(f1)
< f1 | currentMarkup: m0 , pendingMarkup: nil >
< m0 | url: url0 , frame: f1 > addressBar(url0)
urlOfView(url0) urlPaintedOnScreen(url0) .
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3.3.4 Uncovered Spoofing Scenarios
We used Maude’s search command to find all execution paths in the model
that start with the initial state and finish in a bad state (i.e., denoted as “not
goodState” in Maude). The search was performed on two navigations, i.e.,
two FollowHyperlinks, two History Backs, one FollowHyperlink with one
History Back, and one WindowOpen with one FollowHyperlink. The gener-
ation of the states to be explored is done by the search command at runtime.
Whenever a condition could influence which path to take, we did not model
the condition’s value explicitly, but rather had two rules, one for each pos-
sible value of the condition, and then looking at the execution trace allowed
us to identify the rule being used (note all rules are labeled) and thus which
value the condition should have.
Each condition shown in Table 3.5 is present in at least one execution
context of a potential spoofing scenario uncovered by Maude. Some func-
tion names in the Location column were not shown in Figure 3.9, because
Figure 3.9 only shows a sketch of the logic of navigation, while the actual
model we implemented is more detailed (see Appendix A). The search result
in Table 3.5 provides a roadmap for a systematic investigation: (1) we have
verified that when each of these conditions is manually set to true in the cor-
responding location using a debugger, the real IE executable will be forced
to take an execution path leading to a stable bad state; therefore, our in-
vestigation should be focused on these conditions; (2) many other conditions
present in the pseudo code are not in Table 3.5, such as those conditions in
SwitchMarkup, LoadHistory and CreateRenderer, therefore these functions
do not need further investigation.
The versions in our study are IE 6 and IE 7 Beta 1 through Beta 3. In
the rest of this section, we will focus on conditions No. 2, 9, 11 and 18,
for which we have succeeded in constructing real spoofing scenarios. For the
other conditions, we have not found successful scenarios to make them real
without the debugger. They may be false positives due to the fact that our
model does not include the complete logic of updating and correlating these
conditions, but simply assumes that each condition can be true or false at
any point during the execution. In this sense, our address bar modeling is
not exact (too permissive). Because of the imprecision in modeling these
Boolean conditions, we need a considerable amount of effort to understand
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Table 3.5: Conditions of Potential Spoofing Scenarios
Location Condition
1 FireNavigationComplete GetHTMLWinUrl() = NULL
2 FireNavigationComplete GetPFD(bstrUrl) = NULL
3 FireNavigationComplete ActivatedView = true
4 NavigationComplete DontFireEvents = true
5 NavigationComplete DocInPP = true
6 NavigationComplete ViewWOC = true
7 NavigationComplete ObjectTG = true
8 NavigationComplete CreateDFU = true
9 SetAddressBar CurrentUrl = NULL
10 SetClientSite QIClassID()= OK
11 LoadHistory HTMLDoc = NULL
12 CreateMarkup NewMarkup = NULL
13 SetInteractive pPWindowPrxy = NULL
14 SetInteractive IsPassivating = true or
IsPassivated = true
15 SetInteractive HtmCtx() = NULL
16 SetInteractive HtmCtx()→BindResult = OK
17 EnsureView IsActive() = false
18 RenderView RSFC = NULL
their semantics. Constructing successful scenarios is still a non-trivial “secu-
rity hacking” task. Nevertheless, Table 3.5 provides a valuable roadmap to
narrow down our investigations.
Scenarios based on condition 2 and condition 9 (silent-return
conditions). For ease of presentation, we assume there is a malicious site
http://evil (or https://evil) in this section. The function call traces as-
sociated with condition 2 (i.e. GetPFD(url)= NULL in
FireNavigationComplete) and condition 9 (i.e. CurrentURL = NULL in
SetAddressBar) indicate similar spoofing scenarios: there are silent-return
conditions along the call stack of the address bar update. If any one of
these conditions is true, the address bar will remain unchanged, but the con-
tent area will be updated. Therefore, if the script first loads paypal.com
and then loads http://evil to trigger such a condition, the user will see
“http://paypal.com” on the address bar whereas the content area is from
http://evil.
We found that both condition 2 and condition 9 can be true when the
URL of the page has certain special formats. In each case, the function
37
Figure 3.10: Spoofing Scenario Due to a Race Condition
(i.e., FireNavigationComplete or SetAddressBar) cannot handle the spe-
cial URL, but instead of asserting the failure condition, the function silently
returns when the condition is encountered. For condition 9, we observed that
all versions of IE are susceptible; for condition 2, only IE 7 Beta 1 is suscepti-
ble, in which case even the SSL certificate of PayPal is present with the faked
page, because the certificate stays with the address bar. In other versions of
IE, although they have exactly the same silent-returning statement, condi-
tion 2 cannot be triggered because the special URL has been modified at an
earlier stage during the execution before GetPFD is called. However, even for
these seemingly unaffected versions, having the silent-returning condition is
still problematic — IE must guarantee that such a condition can never be
true in order to prevent the spoofing.
These two examples demonstrate a new challenge in graphical interface
design — atomicity is important. In the navigation scenarios, once the pend-
ing markup is switched in, the address bar update should be guaranteed to
succeed. No “silent return” should be allowed. Even in a situation where
atomicity is too difficult to guarantee, the browser should at least raise an
exception to halt its execution rather than leave it in an inconsistent state.
Scenario based on condition 11 (a race condition). Condition 11
is associated with a function call trace which indicates a situation where
two frames co-exist in a renderer and compete to be the primary frame.
Figure 3.10 illustrates this scenario.
The malicious script first loads Page 1 from https://evil. Then it in-
38
tentionally loads an error page (i.e., Page 2 ) in order to make conditional 11
true when LoadHistory() is called later. The race condition is exploited
at time t, when two navigations start at the same time. The following
event sequence results in a spoof: (1) the renderer starts to navigate to
https://paypal.com. At this moment, the primary frame is f1; (2) the
renderer starts to travel back in the history log. Because condition 11 is
true, i.e., HTMLDoc = NULL, a new frame f2 is created as the primary frame.
This behavior is according to the logic of LoadHistory(); (3) the markup
of https://evil in the history is switched into f2; (4) the address bar is
updated to https://evil; (5) the downloading of the paypal.com page is
completed, so its markup is switched into f1. Since f1 is not the primary
frame anymore, it will not be rendered in the content area; (6) the address
bar is updated to https://paypal.com despite the fact that f1 is no longer
the primary frame. When all these six events occur in such an order, the user
sees http://paypal.com on the address bar, but the https://evil page in
the content area. The SSL certificate is also spoofed because it gets updated
with the address bar.
This race condition can be exploited on IE 6, IE 7 Beta 1 and Beta 2 with
a high probability of success: in our experiments, the race condition could be
exploited more than half of the time. The exploit does not succeed in every
trial because event (5) and event (6) may occur before event (3) and event
(4), in which case the users sees the address “https://evil” on the address
bar.
It is worth noting that race conditions are likely to exist in the logic
supporting the tab-browsing mode as well, in which multiple renderers share
and compete for a single address bar.
Scenario based on condition 18 (a hostile environment). Condition
2 and condition 9 trigger the failures of address bar updates, while condition
18 (i.e., RSFC = NULL in RenderView) triggers the failure of the content area
update. We found that the condition can be true when a certain type of
system resource is exhausted. A malicious script is able to create such an en-
vironment by consuming a large amount of the resource and then navigating
the browser from http://evil to http://paypal.com.
When the timing of the navigation is appropriate, the browser will succeed
to update the address bar and fail to update the content area, leaving the
http://evil content and the paypal.com URL visible to the user.
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Once again, this example demonstrates the importance of atomicity in
graphical interface implementations. In addition to the correctness of the
internal logic of a browser, this scenario emphasizes the need for resilience
against a hostile execution environment.
3.4 Discussions
In order to better put our work into perspective, this section presents higher-
level discussions about possible defense techniques, other visual spoofing
flaws and various techniques for GUI logic analysis.
3.4.1 How to Defend Against GUI Logic Exploits
The most direct defense against spoofing attacks is bug fixing. All scenarios
that we have discovered have been confirmed by the IE development team. In
a build after IE 7 Beta 3, all the status bar spoofing bugs and two address bar
bugs have been fixed. Two other address bar bugs have been investigated,
and their fixes have been proposed.
In situations where the vendor’s patches are not yet available, vulnerability-
driven filtering can provide fast and easy-to-deploy patch-equivalent protec-
tion. In particular, our colleagues have explored the possibility of using
BrowserShield [104] to foil spoofing attacks. In BrowserShield, web pages are
intercepted at a browser extension, which injects a script-rewriting library
into the pages and sends them to the browser. The rewriting library is exe-
cuted during page rendering at the browser, and rewrites HTML pages and
any embedded scripts into safe equivalents. The equivalent safe pages con-
tain logic for recursively applying run-time checks according to policies that
detect and remove known attack patterns that we described earlier. In the
proof-of-concept implementation, they authored policies for both status-bar
spoofing removal and address-bar spoofing removal. The status bar policy is
to inject JavaScript code into static HTML contents to monitor the status
bar before the mouse click, and compare it with the URL argument of the
FollowHyperlink call. One of the address bar policies is to inject JavaScript
code to check if a URL can cause a silent failure of the address bar update.
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3.4.2 Achieving GUI Integrity is Challenging
The objective of this chapter is to bring the GUI logic problem to the atten-
tion of the research community, rather than claiming that the visual spoofing
problem as a whole can be solved in the short term. In particular, the fol-
lowing two questions are not addressed by this work.
(1) Is GUI-logic correctness important to users that are
security-unconscious and completely ignore any security indicators? User-
studies have raised the concern that many average users still lack the knowl-
edge or the attention to examine the information provided by security indi-
cators, such as the address bar, the status bar, SSL certificate and security
warning dialogs [37, 126]. Many users readily believe the authenticity of
whatever is displayed in the content area. We agree that this is the current
fact, and argue that a significant effort should be spent on user education
about secure browsing. But such an education would be ineffective without
the trustworthiness of the security indicators — if their information can be
spoofed, even we, as computer science professionals, do not know what to
trust. The success of anti-phishing must be achieved by a joint effort between
the browser vendors and the end users. It is analogous to automobile-safety:
drivers have the responsibility to buckle up, and the automobile manufactur-
ers need to guarantee that the seat-belts are effective.
(2) How to deal with other types of visual spoofs that are not due to GUI
logic flaws? In the introduction, we listed a few visual spoofing scenarios due
to graphical similarities. These issues have little to do with logic problems,
so their treatments are very different from the approach presented in this
chapter. For example, the current version of IE disallows a script from the
Internet zone to open a chromeless window (i.e., a window having only the
content area). It is also clearly specified in design that the URL displayed
on the address bar should be left-justified after each address bar update,
and no pop-up window can stay “always-on-top”, etc. SpoofStick is designed
to interpret any confusing URL on the address bar [116]; Dynamic Security
Skins [38] and Passpet [129] use trusted images to defeat certain spoofing
attacks. Ye and Smith proposed several ideas to implement trusted paths for
browsers by disallowing the page content elements to forge the page status
elements [128]. Virtual machine techniques have also been used to provide
trusted browser GUI elements, e.g., the Tahoma window manager provides
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a virtual screen abstraction to each browser instance [35]. Nevertheless,
when the internal GUI logic is flawed as shown in this chapter, ensuring
unforgeable GUI elements is not a remedy. Therefore, GUI logic flaw and
graphic similarity can be viewed as two different problems under the same
umbrella of visual spoofing.
3.4.3 A Broad Spectrum of Tools Can Be Used for Systematic
Exploration
The essence of our approach is that we systematically explore GUI logic.
Whether the exploration is done by symbolic formal analysis (such as theorem
proving or model checking) or by exhaustive testing is less important. As
an example of exhaustive testing, we used the binary instrumentation tool
Detours [75] to test the status bar logic. The basic idea is that since we know
the program invariant and how to generate canonical user action sequences
and canonical DOM trees, we can generate actual canonical HTML pages
and actual mouse messages to test the actual IE status bar implementation.
The advantage of the exhaustive testing approach is that it does not require
manual modeling of the behaviors of each HTML element, and therefore can
avoid the potential inaccuracies in the logic model. Applying this technique,
we were able to find all spoofs derived from our previous modeling.
Nevertheless, there is no fundamental difference as to whether the explo-
ration is done symbolically (e.g., by Maude) or by exhaustive testing (e.g.,
by Detours), because both techniques are based on the same understanding
of the search space and the test case construction. The main effort for the
symbolic exploration is to correctly specify the GUI logic in sufficient detail.
The exhaustive testing requires much effort to drive the system’s internal
state transitions. For example, to test the address bar logic, we would need
to exhaustively enumerate all event interleaving possibilities in an actual
renderer, which is a nontrivial task.
3.5 Related Work
The contributions of our work are: (1) the formulation of GUI logic correct-
ness as a research problem, and (2) the proposal of a systematic approach
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to uncover GUI logic flaws leading to visual spoofs. There is little existing
work related to our first contribution, but a wealth of work is related to the
second — formal methods and program analysis techniques have been suc-
cessful in discovering software reliability and security flaws. We summarize
a few techniques below.
The SLAM technique [14] uses theorem proving and model checking tools
to statically verify whether or not predefined “API usage rules” are obeyed in
large programs. A static driver verifier is built on the SLAM technique, and
has been deployed for Windows driver implementation correctness. Model
checking techniques are also developed to find file system bugs [127] and
security vulnerabilities [22] in large bodies of legacy source code. Much
research has been done in formal verification of security protocols [87]. A
static analysis technique is used for detecting higher level vulnerabilities such
as SQL injections, cross-site scripting, and HTTP splitting attacks [84]. Our
work is complementary to the existing research, because we have focused on
machine-user link trustworthiness.
Also related are research papers on phishing attacks, e.g., PwdHash is a
browser plug-in that transparently produces a different password for each site
to prevent phishing sites from obtaining usable passwords [106]. Florencio
and Herley designed a technique to detect password phishing by monitor-




BROWSER SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR
IBOS
In this chapter we present work that was in part done together with Sam
King, Shuo Tang and Jose´ Meseguer.
From Chapter 3 we already know about web browsers and some possible
attacks against them, specifically on the graphical user interface (GUI). In
this chapter we are going further than the post mortem analysis of GUI
security which was described in the previous chapter. We consider the idea
of basing the browser design on explicit security requirements to begin with.
And we look at bugs our browser analysis can find in the browser, as well as
discussing guarantees we can give if no bugs are found.
The notion of a browser that is to be secure by design is exemplified in the
work on the Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) [117] web browser,
which is a newly designed browser that builds upon the earlier work on the
OP2 [66] browser. OP2 also aimed at being secure by design and it did use
formal modeling and validation in Maude. We use IBOS as the basis of our
analysis in this chapter. Our analysis was able to influence the design, led
to bug fixes and has increased the overall assurance about the correctness of
IBOS.
In this chapter we get a result on the address bar being correct at all
times, which is an important property for a browser. We already know that
property from Chapter 3. Also, we are able to show that the browser adheres
to the same origin policy. The purpose of the same origin policy is to remove
any possibility of any data leaking from one visited web page to another.
We will explain more about the IBOS browser in Section 4.1, and then
explain the modeling methodology used for the browser in Section 4.2. We
then show three case studies in Section 4.3: (i) a case study on the display
memory in Section 4.3.1, (ii) a case study on the address bar in Section 4.3.2,
and (iii) a case study on the same origin policy in Section 4.3.3.
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4.1 IBOS
The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) [117] is a web browser de-
veloped at the University of Illinois with the goal of increased security. In
particular, security considerations are taken into account in the initial de-
sign phase and during implementation. The issue with state-of-the-art web
browsers is that they are complex, have a huge trusted computing base and
are integrated closely into the actual operating system, and thus are a prime
avenue for malicious attackers to access a computer. The trusted computing
base is the subset of the software in which any exploitable error would lead
to the whole system being potentially compromised.
IBOS is a combination web browser and operating system that reduces
the trusted computing base. It does so by utilizing a microkernel and ex-
posing browser-level abstractions at the lowest software layer, which allows
removal of almost all traditional OS components and services from the trusted
computing base by directly mapping those browser abstractions to hardware
abstractions. Overall, this approach turns out to be flexible enough to allow
browser security policies while supporting traditional applications. Also, the
overhead added to the browsing experience is small.
Indeed, web-based applications (web apps) and the browser itself have
become quite popular targets for attacks on computer systems. The vulnera-
bilities in web apps are ever increasing, so isolation of the web apps is highly
desirable. For example, the formerly most common security vulnerability,
the buffer overflow, has been overtaken by cross-site scripting, which essen-
tially is a form of script injection into web apps [76]. Vulnerabilities in the
actual web browsers are not as common as web app vulnerabilities, but oc-
cur often enough to be troubling. In 2009, Internet Explorer, Chrome, Safari
and Firefox had 349 new security vulnerabilities [77], which get commonly
exploited by attackers [125, 96, 103, 77]. Further vulnerabilities are possible
in the operating system, its services or libraries.
Not all attacks are created equal, of course, and attacks at the top of
the software stack, e.g., using cross-site scripting to attack web apps, will
only give the attacker access to the browsers current vulnerable web app.
Further down the stack, attacks on the browser would give the attacker access
to all web apps, their data, and system resources the browser can access.
At the bottom of that stack, attacks on the operating system itself can be
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the most devastating, as the attacker can gain full control of the system.
Vulnerabilities (and attacks) higher in the stack turn out to be more common,
but are less damaging. Attacks lower in the stack have a much higher threat
potential, and that is what IBOS is trying to address.
There are other alternative browser projects with similar goals, but they
all share the caveat of being built on a legacy operating system and include
complex libraries and shared system services inside their trusted computing
base. IBOS consists of an operating system and browser that are co-designed
to minimize the trusted computing base at the web browser level. IBOS
achieves this by moving device drivers, network protocol implementation,
the storage stack, and window management software, among other system
services, outside of the trusted computing base. These components then run
on top of the trusted kernel of IBOS, which can enforce security policies. The
contrast with current state-of-the-art browsers is that they add one layer on
top of another, particularly the fact that the browser is running on top of
the general-purpose operating system. For all the details on IBOS, see [117].
Let us note one important additional consideration. Even though IBOS
is built on top of the L4Ka::Pistachio microkernel [92], that is itself not es-
pecially more trustworthy than other microkernel operating systems, there is
another variant of that microkernel which has been formally verified. That
microkernel, seL4 [80], which uses a very similar set of function calls, could
have been used instead of L4Ka::Pistachio. In that case, all the good prop-
erties of the underlying microkernel would have been inherited by IBOS.
We are doing our analysis in this chapter under the assumption of a correct
underlying microkernel. As seL4 was not publicly available at the initial
development time of IBOS, it was not used for IBOS. Also, seL4 is com-
pletely single-threaded, which L4Ka::Pistachio is not, so some additional
performance loss would be unavoidable.
Now, IBOS is designed to compartmentalize all the different processes as
much as possible, and all communication is being forcibly routed through
the trusted kernel, which can then implement its policies. The IBOS kernel
decides, based on the policies, which communication between processes is
allowed, and thus possible. As we will see in the next section, the communi-
cation between different web page instance, network processes, the network
card, the display memory and the central kernel is modeled. We will analyze
the adherence of IBOS to the Same Origin Policy, as well as check the ad-
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Figure 4.1: IBOS Architecture
dress bar correctness like we did for Internet Explorer in Section 3.3, and we
also look at the display memory, where we did find a bug.
4.1.1 IBOS Architecture
In Figure 4.1 we show a simplified presentation of the architecture of IBOS.
For all details, please see [117, Section 2]. As shown in the figure, the hard-
ware is at the bottom of the stack, the IBOS kernel is on top of that, and
part of the trusted computing base as well. Everything on top of the kernel
is not part of the TCB. Specifically, all web apps, network processes and the
NIC driver do not need to be trusted. Also, the figure does not show that
all other traditional applications work on top of a UNIX layer, outside the
TCB, on top of the IBOS kernel as well.
Some of the key goals of IBOS are the following, see [117] for all the goals
and more detail:
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• Security decisions happen at the lowest possible level: small TCB.
• Enough browser states and events exposed, so as to allow for security
policy checking; this makes IBOS flexible to allow new browser security
policies.
A key property of the IBOS browser is that all communication, i.e., all
messages sent or received, get transmitted through the IBOS kernel. This is
because the message passing is implemented as system calls, which of course
go the the microkernel operating system, which is tightly integrated with the
IBOS kernel. The components of the IBOS architecture which we want to
highlight are the following three:
• The IBOS kernel. The IBOS kernel builds upon the L4Ka microker-
nel and is the central component of the IBOS web browser. It takes care
of traditional OS tasks, e.g., process creation and application memory
management. Message passing is based on the L4Ka::Pistachio mes-
sage passing implementation, forcing all messages through the kernel,
and specifically allows the checking of the security policies. The case
studies in Section 4.3 will show some of those policies.
• Network process. The network process is responsible for HTTP re-
quests. It transforms HTTP data into a TCP stream and in turn into
a series of Ethernet frames which are passed to the NIC driver.
• Web apps. A new web app is created for each individual page visit of
the user; specifically, whenever a link is clicked or a new URL is entered
into the address bar. A web app sends out the HTTP request to the
network process, parses HTML and runs JavaScript and renders web
content to a tab. Each web app is labeled with the origin of the HTTP
request used at creation.
We will look into the modeling of parts of these IBOS browser elements
in detail in Section 4.2.1.
4.2 Formal Modeling Methodology
The basis of our formal modeling for IBOS is the source code, explained
by one of the developers, who clarified the design ideas when there were
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any questions. Any disagreement between the stated design intent and the
source code were brought up for clarification with the developer. To be
perfectly clear, in the end the intended design as stated by the developers took
precedence over the actual source code reading we did, with discrepancies
reported to the developer to be fixed.
The underlying operating system microkernel is not part of this model-
ing. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the microkernel could be replaced by the
fully verified seL4 microkernel, if that is desired, and thus we assume the
microkernel to be working without error. Also, the underlying hardware is
not taken into account. Naturally, some level of abstraction between the
source code and our model is of course unavoidable. For example, no actual
memory addresses are used in the model, but just different pointers.
What is modeled is the architecture of IBOS, which includes: (i) the
kernel; (ii) general message passing; (iii) web apps; (iv) network processes;
and (v) network interface card access; to mention some of the most important
pieces. Looking at the central piece, in the kernel we have the policy checking
mechanism for messages, an address bar, the content currently displayed on
the screen, etc. Indeed, the UI is also abstracted away into the kernel.
All messages are forced to go through the kernel and they are thus sub-
jected to the policies it wants to enforce. This is already a design decision
in IBOS, which the browser enforces, and it is reflected in our model in the
way messages are passed. Each process can only directly send messages to
the kernel, and the message will include the actual final destination in some
way; but only the kernel is able to send messages to any of the processes. In
our model, we ensure this by having two one-way pipes for messages for each
process and the kernel, i.e., one incoming and one outgoing pipe. No process
can access the pipes of another process, which forces all communication to
go through the kernel. Thus, the kernel is the only connecting point and the
policy checking is easily centralized.
Note that our formal modeling process, similar to our approach in Chap-
ter 3, is done completely by hand. This of course creates two issues: one
being that attacks found in the model might not actually be attacks in the
real browser. That is easily checkable though, and we have no actual false
positive attacks. The other issue is that the model is an abstraction of the
actual browser, as well as a (possibly) imperfect translation of the code. So,
all security guarantees given are based on our model are of course always with
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regards to the design and cannot guarantee the total absence of programmer
introduced bugs in the browser implementation that are not covered in the
design.
Keeping these caveats in mind, we would argue that the success in find-
ing spoofing attacks on Internet Explorer, see Chapter 3, is a good indication
that a formal modeling approach, as we are taking it here, can in the absence
of attacks in the model give good assurance on the design. Indeed, this is
the foundation upon which the whole browser rests. In comparison, having
machine-based checking of the source code requires a specification to be in-
cluded in the source code, and then that still needs to be grounded somehow.
We believe the right grounding is a design that has been checked already, as
shown in this chapter. Indeed we view our work here as complementary of,
and a natural preliminary to, a future formal verification of IBOS at the code
level, since design verification should precede code verification.
This chapter is different from Chapter 3 in that here we are not exclu-
sively looking at visual invariants, even though we do look at the address bar
spoofability in Section 4.3.2. We look also at connectivity properties inside
the browser, specifically regarding connection between content from different
URLs in the form of the same origin policy as in Section 4.3.3. The display
memory is analyzed first, in Section 4.3.1.
4.2.1 IBOS Architecture Modeling
For the full model with explanations see Appendix B. In this section we point
out key properties and give a general flavor of the model. At the top level,
our state space is made up of objects with an object identifier, a type, and a
set of attributes. Each network process, web app, and the kernel is modeled
as a single object. To illustrate this, we show Figure 4.2. In that figure
all objects outside the kernel are shown as rectangles. Note that pipes are
a special kind of object that connects the objects at its left and right end.
Other than that, arrows show connectivity. The ellipses inside the kernel
contain relevant pieces of the kernel, that are not objects themselves. There
will of course be multiple copies of most objects, except for the NIC, display
and web app manager.
Let us start looking at the kernel, and particularly the message pass-
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Figure 4.2: IBOS Model State
ing mechanism. First, we present more information on the messages. All
messages are passed as system calls, where the browser-specific part of the
message is encapsulated in the system call. First, the message part specific
to the browser has the following format, which we call the payload of the
encapsulating system call:
op payload : Oid Oid MsgType MsgVal
String typed untyped -> Payload [ctor] .
The arguments of payload are the sender (as Oid), the receiver (as Oid),
the message type (as MsgType), some auxiliary message info (as MsgVal),
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an argument commonly containing the URL that is requested or sent (as
String) and two more arguments (typed and untyped) that could transport
more data, and which we are going to ignore here. The sort Oid is that of
object or process identifiers. Each web app, network process, etc., has an
Oid. Note that the correct sender Oid is enforced by the kernel, as it knows
which process sent the system call encapsulating this payload.
The actual message is then built using the payload and system call type:
op msg : SyscallType Payload -> Message [ctor] .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE : -> SyscallType .
where OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE is the most commonly used type of
system call for sending browser messages.
To model the fact that the kernel knows which process actually sent
a message (as a system call) and to make sure that in the model no two
processes can send messages directly to each other, but are forced to send
messages via the kernel, the model defines one pipe object per process (using
the same Oid as the associated process), which contains two one-way pipes,
going to the kernel from the process and going to the process from the kernel:
op pipe : -> Cid [ctor] .
op fromKernel : MessageList -> Attribute [ctor] .
op toKernel : MessageList -> Attribute [ctor] .
Let us show an example pipe object for the process with 1050 as Oid
which currently holds no message going either way:
< 1050 : pipe | fromKernel(mt), toKernel(mt) >
Suppose this process wants to send for example the message:
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(1050, 256, MSG-FETCH-URL, 0,
l(http,dom("test"),port(81)),
mtTyped, mtUntyped))
This message comes from web app 1050 and goes to (presumably) network
process 256, sending the message to fetch a URL (MSG-FETCH-URL) from the
(fictional) domain http://test:81. This message would then be appended
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to the list of messages in toKernel in the pipe object. The kernel enforces
correct sender Oid based on the pipe’s id by simply changing the given sender
Oid, if necessary.
As part of the policy checking when a network process and a web app
communicate, their connection is checked. This means that both of them
need to be linked to the same domain. This is modeled by the equation:
eq < kernel-id : kernel |













The property being checked here is that the receiving web app with id
Num’:Nat is associated to a URL L:Label in the kernel storage for web
app connections weblabels, and that the sending network process with id
Num:Nat is associated with the same URL L:Label in the network pro-
cess connection storage networklabels. Then the message is simply be-
ing passed on, by dropping the checkConnection wrapper around the mes-
sage M. The kernel is only handling one thing at a time, which is stored
in handledCurrently. Once the current instruction has been dealt with,
any of the currently incoming messages can become the next message to be
executed. This is modeled by the rule:
rl [kernelReceivesOPMessage] :
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(mt) ,
msgPolicy(MP), Att >
< ID : pipe |
toKernel(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
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T:typed, U:untyped)), ML) ,
Att2 >
=>
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)), MP)) ,
msgPolicy(MP), Att >
< ID : pipe | toKernel(ML) , Att2 > .
Note that the kernel does not take the message to be dealt with directly, but
wraps the actual message inside the policyAllows operator together with
the set of message policies MP as an extra argument, which is an attribute
of the kernel wrapped in msgPolicy. Also, in the message the sender id N
which was given by the sender is forcibly changed to the actual sender id ID,
which is the process id of the pipe (and thus the associated process).
For the network process we are using (as does IBOS) the process id 256
through 1023. The attributes of a network process are:
op returnTo : ProcId -> Attribute [ctor] .
op in : LabelList -> Attribute [ctor] .
op out : LabelList -> Attribute [ctor] .
The returnTo attribute stores the process id of the web app that this network
process will return data to, while the attributes in and out hold the lists of
labels (representing URLs) that the network process will ask data from and
has received data from already. The simplification we use here is to not use
the HTML code from a given URL, but just use a URL as representing the
data from that URL.
For web apps we are using the process id 1024 through 1055. Their
attributes are:
op rendered : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op URL : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op loading : Nat -> Attribute [ctor] .
The label inside rendered is the URL for which the web app has put the
data on the screen, provided it is the active web app. The label inside URL
is the location where this web app wants to load data from. loading is just
a binary flag indicating whether the web app has already sent a request to
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load data. Initially, the rendered field for a new web app will be empty,
and loading is 0, meaning that it has not yet started to load. This equation
sends the message to start loading:
eq < N : proc | rendered(L) , URL(L’) , loading(0) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML) , Att2 >
= < N : proc | rendered(L) , URL(L’) , loading(1) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML,
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(N, network-id, MSG-FETCH-URL, 0, L’,
mtTyped, mtUntyped))) ,
Att2 > .
The message is sent to fetch the data from URL L’ and the loading attribute
changes to 1. On return of the requested data, rendered will change to L’.
The hardware pieces of Figure 4.1, video card, NIC, etc., are not modeled
in any detail. Only the NIC is modeled, and it receives target URLs from
the memory set aside for this purpose through the kernel, and then, after a
potential delay, returns the representation of the resulting data.
For the display memory case study in Section 4.3.1, the model has been
extended with the required notions of memory, page table and page faults.
This extended model exposed a bug in IBOS.
4.3 Case Studies
Our analysis of the IBOS web browser includes three different case studies. In
the first study, we analyze the display memory and find a bug that has been
fixed for IBOS. For the second study we analyze the address bar correctness.
In the third study, we look at the Same Origin Policy (SOP), which comes
in the form of a number of sub-properties that are required for SOP to hold
that were proposed in [117]. The second and third case studies show that
the browser design, as modeled, using appropriate reductions in our proofs,
is secure and so these good properties are true of the actual browser.
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4.3.1 Case Study 1: Display Memory
In IBOS, only the currently active web app is able to write to the display
memory, i.e., change what the user sees on the screen in the content area.
This is a security feature that prevents other web apps from manipulating
the output of the current web app and makes them unable to eavesdrop
content that is being displayed. In broad terms, the way this is handled is
that the display memory is completely flushed whenever the active web app
changes, the old active web app loses its access to the display memory and
the new active web app gains access to that display memory. The IBOS
developers knew that under some (at that point unknown) circumstances it
could happen that the browser’s content area simply was empty and further
did not update upon switching from one tab to another. Note that this is
not a security concern. No data can be leaked and no mis-match between
the content area and the displayed URL is possible. This is rather a usability
concern as that tab became unusable.
We modeled the interaction between the web apps, the kernel (holding
the page table) and the memory abstraction we use. The cleansing of the
display memory is enforced by the memory page table, which resides in the
kernel. To illustrate this, let us first describe how the bug that we ultimately
uncovered in the model works. The bug is reproducible in the actual browser
and a fix also has been proposed.
1. Assuming a single web app, A, that is currently active, we note that the
display-mem pointer of A (used for accessing the video memory) goes
to the location A-VID in the page table, and that maps to the actual
video memory, and displays the content of the web page A is associated
with.
2. Adding a second web app B by creating, e.g., a new tab (this makes B
the active web app) has the following effects:
• The page table in the kernel maps A-VID to NULL instead of the
video memory.
• The display-mem pointer of B points to B-VID in the page table,
which in turn points to the video memory, and the content that B
is associated with gets displayed.
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3. A redraw request for A, while it is not the active web app, is the crucial
piece of the puzzle for this bug. When that happens, the page fault for
A-VID is dealt with by making it point to some memory we call dummy
memory. The changed content for A is put there, but that memory is
of course not presented on the screen.
4. When the user then switches back to the tab containing A the behavior
is similar to before when the new tab was created:
• The page table in the kernel maps B-VID to NULL.
• But, as A-VID already points to DUMMY, there is no page fault when
that memory gets updated. Without a page fault, A-VID is not
mapped to the video memory. Therefore, the display stays blank.
The key lesson here is that an update to a background web app will lead to
the content area of the screen not properly updating when the user switches
back to that web app. Usually, such updates will happen to the active web
app only, but if it does happen in the background, this problem appears.
The reason for this to happen is that page faults are used to (re-)assign the
pointers in the page table. The simple fix is to force the pointer A-VID from
above to change appropriately.
Knowing how to fix the design allowed us to propose a fix for the actual
implementation as well. The model allowed us to extract the required order
of tab switching and data loading that lead to the browser exhibiting this
error. We explain how we find it, in the rest of this section.
First, let us explain a necessary part of the search exploration, which is
the command explore-space:
op explore-space : -> Configuration .
eq explore-space = < testMsg : testMsg | cmd( explore ) > .
where testMsg is a wrapping process, which allows this to be put at the
top level of our multi-set of processes, and cmd is a wrapper allowing this to
follow the usual way of storing information in process attributes. The key is
the explore command inside:
op explore : -> Cmd .
op explore : Nat -> Cmd .
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rl explore => explore(3) .
rl explore(0) => mtCmdList .
rl explore(s(N:Nat)) => new-tab , explore(N:Nat) .
rl explore(s(N:Nat)) => update , explore(N:Nat) .
rl explore(s(N:Nat)) => tab-switch , explore(N:Nat) .
where the number 3 can be replaced by any desired number. The explore
command will then unroll, step by step, and at each step will create either a
new-tab command, an update command or a tab-switch command. These
simulate user input. As explore is defined by rules, the search we use this
command in will explore all combinations of all orders and repetitions of
these commands. We do not show how each of those commands will addi-
tionally get assigned to it one of a number of possible URLs, as well as one
of the existing web-apps (for update only), as needed. Again, all of the pos-
sible combinations will be explored. The explore command indeed includes
creation of new tabs, loading data to any existing web app, and switching
between web apps.
We give the following search command, that in initial-test starts with
one active web app, and in explore-space contains the exploration of dif-
ferent commands as we have just described.
search in MEMORY : initial-test explore-space
=>! X:Configuration





The goal state we are looking for in this search command is one in
which there is an active web app, but the page table entry for that web
apps memory is pointing at the afore-mentioned dummy memory, noted as
otherMemory here, while the content of the actual vidMem is empty, shown
by the about-blank inside.
The search does lead to a number of states that are similar modulo some
renaming, and removal of unneeded instructions. By looking at those result
states, and at the trace leading to them, we can see what happens, and find
the order of actions, which we have described above already, that leads to
the display memory becoming empty and unchanging for a particular web
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app. Now we can distill the commands from that exploration to a list of
three commands, which we call bug-trigger:
eq bug-trigger = < testMsg : testMsg |
cmd( new-tab(Url2) , update(1050, Url3) ,
tab-switch(1050)) > .
where the testMsg process wraps the cmd wrapper which includes the actual
set of commands that triggers the bug. Note that Url2 and Url3 are just
any URLs and 1050 is the process id of the initially existing web app process
from initial-test.
In the search above we can replace explore-space by bug-trigger and
then we get a single resulting goal state, showing this bug. To note again, this
is not a security issue but it certainly is a usability issue that the modeling
has been able to uncover.
4.3.2 Case Study 2: Address Bar
Another important property for a web browser is the trustworthiness of user
interface elements, in their capacity to counter spoofing attacks. Particu-
larly, the address bar needs to be trustworthy, so that the user always knows
which site is actually being visited right now. It is truly important to know
whether the currently visited site is really his/her banking web site, where
entering credentials is fine, or if it is instead a phishing web site, where if
the user enters his/her account information monetary loss is imminent. We
all know that it is possible, even simple, for malicious attackers to create
phishing web sites that are indistinguishable on the surface from the real
web sites. A careful user should be able to trust the address bar, to prevent
such phishing from succeeding. Also see Section 3.3 about the address bar
spoofing possibilities we found in our Internet Explorer analysis.
As IBOS is designed with security in mind, our goal in this section is
not only to find flaws that could be abused by attackers, if they exist, but
also, more importantly, in the case of the absence of such flaws we will be
able to gain a higher level of assurance that no such spoofing attacks are
possible. The concern about the address bar is a security concern, so it is
more important than the usability concern we have looked at in Section 4.3.1.
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The important property for the address bar is that the content of the dis-
played page is always from the address which is displayed in the address bar.
In our model, the kernel keeps track of the address bar by means of the data
stored in the displayedTopBar. The source of the content being displayed is
stored in the display process abstraction, which has the displayedContent
field to store the information. At all times, the content of both these fields
needs to be the same, the exception being when there currently is no content,
which is modeled by the about-blank URL. If one of the two fields is empty,
in that sense, the other one can have any value.
We start the search for potential attacks, in the form of a mismatch of
these two fields, from an initialized kernel, together with the driver
inspect-space. We are looking for any configuration in which there is a
mismatch between the value of displayedTopBar and displayedContent.





< kernel-id : kernel | Att:AttributeSet ,
displayedTopBar(URL:Label) >
< display-id : proc |
displayedContent(URL’:Label),
Att2:AttributeSet >
such that URL:Label =/= URL’:Label
and URL:Label =/= about-blank
and URL’:Label =/= about-blank .
First let us note that inspect-space is similar to explore-space from
Section 4.3.1:
op inspect-space : -> Configuration .
eq inspect-space = < testMsg : testMsg | cmd( inspect ) > .
with the same testMsg wrapping process and cmd the wrapper for the actual
sequence of commands to be tested. The key here is the inspect command.
We will call the rules for inspect the trigger rules, and write them as RT .
All other rules we have presented here, and in Appendix B, belong to the
internal rules of the model, written as RI . We are working modulo the
equations E, which are all the equations given here and in the appendix. So
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we are actually rewriting with →R(I∪T )/E , which can be split into →RI/E and
→RT/E . We will use the short-hands →I and →I/E (resp. →T and →T/E) to
represent →RI/E (resp. →RT/E).
op inspect : -> Cmd .
op inspect : Nat -> Cmd .
rl inspect => inspect(3) .
rl inspect(0) => mtCmdList .
rl inspect(s(N:Nat)) => new-url , inspect(N:Nat) .
rl inspect(s(N:Nat)) => switch-tab , inspect(N:Nat) .
This shows that inspect is unrolled step by step. The number 3 can of course
be changed, but that number is picked in particular so that two web apps can
be created and the tab can then be switched as well. This is enough to show
the property of our choice here, as we explain below. At each step either a
switch-tab or new-url will be generated. This simulates user input again.
Compared to the prior section there is no explicit update here as the current
active web app can update the content area at any time and we do not have
to explicitly force that. As inspect is defined by rules, the search command
will create all possible combinations. Not shown here is how new-url gets
assigned a new URL and how switch-tab picks any of the web apps to be
the new active web app. Here, we do work on a model without the display
memory bug that has been exposed in Section 4.3.1. Indeed, when we run
the above search command we get the result that there are no solutions:
No solution.
states: 247743 rewrites: 3663864 in 247886ms cpu
(248055ms real) (14780 rewrites/second)
We now have to discuss what this really tells us about the browser and
the security of the address bar. In Section 4.2 we have already discussed the
limitations and conditions of our approach in general, but now we can look
into this specific case study. First, note that the two objects we care about,
the address bar and the content as stored in the display process, are both
stateless objects. That is, they have no memory what was stored in them
before, but only know what is there right now.
Both the address bar and the display content are only changed due to the
current web app interacting with the kernel when created or when the tab is
switched to it. To create a mis-match between the two, two different URLs
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are all that is needed, which can be provided by just two web apps. This
allows us to make the reduction that only the last two web apps that are
on the screen need to be taken into account. The rest of the browser model
state and the length of the run of the browser model is irrelevant and thus
abstracted away.
Assume we needed to consider a third web app, then that would only
be the case if that web app made a change to either of the two objects in
question; but then one of the other two does not make a change (or does a
duplicate one), so then that other web app becomes irrelevant and we are
back to the case of two web apps. If there was a way for more than two web
apps to create such a mis-match, then the deciding last step (we would stop
at such a mis-matching point) must be either a new web app being added or
the tab being switched. But then, that whole trace of actions and number
of web apps can be simplified to just the state before that last action, with
only the old active web app and the new active web app taken into account
to create the exact same mis-match. Now we can focus on the interaction of
only two web apps, which requires search up to depth three, due to the need
of also allowing a tab switch.
Now, due to the reduction we can conclude that, since there are no mis-
matches for the limited number of web apps and steps, there will not be any
such mis-match at all. Now that we have sufficiently motivated the property,
let us make it precise and formal by presenting first a necessary lemma and
then our key theorem.
Internal Normalization Between Trigger Rules
Let us first note that this is a general observation, that will also be helpful in
Section 4.3.3. There is no interference between internal rules I and trigger
rules T , i.e., we can re-order them in any way we please. In particular, we
like to normalize with the internal rules after each execution of a trigger
rule. That means, for execution using both internal rules and trigger rules,
→∗(T∪I), we will rearrange that to →T→!I . . .→T→!I . . .→T→∗I . The last set
of internal rules does not have to be carried all the way to normalization, to
take into account the fact that the combination of trigger and internal rules
might not normalize either. Let us phrase this claim formally as a lemma,
noting that by →iT/E we mean the i-th use of a rule from T/E:
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Lemma 1 Given terms s1 and s2, for any chain of rewrites of the form
s1 →∗(T∪I)/E s2, with n uses of trigger rules, we can rearrange that sequence,
using the same rewrites, to s1 →1T/E→!I/E . . .→iT/E→!I/E . . .→nT/E→∗I/E s2.
Proof. Given any state t for which both an internal rule I0 and a trigger
rule T0 are available for rewriting, we claim that the application of these
rules commutes. That is, there are t′ and t′′ so that t →I0 t′ →T0 s as well
as t→T0 t′′ →I0 s. Now, let us prove this claim.
• Using a rule I0 to go from t to t′ will still leave the rule T0 enabled,
because all rules in T use only inspect on the left hand side, while
none of the rules in I use inspect at all.
• Using a rule T0 to go from t to t′′ also leaves rule I0 enabled as any of
the rules in T transforms inspect (which is unusable by any rule in I
anyway) but leaves the rest of the state intact.
The resulting term s is indeed the same, for either order of internal and
trigger rule execution, if both are enabled. Now, based on the proof of any
one step commuting, we can actually rearrange the whole rewrite sequence so
that we always take all possible steps using internal rules first. Only upon
hitting a normal form by the internal rule steps will we take a single step
with a trigger rule. We then repeat this. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3,
where Ii is an internal rule, Ti is a trigger rule, and ! means that we go for
normalization using rules from I.
We can now consider the effect of each trigger rule on the state by itself.
We let the model do all internal computations until finished before using
another trigger.
General Notes on Trigger Rules
Let us discuss the results of each trigger in a rewriting sequence first, which
will be relevant in Section 4.3.3 as well. Note that we consider not just
the trigger rule application, but the following normalization by the internal
rules, which is associated to this trigger. There are two kinds of triggers,
switch-tab and new-url. Let us look at them one at a time:
switch-tab: The switch-tab trigger makes the kernel switch the ac-
tive tab, as if a user interaction to switch had happened. In particular, in
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Figure 4.3: Commuting Diagram for Internal and Trigger Rules
the model it can impact the activeWebapp, the displayedContent and the
displayedTopbar. Keep in mind that all of these data fields are without
history, only the current value is retained.
new-url: The new-url trigger models the user giving a URL. It will lead
to the creation of a new web app, find or create an appropriate network
process, and transfer data from target URL (request and response) via the
NIC. It will also extend the mapping of web apps and network processes to
URLs, and thus each other. Also, the active tab is switched, as described
above in the summary of switch-tab. Each new-url is independent of all
prior triggers of the type.
Note that in both cases, if no violation is found at the trigger step (in-
cluding the following normalization by internal transitions), then the trigger
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potentially increases the state space size. But, as all URLs and process ids
are generic in the model (i.e., rules are blind with regards to the exact id or
URL) this trigger could be ignored anyway, unless it adds the process that
is active at the time of a violation being found, or if it adds the specific URL
needed for the violation.
Also, note that the kernel mappings of processes to URLs, for both web
apps and network processes, never has any element modified, but is only
added to.
Internal Rules Termination
Let us now consider the internal rules and make sure that they actually do
terminate, as the above reordering of trigger rules and internal rules does rely
on this fact. Essentially, the internal rules deal with the passing of messages,
and those messages get consumed ultimately. New messages are only created
as responses to the consumption of existing messages, but those messages
have less potential for spawning further messages down the line. There is a
clear order on the rules that does not include any loops. That is, an initial
message will get passed around and transformed into different messages, but
will ultimately disolve once its travels are completed.
Additional messages can of course be added to the system by trigger
rules. Initially (not taking trigger rules into account) a system will contain
a fixed number of messages, potentially in different points of this descending
chain of possible rule applications. Each of this set number of messages will
be consumed in the end and the rewrite system using the internal rules,
without the trigger rules, will thus terminate.
We look at a single generic data transfer and explain how its messages
will go from one rule to the other but will descend in the number of po-
tential further rule applications. The internal rules do terminate, and the
details for this with the detailed order of the internal rules can be found in
Appendix B.2.
Address Bar Correctness Proof
Due to the previously discussed Lemma 1 we only need to consider sequences
of the form →T→!I→T→!I . . . →T→∗I . As we have shown, our bounded
65
model checking has analyzed all sequences with at most 3 trigger rules being
used, and found no possible violation. So, the address bar is correct for all
sequences with at most 3 trigger rules. We now state and prove a theorem,
showing that this correctness extends to sequences with any number of trigger
rules being used.
Theorem 1 The property of address bar correctness holds for any rewrite
sequence, using any number of trigger rule steps.
Proof. The base case of at most 3 trigger rule steps is proven by the above
model-checking analysis. The reduction given in Lemma 2 then completes the
proof by reducing any violation of greater length to use at most 3 trigger rule
steps, so no violation can exist.
We now give the reduction lemma that assures us that all longer sequences
can be reduced to shorter ones:
Lemma 2 Any sequence of trigger rule steps that leads to a violation of the
address bar correctness and uses 4 or more trigger rule steps can be reduced
by a step. This yields that all the possible trigger rule sequences leading to a
violation must be of length 3 or less.
Proof. First note that for all rewrite sequences with at most 3 trigger rule
steps used, our model-checking analysis has proved that there are no viola-
tions. Now let us assume that our claim is incorrect, that is, that there is at
least one sequence of rewrites for which a violation of the property is found
in 4 or more steps. Let us pick any such sequence with the smallest possible
number of trigger rule steps used, and let that number be N , obviously with
N ≥ 4.
Looking at the search command above, which establishes correctness for
up to 3 triggers, we see that in a violation there need to be two different
URLs, so there must have been at least two trigger rule steps of the type
new-url(U) that have been used. Looking at the violation description (in the
search command above), we find that for one of them U = URL:Label and
for the other U = URL’:Label. Naturally, there will also be the last trigger
rule step used, after which the violation is exhibited. Let us denote that last
trigger by n, while we denote the two new-url cases by l1 (with URL:Label)
and l2 (with URL’:Label). Also, note that if one of those triggers appears
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more than once, we can always pick its last appearance for l1 respectively l2.
Now, whenever n is not the same as l1 and not the same as l2, then there
are two cases, one where l1 happens before l2 (written l1 < l2 < n) and one
where l2 happens before l1 (written l2 < l1 < n). In all cases, n is the last
trigger happening. We will consider the special cases of n = l1 and n = l2
later. We will now look at sequences leading to a violation and show that
we can construct a sequence using fewer triggers, in contradiction to having
picked the sequence with smallest N .
Let us first look at the case where l1 < l2 < n, with a violation occurring
during the internal steps after n (or at n itself). As we know that N ≥ 4,
there will be at least one further trigger rule step used, let us call it k. That
leads to the case distinction of such an additional rule step being before the
three other triggers, between l1 and l2 or between l2 and n. If there is more
than one such trigger rule step happening, we will pick one which is before l1
if possible, between l1 and l2 if there is one there and no step before l1, and
only pick a step after l2 if there are no other steps earlier.
Case 1: k < l1 < l2 < n. There can be multiple additional trigger rule
steps before l1, we actually pick the immediate predecessor of l1 for k.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l1 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l1 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence, which is now one step shorter.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried in
the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found later as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence.
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In case U = URL:Label, then the following step l1 will duplicate that
trigger step, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and
can again drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter
with the same resulting violation.
In case U = URL’:Label, then the step l2 which happens later will
duplicate it, and again we only need the last one, so we can drop this
trigger and the resulting sequence will give rise to the same violation
but be one shorter.
Case 2: l1 < k < l2 < n. There can be multiple additional trigger rule
steps between l1 and l2, we actually pick the immediate predecessor of l2 for
k. This works quite similar to case 1.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l2 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l2 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence, which is now one step shorter.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried in
the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found later as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger step k and will get the same violation at the end, but with
a shorter sequence.
In case U = URL:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l1. We
stated earlier that we pick l1 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(URL:Label), so this case is moot.
In case U = URL’:Label, then the following step l2 will duplicate that
trigger step, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and can
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again drop the trigger step k and have a sequence that is one shorter
with the same resulting violation.
Case 3: l1 < l2 < k < n. There can be multiple additional trigger rule
steps between l2 and n. If there is any new-url(U) type trigger, we pick
the last of them as k. If there are only switch-tab triggers, we pick the
immediate predecessor of n for k.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried
in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger step k and will get the same violation at the end, but with
a shorter sequence.
In case U = URL:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l1. We
stated earlier that we pick l1 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(URL:Label), so this case is moot.
In case U = URL’:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l2. We
stated earlier that we pick l2 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(URL’:Label), so this case is also moot.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before the step n which creates the violation. Let us first
emphasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l1 and l2. All the triggers between l2 and n are of the switch-tab
form.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
n there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed, and
removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l1; l2; k;n as the sequence
giving a violation. But, then k can only switch the active tab to either
the web app associated to l1 or l2. In the case of k making the web app
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of l1 the active one, we get the same result by moving l1 to the spot of k
in the order and dropping k, that is, l2; l1;n will yield the violation and
be shorter. On the other hand, if k makes the web app of l2 active, that
is not needed, as it already is the active one at that point. So l1; l2;n
will similarly yield the violation and it is shorter.
Now we need to look at the case when l2 < l1 < n, but it works just like
the case of l1 < l2 < n, so we do not repeat all the arguments.
This leaves us with the two cases where either l1 = n or l2 = n.
First, we look at l1 = n. This means we have l2 < n, so any additional
trigger k can either be before or after l2, giving rise to two cases.
Case 1: k < l2 < n.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l2 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l2 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence, which is now one step shorter.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried in
the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found later as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence.
In case U = URL:Label, then this is duplicating the later step n, in
which case we only need the last one of the two, and can again drop
the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter with the same
resulting violation.
In case U = URL’:Label, then the following step l2 will duplicate that
trigger, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and can
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again drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter with
the same resulting violation.
Case 2: l2 < k < n. There can be multiple additional trigger rule steps
between l2 and n. If there is any new-url(U) type trigger, we pick the last
of them as k. If there are only switch-tab triggers, we pick the immediate
predecessor of n for k.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried
in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence.
In case U = URL:Label, then this is duplicating the later step n, in
which case we only need the last one of the two, and can again drop
the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter with the same
resulting violation.
In case U = URL’:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l2. We
stated earlier that we pick l2 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(URL’:Label), so this case is moot.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before the step n which creates the violation. Let us first
emphasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l2. All the triggers between l2 and n are of the switch-tab form.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
n there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed, and
removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l2; k;n as the sequence
giving a violation. k can change the active web app but there is only one
(created by l2) and it is already active, so we can drop k and have a
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shorter sequence leading to the violation. (This sequence is only of
length three anyway, and thus, by model-checking, has already been
proven to have no violation.)
Then, we consider l2 = n, so we have l1 < n and additional triggers k are
either before l1 or after l1, yielding two cases. But, this works just like the
case of l1 = n so we do not repeat all the arguments.
So, in each case we have shown that there is a sequence one shorter, which
still violates the property. This is in contradiction to our assumption that we
have picked the sequence with the smallest number of triggers, N . 2
The lemma that allows reduction of all sequences to 3 or less trigger rule
steps, proved just above, together with the model-checking analysis of the
base case of up to 3 trigger rule steps thus prove that the address bar does
behave correctly at all times. This holds for any number of trigger rule steps
used in a sequence.
4.3.3 Case Study 3: Same Origin Policy and More
The same origin policy (SOP) is the primary security policy that all modern
browsers implement. We present a very short summary here. A much more
complete discussion of this policy is available in [115].
In essence, SOP is a non-interference policy. It is designed to isolate
web pages, including all the associated information regarding them, by their
source. The labels being used for this are the domains of their origin in the
form of an URL. If the browser has opened two web pages from domain A
and domain B, a correctly implemented SOP will enforce these two web pages
to be isolated. It turns out that commodity browsers do not do a very good
job of doing this correctly [24], due to the fact that the required checks are
scattered through their large code base.
Each web page is a frame, containing a HTML document and any material
linked from that HTML document. It can include references to network
objects, e.g., images, JavaScript, etc. When downloading these elements the
browser will label them with the frame level URL. In some sense, the original
web page is responsible for all elements it loads. Say, the top level URL is A,
but a JavaScript from B is downloaded. That JavaScript then runs with the
permissions of A, not those of B. This means that the script can access all the
72
information currently loaded from A in this frame, but not any information
from B, even if there is a separate frame from B. For linked HTML elements
SOP is more restrictive in that it requires those objects to have the same
source as the frame level.
To motivate how crucial the SOP is, let us look at a standard browsing
experience: you have two web pages open, where one of those is your bank’s
web site. If the other currently open web page turns out to be malicious (say,
you clicked on some random link by accident), we want to ensure that it will
not be able to get information about your bank account, or worse, make any
changes to your bank account or start a transaction. As the two pages will be
from different origins (otherwise your bank has been hacked already) there
should be no way for them to communicate.
In [117] a number of security considerations for IBOS are presented, and
a subset of those turns out to be the SOP. In this chapter we will look more
closely at those security requirements which result in the browser implement-
ing SOP. As it turns out, our verification in the Maude model shows that
these properties are true, and thus that IBOS indeed implements the SOP.
To model check this property in our browser model, we use the model
of the internal logic of the browser which we have mentioned already in
Section 4.2; it includes the policies being enforced by the kernel. We already
noted that all messages go through the kernel and thus are subject to being
checked with respect to the policies. We then also have to create canonical
messages that different components can try to send to each other. That
is, we need a small set of messages that is generic, so that the instances
of these generic messages can cover all messages. Then the model checking
analysis can in fact verify that none of those messages can reach disallowed
destinations.
Theorem 2 The Same-Origin Policy holds for any rewrite sequence, using
any number of trigger rule steps.
Proof. The proof consists of proving the properties (1)–(7) below. This is
done in the remainder of this section and in particular in Theorems 3–7. 2
Now that we have completed the high level overview of the SOP, we will
look at each of the properties that altogether make up SOP in the context
of IBOS one at a time. These properties are based on [117]:
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1. The kernel must route network requests from web page instances to the
proper network process.
2. The kernel must route Ethernet frames from the network interface card
(NIC) to the proper network process.
3. Ethernet frames from network processes to the NIC must have an IP
address and TCP port that matches the origin of the network process.
4. HTTP data from network processes to web page instances must adhere
to the SOP.
5. Network processes for different web page instances must remain iso-
lated.
6. The browser chrome (UI elements) and web page content displays are
isolated.
7. Only the current tab can access the screen, mouse, and keyboard.
8. All components can only perform their designated functions.
9. The URL of the current tab is displayed to the user.
The SOP is given by properties (1)–(7). Property (8) is another good
property for IBOS, while property (9) aids in verifying property (7).
Let us look at the first property which is part of SOP:
• (1) The kernel must route network requests from web page instances to
the proper network process.
Simply said, each web page instance and each network process have an as-
sociated URL which identify them to the kernel, in addition to their actual
process id. This URL is the URL they are allowed to communicate with.
Now, whenever a web page instance tries to communicate with a network
process, the kernel checks the process id and associated URL for both. For
this purpose, the kernel stores a mapping of process id to URLs. If no ap-
propriate network process exists, a new one will be created by the kernel at
this point. In practice, the kernel (and its representation in our model) en-
forces that only matching processes communicate. For checking property (1)
74
we look at each message that is received by any network process and com-
pare the URLs of sender and receiver using the kernel’s mapping. Note that
sender and receiver names cannot be forged as these are their process ids and
enforced by the kernel based on the underlying guarantees of the operating
system.
Indeed, the execution for property (1) does not make use of a history of
what happened before, but only of the current assignment of each process to
URL. We abstract away from a long sequence of network requests to simply
one single network request. As the state is generic and the correctness of the
property only depends on one network request, if we can show the absence
of errors for this one network request, we know that any arbitrary number
of them still will not exhibit any errors. Otherwise, we could take just that
network request which triggers the error and use it to get the error by itself,
contradicting the fact that we show that no single message creates an error.
Checking property (1) then boils down to checking executions (up to some
depth of input), from canonical starting points, to see whether there is a mis-
match between URLs in the resulting configuration for any message. If there
is no mis-match for all starting points, then all communications have been
legal and property (1) is actually proved. We can limit the depth of execution,
i.e., the number of messages being considered, and still be complete. Each
message is generic and representative of a set of messages. The reason we can
limit the depth is that if the property would turn out to be possibly violated
at an arbitrary number of messages, then that final message triggering the
failure will only have one source process and one destination process. That
violation can then be boiled down to the triggering network request, and the
setup for those involved two processes, which would be a total depth of three
actions.
The following search, presented in simplified fashion, returns no solution,
meaning that no illegal (according to SOP) communication happened. Note
that L1, L1’, L2, L2’ are the URLs and N is the process id of a web app
and N’ is the process id of a network process.
search init =>*
X:Configuration
< N : pipe | incoming(msg(from(N’), to(N), L1), ...) , ... >
< kernel-id : kernel | ... ,
weblabels(pi(N’,L1’), ...) ,
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networklabels(pi(N, L2’, L2), ...) >
such that L1 =/= L2 or L1’ =/= L2’ .
For this property, let us also show the actual search command with all
the detail, to give the reader a better idea of what this looks like.
search init-simp-kernel inspect-space =>*
X:Configuration




V:MsgVal, L1:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML’:MessageList) , Att:AttributeSet >






such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label or L1’:Label =/= L2’:Label .
As the above search did not return any solution, no illegal messages were
passed. All network requests indeed end up going to the proper network
processes.
Let us note here that weblabels and networklabels are the data struc-
tures which store the connection between URLs and web apps, and, respec-
tively, network processes. Indeed, pi contains the relation of one web app or
network process and the URL it is assigned to. In the case of the network
process there are two URLs, the first, which will exactly match that of the
associated web app, and the second, which is used for communication to the
outside. That URL may be the same as the first, or more specific.
After the above motivation, let us remind you of Lemma 1, so that we
only need to consider sequences of the form →T→!I . . . →T→!I . . . →T→∗I .
Looking at the search command for property (1) we see that there is one web
app with id Num:Nat and one network process with id N:Nat that impact a
violation. The web app Num:Nat is sending a message to the network process
N:Nat. For this, both the web app and the network process could have been
created by a single trigger rule step new-url(U) or by two separate such
trigger rule steps of form new-url(U). Of course there is again the last trigger
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rule step that causes the violation, which can be of the form new-url(U)
and can create none, either one, or both the web app and network process in
question. Let us now give the formal theorem for the property (1):
Theorem 3 Property (1) holds for any rewrite sequence, using any number
of trigger rule steps.
Proof. The base case of at most 3 trigger rule steps is proven by the above
model-checking analysis. The reduction given in Lemma 3 then completes the
proof by reducing any violation of greater length to use at most 3 trigger rule
steps, so no violation can exist.
We now give the reduction lemma that assures as that all longer sequences
can be reduced to shorter ones:
Lemma 3 Any sequence of trigger rule steps that leads to a violation of
property (1) and uses 4 or more trigger rule steps can be reduced by a step.
This yields that all the possible trigger rule sequences leading to a violation
must be of length 3 or less.
Proof. For rewrite sequences with at most 3 trigger rule steps, the model-
checking via search has already proven that there are no violations. We now
assume our claim is incorrect. Then there must exist some sequence leading to
a violation. Let us pick any such sequence with the smallest possible number
of trigger rule steps being used, and let that number be L. Now note that
we are only considering L ≥ 4. We will now consider all the possible cases,
based on what the last trigger step can do.
First, let us assume that the last trigger step, called l, is of type
new-url(U) and creates both the web app with id Num:Nat and the network
process with id N:Nat. This means that there will be (at least) three further
trigger steps before l, due to L ≥ 4. Let us call these three steps k1, k2, k3
with k1; k2; k3; l being the end of the sequence of trigger steps that leads to the
violation.
Any switch-tab only changes the active web app, so if k1 (or k2) is a
switch-tab, then the result of that trigger rule step will be overwritten by
the following trigger rule step, so we can drop k1 (or k2) from the sequence
and the resulting sequence still leads to the same violation, but is one trigger
rule step shorter, which contradicts L being minimal.
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So we know that k1 must be of form new-url(U) (otherwise we are back
in the prior case). Clearly, it can create neither of the two processes relevant
for the violation, as they are added at l. So whatever k1 added to the state
is just data that is being carried along and that has no effect on the violation
that will be found as it is not connected to the two processes in question.
Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping k1 and will still get the same
violation at the end, but with a shorter sequence, contradicting the minimality
of L.
Let us now assume that the last trigger rule step l is of type new-url(U)
and creates the web app Num:Nat but not the network process N:Nat. Then
there must be another trigger rule step new-url(U) that creates the network
process N:Nat, which we call l1.
Now l1 < l. Let us mark this part of the proof as (∗) as it will be reused.
As there are at least 4 trigger rule steps there need to be at least 2 more.
Case 1: There is a trigger rule step before l1, call the immediate prede-
cessor k. Then k < l1 < l. We now reason by cases:
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app but
upon the execution of the trigger l1 and normalization by internal rules
all changes by this switch-tab are completely undone. So we can
remove this trigger, and the shorter sequence still leads to the same
violation, against the minimality of L.
• Trigger rule k is a new-url(U): Then k can create neither of the two
processes relevant for the violation, as they are added at l1 and l. So
whatever k adds to the state is just data that is being carried along
and that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it is not
connected to the two processes in question. Thus, we can shorten the
sequence by dropping k and will still get the same violation at the end,
but with a shorter sequence, against the minimality of L.
Case 2: All other triggers are between l1 and l: l1 < k1 < k2 < l.
• Any switch-tab only changes the active web app, so if k1 is of type
switch-tab, then the result of that trigger rule step will be overwritten
by the following trigger rule step, so we can drop k1 from the sequence
and the resulting sequence still leads to the same violation, but is one
trigger rule step shorter, which contradicts L being minimal.
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• Trigger rule k1 has to be a new-url(U) (otherwise we are in the prior
case): Then k1 can create neither of the two processes relevant for the
violation, as they are added at l1 and l. So whatever k adds to the state
is just data that is being carried along and that has no effect on the
violation that will be found as it is not connected to the two processes
in question. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping k and will
still get the same violation at the end, but with a shorter sequence,
contradicting L minimal.
Let us assume the last trigger rule step l is of type new-url(U) and creates
the network process N:Nat, but not the web app Num:Nat. Then the same
reasoning as for the prior analysis where l is creating the web app and not
the network process holds, as none of the proof steps needed that distinction.
Therefore we do not repeat all those arguments here.
In the last set of cases we assume that the last trigger step l creates neither
the web app Num:Nat, nor the network process N:Nat. So, l can be either a
new-url(U) or a switch-tab. There also needs to be either one trigger
step l0 that creates both processes (web app and network process), or separate
trigger steps creating one each, l1 for the web app Num:Nat and l2 for the
network process N:Nat. All of them are of the new-url(U) type.
First let us look at the case with a single trigger step creating both pro-
cesses. Then l0 < l. The case analysis we get is just like the one at (∗) above,
so we do not repeat all of those arguments here.
In the case of two trigger rule steps creating the two processes we have two
possibilities, l1 < l2 < l and l2 < l1 < l. We will look at l1 < l2 < l and note
that the other case works similarly, so we will omit it from this presentation.
There has to be at least one additional trigger step. If one exists before l1 we
pick the direct predecessor. Otherwise we pick a trigger step between l1 and
l2 (predecessor of l2) if such a one exists. Otherwise we pick the immediate
predecessor of l. We call this pick k.
Case 1: k < l1 < l2 < l
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app but
upon the execution of the trigger l1 and normalization by internal rules
all changes by this switch-tab are completely undone. So we can
remove this trigger, and the shorter sequence still leads to the same
violation, contradicting L minimal.
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• Trigger rule k is a new-url(U): Then k can create neither of the two
processes relevant for the violation, as they are added at l1 and l2. So
whatever k adds to the state is just data that is being carried along
and that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it is not
connected to the two processes in question. Thus, we can shorten the
sequence by dropping k and will still get the same violation at the end,
but with a shorter sequence, contradicting L minimal.
Case 2: l1 < k < l2 < l
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app but
upon the execution of the trigger l2 and normalization by internal rules
all changes by this switch-tab are completely undone. So we can
remove this trigger, and the shorter sequence still leads to the same
violation, contradicting L minimal.
• Trigger rule k is a new-url(U): Then k can create neither of the two
processes relevant for the violation, as they are added at l1 and l2. So
whatever k adds to the state is just data that is being carried along
and that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it is not
connected to the two processes in question. Thus, we can shorten the
sequence by dropping k and will still get the same violation at the end,
but with a shorter sequence, contradicting L minimal.
Case 3: l1 < l2 < k < l
• Trigger rule k is a new-url(U). Pick k to be this if there is any such
new-url(U) between l2 and l. Then k can create neither of the two
processes relevant for the violation, as they are added at l1 and l2. So
whatever k adds to the state is just data that is being carried along
and that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it is not
connected to the two processes in question. Thus, we can shorten the
sequence by dropping k and will still get the same violation at the end,
but with a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab. Now note that there are only the two
web apps created by l1 and l2 as in case there is another new-url(U)
trigger step we are in the case before. If there is more than one trigger
of type switch-tab here, all but the last can be dropped as they are
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overwritten right away, and we would have a shorter sequence leading
to the same violation, a contradiction.
This means that there is only one switch-tab between l2 and l, at
k. It either makes the web app of l1 or the web app of l2 the active
one. If it makes l2 active, then k can be dropped as it is superfluous
and makes active the process which is already active, and we have the
shorter sequence l1; l2; l leading to the violation, a contradiction.
If k makes l1 active then we can just reorder the sequence to be l2; l1; l
while dropping k, as it would then again make the active web app active,
which is not needed, so we get a contradiction.
So, in each case we have shown that there is a sequence one shorter, which
still violates the property. This is in contradiction to our assumption that we
have picked the sequence with the smallest number of triggers, L. 2
With the reduction explained in the proof, we have extended the model-
checking proof for sequences with at most three triggers, to sequences with
any number of triggers.
The next SOP property is:
• (2) The kernel must route Ethernet frames from the network interface
card (NIC) to the proper network process.
Similarly to (1), the kernel knows which URL a network process is al-
lowed to communicate with. The following search is designed to check that
only acceptably sourced data from the NIC gets transmitted to the network
process.
search init-simp-kernel inspect-space =>*
X:Configuration
< N:Nat : mem | in(L1:Label, Ll:LabelList),
Att:AttributeSet >




such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label .
Here, L2:Label is the URL that the network process N is allowed to com-
municate with, and N:Nat : mem represents the network process N memory,
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used for receipt of Ethernet frames. With no mismatch between the URL it
is allowed to receive and the source of the data, we know that property (2)
is maintained. The search started that way indeed returns no solution.
Based on this motivation let us give our formal theorem for the prop-
erty (2):
Theorem 4 Property (2) holds for any rewrite sequence, using any number
of trigger rule steps.
Proof. The base case of at most 3 trigger rule steps is proven by the above
model-checking analysis. The reduction given in Lemma 4 then completes the
proof by reducing any violation of greater length to use at most 3 trigger rule
steps, so no violation can exist.
We now give the reduction lemma that assures as that all longer sequences
can be reduced to shorter ones:
Lemma 4 Any sequence of trigger rule steps that leads to a violation of
property (2) and uses 4 or more trigger rule steps can be reduced by a step.
This yields that all the possible trigger rule sequences leading to a violation
must be of length 3 or less.
Proof. For rewrite sequences with at most 3 trigger rule steps, the model-
checking via search has already proven that there are no violations. We now
assume our claim is incorrect. Then there must be some sequence leading to
a violation. Let us pick any such sequence with the smallest possible number
of trigger rule steps being used, and let that number be L. Now note that we
must have L ≥ 4. We will now consider all the possible cases, based on what
the last trigger step can do.
For a violation to possibly occur there need to be two different URLs
available, both of which get generated by different trigger rule steps of type
new-url(U). Now the last trigger step, called l, can be either of the two
new-url(L1:Label) and new-url(L2:Label), or, alternatively, does not
add either of the two URLs. In that case it can be of type new-url(U) with
U neither of those URLs, or it can be of type switch-tab.
First, let us deal with the case where l is new-url(L1:Label). The case
where l is new-url(L2:Label) works just the same, so we do not spell
that case out. In this case there needs to be one other trigger rule step
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new-url(L2:Label), whose last appearance we call l1. Of course we know
l1 < l. As there are at least 4 trigger rule steps, there need to be at least 2
more.
Case 1: k < l1 < l, meaning there is a trigger rule step before l1, call the
immediate predecessor k.
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab. As there is no violation during ex-
ecution of k and the following normalization, all traces of k will be
eliminated during the following execution (and normalization) of l1. So
we can remove this trigger and the shorter sequence still leads to the
same violation, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does in-
crease the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before in
the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label and
U 6= L2:Label, then all additions are part of the state, but no violation
occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along in the
state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it is for
a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping this
trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a shorter
sequence, a contradiction.
In case that U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the later step l,
in which case we only need the last one of the two appearances, and
can drop the trigger k and have a sequence one shorter with the same
resulting violation, a contradiction.
In case that U = L2:Label, then this is duplicating the immediately
following step l1, in which case we also only need the last of the two
appearances, and can thus drop the trigger k to get a sequence that is
one shorter, which has the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
Case 2: l1 < k < l. There are no triggers before l1, but there can be multi-
ple additional trigger rule steps between l1 and l. If there is any new-url(U)
type trigger, we pick the last of them as k. If there are only switch-tab
triggers, we pick the immediate predecessor of l for k.
• Trigger rule step k is new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
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in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along
in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the next step l, in which
case we only need the last of the two, and can again drop trigger k to
get a sequence that is one shorter but leads to the same violation, a
contradiction.
In case U = L2:Label, then this would be duplicating the prior step l1.
But, we had picked l1 to be the last such trigger rule step, so we have a
contradiction and this case is moot.
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app im-
mediately before the step l which creates the violation. Let us first em-
phasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l1. All the triggers between l1 and l are of the switch-tab form,
otherwise we are in the prior case.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
l, there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed,
and removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation, a con-
tradiction.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l1; k; l as the sequence
giving the violation. k can change the active web app but there is only
one (created by l1) and it is already active, so we can drop k and have
a shorter sequence leading to the violation, a contradiction.
Now we look at the case where l does not add either of the two URLs
in question. In this case there need to be two other trigger rule steps in the
sequence. We call l1 the last appearance of new-url(L1:Label), and we call
l2 the last appearance of new-url(L2:Label). Now there are two cases that
work just the same, depending on l1 < l2 or l2 < l1. We will give in detail
the case l1 < l2. We will look at additional trigger rule steps k, first if there
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are any before l1, then if there are none before l1 but some between l1 and l2,
and otherwise with them between l2 and l. As usual we pick the immediate
predecessors of other steps for k.
Case 1: k < l1 < l2 < l. Given multiple additional trigger rule steps
before l1, we pick k to be the immediate predecessor of l1.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l1 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l1 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence which is now one step shorter, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried
along in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found
later as it is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by
dropping this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but
with a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then the following step l1 will duplicate that
trigger step, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and
can again drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter
with the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
In case U = L2:Label, then the step l2 which happens later will dupli-
cate it, and again we only need the last one, so we can drop this trigger
and the resulting sequence will give rise to the same violation but be
one shorter, a contradiction.
Case 2: l1 < k < l2 < l. We pick the immediate predecessor of l2 for
k, in case there are multiple additional trigger rule steps between l1 and l2.
This works similar to case 1.
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• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l2 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l2 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence which is now one step shorter, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried in
the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found later as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the earlier step l1. But,
we picked l1 to be the last such trigger rule step, so this is a contradic-
tion and this case is moot.
In case U = L2:Label, then the following step l2 will duplicate that
trigger step, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and
can again drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter
with the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
Case 3: l1 < l2 < k < l. There can be multiple additional trigger rule
steps between l2 and l. If there is any new-url(U) type trigger, we pick the
last one of them as k. If there are only switch-tab triggers, we pick the
immediate predecessor of l for k.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried in
the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it is
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for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger step k and will get the same violation at the end, but with
a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l1. We
stated earlier that we pick l1 to be the last appearance of trigger rule
step new-url(L1:Label), so this case is moot.
In case U = L2:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l2. We
stated earlier that we pick l2 to be the last appearance of trigger rule
step new-url(L2:Label), so this case is also moot.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before the step l which creates the violation. Let us first
emphasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l1 and l2. All the triggers between l2 and l are of the switch-tab
form.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
l there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed,
and removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation, a con-
tradiction.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l1; l2; k;n as the sequence
giving a violation. But, then k can only switch the active tab to either
the web app associated to l1 or l2. In the case of k making the web app
of l1 the active one, we get the same result by moving l1 to the spot of k
in the order and dropping k, that is, l2; l1;n will yield the violation and
be shorter, giving us a contradiction. On the other hand, if k makes
the web app of l2 active, that is not needed, as it already is the active
one at that point. So l1; l2;n will similarly yield the violation and it is
shorter, another contradiction.
So, in each case we have shown that there is a sequence one shorter, which
still violates the property. This is in contradiction to our assumption that we
have picked the sequence with the smallest number of triggers, L. 2
With the reduction explained in the proof, we have extended the model-
checking proof for sequences with at most three triggers, to sequences with
any number of triggers.
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Another SOP property is:
• (3) Ethernet frames from network processes to the NIC must have an IP
address and TCP port that matches the origin of the network process.
Outgoing Ethernet frames are created by the network process, but are
then checked by the kernel for a match between the included URL and the
URL associated to the network process. In the search command below, the
check is on the outgoing memory of the network process, before it is being sent
out. It indeed looks at the URL the Ethernet frame will be sent to, L1:Label
noted in out, and checks that against the network process associated URL,
L2:Label.
search init-simp-kernel inspect-space =>*
X:Configuration
< N:Nat : mem | out(L1:Label) , Att:AttributeSet >




such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label .
The search does not find a state, which means that there is no mis-match.
Again, there is no history to consider here, so a single such outgoing message
is either correct, or not. Based on this motivation let us give our formal
theorem for the property (3):
Theorem 5 Property (3) holds for any rewrite sequence, using any number
of trigger rule steps.
Proof. The base case of at most 3 trigger rule steps is proven by the above
model-checking analysis. The reduction given in Lemma 5 then completes the
proof by reducing any violation of greater length to use at most 3 trigger rule
steps, so no violation can exist.
We now give the reduction lemma that assures as that all longer sequences
can be reduced to shorter ones:
Lemma 5 Any sequence of trigger rule steps that leads to a violation of
property (3) and uses 4 or more trigger rule steps can be reduced by a step.
This yields that all the possible trigger rule sequences leading to a violation
must be of length 3 or less.
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Proof. The proof is identical to the one given for property (2), i.e., for
Lemma 4. The difference between property (2) and property (3) is whether
the Ethernet frame is incoming or outgoing, but that difference was not needed
in the proof of property (2). 2
The last two theorems have proved that all Ethernet frame handling is
according to what SOP allows.
Consider the SOP property:
• (4) HTTP data from network processes to web page instances must
adhere to the SOP.
By this we mean that the HTTP data that is transmitted has to be from
allowable sources for both the sending network process and the receiving web
app. In this case we check that the return message from a network process
to a web page instance only contains data from an appropriate source, i.e.,




< N:Nat : proc | rendered(Lll:Label) , URL(L’’:Label) ,
loading(1) , Att:AttributeSet >
< N:Nat : pipe | fromKernel(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(N’:Nat, N:Nat, MSG-RETURN-URL, V:MsgVal,
L2:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML:MessageList) , Att2:AttributeSet >
< kernel-id : kernel |




such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label .
This model-checking search does not find any result, so we know that
property (4) holds. No history is required for this and the important URLs
here are L1:Label and L2:Label. If they disagree that would have been a
violation. Based on this motivation let us give our formal theorem for the
property (4):
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Theorem 6 Property (4) holds for any rewrite sequence, using any number
of trigger rule steps.
Proof. The base case of at most 3 trigger rule steps is proven by the above
model-checking analysis. The reduction given in Lemma 6 then completes the
proof by reducing any violation of greater length to use at most 3 trigger rule
steps, so no violation can exist.
We now give the reduction lemma that assures as that all longer sequences
can be reduced to shorter ones:
Lemma 6 Any sequence of trigger rule steps that leads to a violation of
property (4) and uses 4 or more trigger rule steps can be reduced by a step.
This yields that all the possible trigger rule sequences leading to a violation
must be of length 3 or less.
Proof. For rewrite sequences with at most 3 trigger rule steps, the model-
checking via search has already proven that there are no violations. We now
assume our claim is incorrect, then there must be some sequences leading to
a violation. Let us pick any such sequence with the smallest possible number
of trigger rule steps being used, and let that number be L. Now note that we
must have L ≥ 4. We will now consider all the possible cases, based on what
the last trigger step can do.
For a violation to possibly occur there need to be two different URLs
available, both of which get generated by different trigger rule steps of type
new-url(U). Now the last trigger step, called l, can be either of the two
new-url(L1:Label) and new-url(L2:Label), or alternatively does not add
either of the two URLs. In that case it can be of type new-url(U) with U
neither of those URLs, or it can be of type switch-tab. This proof is very
similar to that of Theorem 4. The fact that this time we are checking the
return data from a network process to a web app instead of the actual Eth-
ernet frame correctness mostly disappears at this point, as these are just two
different steps in the same chain of data transmission anyway.
First, we look at the case where l does not add either of the two URLs
in question. In this case there need to be two other trigger rule steps in the
sequence. We call l1 the last appearance of new-url(L1:Label), and we call
l2 the last appearance of new-url(L2:Label). Now there are two cases that
work just the same, depending on l1 < l2 or l2 < l1. We treat in detail the
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case l1 < l2. We will look at additional trigger rule steps k, first if there are
any before l1, then if there are none before l1 but some between l1 and l2,
and otherwise with them between l2 and l. As usual we pick the immediate
predecessors of other steps for k.
Case 1: k < l1 < l2 < l. Given multiple additional trigger rule steps
before l1, we pick k to be the immediate predecessor of l1.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l1 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l1 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence which is now one step shorter, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried
along in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found
later as it is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by
dropping this trigger k and we will get the same violation at the end,
but with a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then the following step l1 will duplicate that
trigger step, so that we only need the last one of the two, and can again
drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter with the same
resulting violation, a contradiction.
In case U = L2:Label, then the step l2 which happens later will dupli-
cate it, and again we only need the last one, so we can drop this trigger
and the resulting sequence will give rise to the same violation but be
one shorter, a contradiction.
Case 2: l1 < k < l2 < l. We pick the immediate predecessor of l2 for
k, in case there are multiple additional trigger rule steps between l1 and l2.
This works similar to case 1.
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• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l2 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l2 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence which is now one step shorter, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried
along in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found
later as it is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by
dropping this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but
with a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the earlier step l1. But,
we picked l1 to be the last such trigger rule step, so this is a contradic-
tion and this case is moot.
In case U = L2:Label, then the following step l2 will duplicate that
trigger step, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and
can again drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter
with the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
Case 3: l1 < l2 < k < l. There can be multiple additional trigger rule
steps between l2 and l. If there is any new-url(U) type trigger, we pick the
last one of them as k. If there are only switch-tab triggers, we pick the
immediate predecessor of l for k.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along
in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
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is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger step k and will get the same violation at the end, but with
a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l1. We
stated earlier that we pick l1 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(L1:Label), so this case is moot.
In case U = L2:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l2. We
stated earlier that we pick l2 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(L2:Label), so this case is also moot.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before the step l which creates the violation. Let us first
emphasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l1 and l2. All the triggers between l2 and l are of the switch-tab
form.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
l there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed,
and removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation, a con-
tradiction.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l1; l2; k;n as the sequence
giving a violation. But, then k can only switch the active tab to either
the web app associated to l1 or l2. In the case of k making the web app
of l1 the active one, we get the same result by moving l1 to the spot of k
in the order and dropping k, that is, l2; l1;n will yield the violation and
be shorter. On the other hand, if k makes the web app of l2 active, that
is not needed, as it already is the active one at that point. So l1; l2;n
will similarly yield the violation and it is shorter, a contradiction.
Now, let us deal with the case where l is new-url(L1:Label). The case
where l is new-url(L2:Label) works just the same, so we do not spell
that case out. In this case there needs to be one other trigger rule step
new-url(L2:Label), whose last appearance we call l1. Of course we know
l1 < l. As there are at least 4 trigger rule steps, there need to be at least 2
more.
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Case 1: k < l1 < l, meaning that there is a trigger rule step before l1, call
the immediate predecessor k.
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab. As there is no violation during ex-
ecution of k and the following normalization, all traces of k will be
eliminated during the following execution (and normalization) of l1. So
we can remove this trigger and the shorter sequence still leads to the
same violation, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does in-
crease the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before in
the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label and
U 6= L2:Label, then all additions are part of the state, but no violation
occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along in the
state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it is for
a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping this
trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a shorter
sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the later step l, in which
case we only need the last one of the two appearances, and can drop
the trigger k and have a sequence one shorter with the same resulting
violation, a contradiction.
In case U = L2:Label, then this is duplicating the immediately follow-
ing step l1, in which case we also only need the last of the two appear-
ances, and can thus drop the trigger k to get a sequence that is one
shorter, which has the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
Case 2: l1 < k < l. There are no triggers before l1, but there can be multi-
ple additional trigger rule steps between l1 and l. If there is any new-url(U)
type trigger, we pick the last of them as k. If there are only switch-tab
triggers, we pick the immediate predecessor of l for k.
• Trigger rule step k is new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along
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in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the next step l, in which
case we only need the last of the two, and can again drop trigger k to
get a sequence that is one shorter but leads to the same violation, a
contradiction.
In case U = L2:Label, then this would be duplicating the prior step l1.
But, we had picked l1 to be the last such trigger rule step, so we have a
contradiction and this case is moot.
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app im-
mediately before the step l which creates the violation. Let us first em-
phasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l1. All the triggers between l1 and l are of the switch-tab form,
otherwise we are in the prior case.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
l, there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed,
and removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation, a con-
tradiction.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l1; k; l as the sequence
giving the violation. k can change the active web app but there is only
one (created by l1) and it is already active, so we can drop k and have
a shorter sequence leading to the violation, another contradiction.
So, in each case we have shown that there is a sequence one shorter, which
still violates the property. This is in contradiction to our assumption that we
have picked the sequence with the smallest number of triggers, L. 2
Regarding the SOP property:
• (5) Network processes for different web page instances must remain
isolated.
By virtue of the aforementioned labeling we have for all web apps and
network processes, each network process can only communicate with the right
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web page instances. Simply by construction of our model (all messages going
through the kernel) there is no way for network processes to communicate
with each other directly. Therefore the isolation of network processes holds.
Consider now the SOP property:
• (6) The browser chrome (UI elements) and web page content displays
are isolated.
This property easily holds in the model, due to its construction. The
web page content is represented in displayedContent(...) of the process
representing the display < display-id : ... >, while the UI elements
are part of the kernel, in particular displayedTopBar for the address bar,
see Section 4.3.2.
Last SOP property:
• (7) Only the current tab can access the screen, mouse, and keyboard.
For this property, let us note that all input is given to the kernel, which
in turn passes it to the active web app. We have not explicitly modeled a
mouse or keyboard. With regards to the screen, we ask you to look below at
property (9) and realize that property (7) is a corollary of property (9) and
the address bar correctness.
General good property:
• (8) All components can only perform their designated functions.
This property holds in the model, as that is the way it was built. The
design of each component as captured in the model is exactly that set of
designated functions, only.
Last property:
• (9) The URL of the current tab is displayed to the user.
To relate this to (7), let us note that the current tab is representative of
the active web app, which has control of the screen, and that we take this
property to actually mean the stronger property that the screen contents are
also of the currently active web app whenever the screen is not about-blank.
search init-simp-kernel inspect-space =>*
X:Configuration
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< kernel-id : kernel | Att:AttributeSet ,
displayedTopBar(URL:Label) >
< display-id : proc |
activeWebapp(W:ProcId),
Att2:AttributeSet >
< W:ProcId : proc |
URL(URL’:Label),
Att3:AttributeSet >
such that URL:Label =/= URL’:Label .
Indeed, the URL associated to the active web app is being presented to
the user in the address bar (displayedTopBar).
Based on this motivation let us give our formal theorem for the prop-
erty (9):
Theorem 7 Property (9) holds for any rewrite sequence, using any number
of trigger rule steps.
Proof. The base case of at most 3 trigger rule steps is proven by the above
model-checking analysis. The reduction given in Lemma 7 then completes the
proof by reducing any violation of greater length to use at most 3 trigger rule
steps, so no violation can exist.
We now give the reduction lemma that assures as that all longer sequences
can be reduced to shorter ones:
Lemma 7 Any sequence of trigger rule steps that leads to a violation of
property (9) and uses 4 or more trigger rule steps can be reduced by a step.
This yields that all the possible trigger rule sequences leading to a violation
must be of length 3 or less.
Proof. For rewrite sequences with at most 3 trigger rule steps, the model-
checking via search has already proven that there are no violations. We now
assume our claim is incorrect. Then there must be some sequences leading to
a violation. Let us pick any such sequence with the smallest possible number
of trigger rule steps being used, and let that number be L. Now note that we
must have L ≥ 4. We will now consider all the possible cases, based on what
the last trigger step can do.
To make a violation possible there need to be two different URLs, cre-
ated by two different new-url(U) trigger rule uses. One appears in the ad-
dress bar, while the other is the source URL for the web app that is cur-
rently active. The last trigger rule l can thus either be a switch-tab, a
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new-url(URL:Label), a new-url(URL’:Label) (the active web app’s URL)
or a different trigger rule of type new-url(U). There will then be one or two
further new-url(U) type trigger rule steps.
First, we consider l to be switch-tab, which means there are two other
trigger rule steps. We call l1 the last step new-url(URL:Label) and we call
l2 the last step new-url(URL’:Label). Now either l1 < l2 or l2 < l1. We
only spell out the case l1 < l2, as the other works just the same. So, we have
l1 < l2 < l.
Case 1: k < l1 < l2 < l. Given multiple additional trigger rule steps
before l1, we pick k to be the immediate predecessor of l1.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l1 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l1 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence which is now one step shorter, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried
along in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found
later as it is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by
dropping this trigger k and we will get the same violation at the end,
but with a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = URL:Label, then the following step l1 will duplicate that
trigger step, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and
can again drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter
with the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
In case U = URL’:Label, then the step l2 which happens later will
duplicate it, and again we only need the last one, so we can drop this
trigger and the resulting sequence will give rise to the same violation
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but be one shorter, a contradiction.
Case 2: l1 < k < l2 < l. We pick the immediate predecessor of l2 for
k, in case there are multiple additional trigger rule steps between l1 and l2.
This works similar to case 1.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before introducing the URL in l2 which appears in the vi-
olation. Upon the execution of the trigger in l2 and normalization by
the internal rules, all changes made by this switch-tab are completely
undone, and as there was no violation here (or we would have a shorter
sequence already) we can drop this switch-tab trigger from our list of
triggers to be executed, and will reach the same violation at the end of
the sequence which is now one step shorter, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but
no violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried
along in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found
later as it is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by
dropping this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but
with a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = URL:Label, then this is duplicating the earlier step l1.
But, we picked l1 to be the last such trigger rule step, so this is a
contradiction and this case is moot.
In case U = URL’:Label, then the following step l2 will duplicate that
trigger step, in which case we only need the last one of the two, and
can again drop the trigger k and have a sequence that is one shorter
with the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
Case 3: l1 < l2 < k < l. There can be multiple additional trigger rule
steps between l2 and l. If there is any new-url(U) type trigger, we pick the
last one of them as k. If there are only switch-tab triggers, we pick the
immediate predecessor of l for k.
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• Trigger rule step k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= L1:Label
and U 6= L2:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along
in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger step k and will get the same violation at the end, but with
a shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = L1:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l1. We
stated earlier that we pick l1 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(L1:Label), so this case is moot.
In case U = L2:Label, then this is duplicating the prior step l2. We
stated earlier that we pick l2 to be the last appearance of the trigger rule
step new-url(L2:Label), so this case is also moot.
• Trigger rule step k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app
immediately before the step l which creates the violation. Let us first
emphasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l1 and l2. All the triggers between l2 and l are of the switch-tab
form.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
l there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed,
and removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation, a con-
tradiction.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l1; l2; k; l as the sequence
giving a violation. But, then k can only switch the active tab to either
the web app associated to l1 or l2. In the case of k making the web app
of l1 the active one, we get the same result by moving l1 to the spot of
k in the order and dropping k, that is, l2; l1;n will yield the violation
and be shorter, yielding a contradiction. On the other hand, if k makes
the web app of l2 active, that is not needed, as it already is the active
one at that point. So l1; l2;n will similarly yield the violation and it is
shorter, another contradiction.
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Now we consider l to be new-url(URL:Label), then there will be another
trigger rule step l1 of the form new-url(URL’:Label). Other trigger rule
steps can happen before or after l1. If there are any before l1 we pick from
there for k, only otherwise do we look after l1.
Case 1: k < l1 < l. We pick the immediate predecessor of l1 for k in case
there are multiple trigger rules before l1.
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab. As there is no violation during ex-
ecution of k and the following normalization, all traces of k will be
eliminated during the following execution (and normalization) of l1. So
we can remove this trigger and the shorter sequence still leads to the
same violation, a contradiction.
• Trigger rule k is a new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does in-
crease the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before in
the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along
in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = URL:Label, then this is duplicating the later step l, in which
case we only need the last one of the two appearances, and can drop
the trigger k and have a sequence one shorter with the same resulting
violation, a contradiction.
In case U = URL’:Label, then this is duplicating the immediately fol-
lowing step l1, in which case we also only need the last of the two
appearances, and can thus drop the trigger k to get a sequence that is
one shorter, which has the same resulting violation, a contradiction.
Case 2: l1 < k < l. There are no triggers before l1, but there can be multi-
ple additional trigger rule steps between l1 and l. If there is any new-url(U)
type trigger, we pick the last of them as k. If there are only switch-tab
triggers, we pick the immediate predecessor of l for k.
• Trigger rule step k is new-url(U): Using this trigger rule step does
increase the state space size by adding all the pieces mentioned before
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in the description of what such a trigger does. Now, if U 6= URL:Label
and U 6= URL’:Label, then all the additions are part of the state, but no
violation occurs here. Whatever k added is just data being carried along
in the state that has no effect on the violation that will be found as it
is for a different URL. Thus, we can shorten the sequence by dropping
this trigger k and will get the same violation at the end, but with a
shorter sequence, a contradiction.
In case U = URL:Label, then this is duplicating the next step l, in
which case we only need the last of the two, and can again drop trigger
k to get a sequence that is one shorter but leads to the same violation,
a contradiction.
In case U = URL’:Label, then this would be duplicating the prior step
l1. But, we had picked l1 to be the last such trigger rule step, so we
have a contradiction and this case is moot.
• Trigger rule k is a switch-tab: This changes the active web app im-
mediately before the step l which creates the violation. Let us first em-
phasize that there are no new-url(U) triggers in the sequence except
for l1. All the triggers between l1 and l are of the switch-tab form,
otherwise we are in the prior case.
If there are multiple such triggers, then in addition to k directly before
l, there is another one, call it m. Now, trigger m and all its changes
will be completely undone by trigger k. So, trigger m is not needed,
and removing trigger m will still yield the exact same violation, a con-
tradiction.
If there is only one such trigger, then we have l1; k; l as the sequence
giving the violation. k can change the active web app but there is only
one (created by l1) and it is already active, so we can drop k and have
a shorter sequence leading to the violation, a contradiction.
Then we consider l to be new-url(URL’:Label), this case works just the
same as the prior case of l being new-url(URL:Label).
So, in each case we have shown that there is a sequence one shorter, which
still violates the property. This is in contradiction to our assumption that we
have picked the sequence with the smallest number of triggers, L. 2
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With all of these properties verified we know that the SOP holds for the
model of IBOS. The same caveats, as explained earlier in this chapter, of
course do apply. That is, there could be a coding error in the actual imple-
mentation that the model does not capture or the model simply translates
the code imperfectly.
As you see in this section, we always limited the amount of steps we are
running the model for to check our properties of interest. This reduced num-
ber of steps still provides a complete analysis, because all of the properties
we look at are independent of any history. Each of them only requires the
current state. Building all possible canonical current states can be done in
few steps. We have given reduction-based proofs for all of the theorems.
4.4 Related Work
In 2009, Internet Explorer, Chrome, Safari and Firefox had 349 new security
vulnerabilities [77], which get commonly exploited by attackers [125, 96, 103,
77]. This shows the need for work on secure browsers. Some work on a web
browser that uses formal modeling as part of its design has been done before,
for the OP2 [66] browser. For Internet Explorer, the graphical user interface
security has been addressed in [23].
A fully verified microkernel operating system is now available in the
form of seL4 [80], which uses a very similar set of function calls as the
L4Ka::Pistachio microkernel [92]. In the Illinois Browser Operating System
(IBOS) [117] web browser the underlying microkernel is L4Ka due to seL4
not being available at the time. IBOS is based on some of the ideas of OP2
but takes them further.
The same origin policy (SOP) is discussed in [115] and it turns out that
commodity browsers do not do a good job of implementing SOP correctly [24],




FOLDING VARIANT NARROWING AND
OPTIMAL VARIANT TERMINATION
This chapter is based on [57], which is joint work with Santiago Escobar and
Jose´ Meseguer. Automated reasoning modulo an equational theory E is a
fundamental technique in many applications. If E can be split as a disjoint
union E∪Ax in such a way that E is confluent, terminating, sort-decreasing,
and coherent modulo a set of equational axioms Ax, narrowing with E mod-
ulo Ax provides a complete E-unification algorithm [78]. However, except
for the hopelessly inefficient case of full narrowing, little seems to be known
about effective narrowing strategies in the general modulo case beyond the
quite depressing observation that basic narrowing is incomplete modulo AC.
Narrowing with equations E modulo axioms Ax can be turned into a prac-
tical automated reasoning technique by systematically exploiting the notion
of E,Ax-variants of a term. After reviewing such a notion, originally pro-
posed by Comon-Lundh and Delaune, and giving various necessary and/or
sufficient conditions for it, we explain how narrowing strategies can be used
to obtain narrowing algorithms modulo axioms that are: (i) variant-complete
(generate a complete set of variants for any input term), (ii) minimal (such
a set does not have redundant variants), and (iii) are optimally variant-
terminating (the strategy will terminate for an input term t iff t has a finite
complete set of variants). We define a strategy called folding variant nar-
rowing that satisfies above properties (i)–(iii); in particular, when E ∪ Ax
has the finite variant property, that is, when any term t has a finite complete
set of variants, this strategy terminates on any input term and provides a
finitary E ∪ Ax-unification algorithm. We also explain how folding variant
narrowing has a number of interesting applications in areas such as unifica-
tion theory, cryptographic protocol verification, and proofs of termination,
confluence and coherence of a set of rewrite rules R modulo an equational
theory E.
Narrowing is a fundamental rewriting technique useful for many purposes,
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including equational unification and equational theorem proving [74], combi-
nations of functional and logic programming [65, 69, 95], partial evaluation
[4], symbolic reachability analysis of rewrite theories understood as transition
systems [91], and symbolic model checking [51].
Narrowing with confluent and terminating equations E enjoys key com-
pleteness results, including the generation of a complete set of E-unifiers and
the covering of all rewrite sequences starting at an instance of term t by a
normalized substitution (see [74]). However, full narrowing (i.e., narrowing
at all non-variable term positions) can be quite inefficient both in space and
time. Therefore, much work has been devoted to narrowing strategies that,
while remaining complete, can have a much smaller search space. For in-
stance, the basic narrowing strategy [74] was shown to be complete w.r.t. a
complete set of E-unifiers for confluent and terminating equations E.
Termination aspects are another important potential benefit of narrow-
ing strategies, since they can sometimes terminate, generating a finite search
tree when narrowing an input term t, while full narrowing may generate an
infinite search tree on the same input term. For example, works such as
[74, 7] investigate conditions under which basic narrowing, one of the most
fully studied strategies for termination purposes, terminates. Similarly, so-
called lazy narrowing strategies also seek to both reduce the search space and
to increase the chances of termination. However, the extensive literature on
lazy narrowing strategies [105, 10, 55] is mainly focused on efficient evalua-
tion strategies (efficient in the number of narrowing steps or the generality of
computed substitutions to reach a term that cannot be narrowed any more)
whereas we are interested in narrowing strategies that are terminating and
complete for variant generation. The topic of efficient evaluation strategies
is outside the scope of this chapter and can be seen as complementary to
the narrowing strategies for variant generation developed here. See [9, 71]
for references on lazy narrowing strategies. On the other hand, lazy narrow-
ing strategies are demand-driven, and we are not aware of demand-driven
strategies for the modulo case, or even of a notion of needed (or demanded)
evaluation for the modulo case.
By decomposing an equational theory E into a set of rules E and a set of
equational axioms Ax for which a finite and complete Ax-unification algo-
rithm exists, and imposing natural requirements such as confluence, termina-
tion and coherence of the rules E modulo Ax, narrowing can be generalized
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to narrowing modulo axioms Ax. As known since the original study [78],
the good completeness properties of standard narrowing extend naturally
to similar completeness properties for narrowing modulo Ax. This gener-
alization of narrowing to the modulo case has many applications. It is, to
begin with, a key component of theorem proving systems that often reason
modulo axioms such as associativity-commutativity, and greatly improves
the efficiency of general paramodulation. It is, furthermore, very important
for adding functional-logical features to algebraic functional languages sup-
porting rewriting modulo combinations of equational axioms. Yet another
recent area with many applications is cryptographic protocol analysis, where
there is strong interest in analyzing protocol security modulo the algebraic
theory E of a protocol’s cryptographic functions. That is because protocols
deemed to be secure under the standard Dolev-Yao model, which treats the
underlying cryptography as a black box, can sometimes be broken by clever
use of algebraic properties, e.g., [110].
However, very little is known at present about effective narrowing strate-
gies in the modulo case, and some of the known anomalies ring a cautionary
note, to the effect that the naive extensions of standard narrowing strategies
can fail rather badly in the modulo case. Indeed, except for [78, 123], we
are not aware of any studies about narrowing strategies in the modulo case.
Furthermore, as work in [32, 123] shows, narrowing modulo axioms such
as associativity-commutativity (AC) can very easily lead to non-terminating
behavior and, what is worse, as shown in the Example 1 below, due to Comon-
Lundh and Delaune, basic narrowing modulo AC is not complete.
Example 1 [32] Consider the equational theory (Σ, E ∪Ax) where E con-
tains the following equations and Ax contains associativity1 and commuta-
tivity (AC) for +:
a+ a = 0 (5.1)
b+ b = 0 (5.2)
a+ a+X = X (5.3)
b+ b+X = X (5.4)
0 +X = X (5.5)
The set E is terminating, AC-confluent, and AC-coherent. Consider now the
unification problem X1 +X2
?
= 0 and one of the possible solutions σ = {X1 7→
1We use AC operators many times in the chapter and we often write terms using AC
symbols in its varyadic form, e.g., given an AC symbol +, we write a+a+X or +(a, a,X)
instead of a + (a + X), +(a,+(a,X)), (a + X) + a, or +(+(a,X), a).
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a + b;X2 7→ a + b}, which is a normalized solution. It is well-known that in
the free case (when Ax = ∅) basic narrowing is complete for unification in
the sense of lifting all innermost rewriting sequences into basic narrowing
sequences (see [94]). That is, given a term t and a (normalized) substitution
σ, every innermost rewriting sequence starting from tσ can be lifted to a basic
narrowing sequence from t computing a substitution more general than σ.
This completeness property fails for basic narrowing modulo AC as shown by
the above example when we consider the term t = X1 +X2 instantiated with σ
and the following innermost rewriting sequence modulo AC from tσ: (a+b)+
(a+ b)→E,AC b+ b→E,AC 0. As further explained in Example 6 below, basic
narrowing modulo AC, i.e., the extension of basic narrowing to AC where
we just replace syntactic unification by AC-unification, cannot lift the above
innermost sequence for tσ into a more general basic narrowing sequence,
because it is necessary to narrow inside the term generated by instantiation.
Therefore, basic narrowing modulo AC is incomplete in the sense of not
providing a complete E∪AC-unification algorithm, even though E may be
confluent, terminating, and coherent modulo AC.
It seems clear that full narrowing, although complete, is hopelessly inef-
ficient in the free case, and even more so modulo a set Ax of axioms. The
above example shows that known efficient strategies like basic narrowing
can totally fail to enjoy the desired completeness properties modulo axioms.
What can be done? For equational theories of the form E∪Ax, where E is
confluent, terminating, and coherent modulo Ax, and such that E∪Ax has
the finite variant property (FV) in the sense of [32], we proposed in [54] a
narrowing strategy that is complete in the sense of generating a complete set
of most general E∪Ax-unifiers, and terminates for any input term computing
its complete set of variants. And in [53] we gave a method that can be used
to check if E∪Ax is FV. However, FV is a quite strong restriction. What can
be done for any confluent, terminating and coherent theory modulo axioms
Ax?
To the best of our knowledge, except for the hopelessly inefficient case
of full narrowing, nothing is known at present about a general narrowing
strategy that is effective and complete in an adequate sense, including being
complete for computing E∪Ax-unifiers, for any theory E∪Ax under the
minimum requirements that E is confluent, terminating, sort-decreasing and
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coherent modulo Ax, and under minimal requirements on Ax, such as having
a finitary Ax-unification algorithm. It turns out that the general notion of
variant, which makes sense for any such theory E∪Ax and does not depend
on FV, provides the key to obtaining a strategy meeting these requirements,
and sheds considerable light on the very process of computing E∪Ax-unifiers
by narrowing. In [56] we proposed such a general and effective strategy, called
folding variant narrowing, which can be applied to any theory E∪Ax, with E
confluent, terminating, sort-decreasing, and coherent moduloAx, and showed
that it is both complete – both in the sense of computing a complete set of
E∪Ax-unifiers, and of computing a minimal and complete set of variants for
any input term t – and optimally variant-terminating – in the sense that it
will terminate for an input term t if and only if t has a finite, complete set of
variants. To the best of our knowledge, folding variant narrowing is the only
practical, yet complete, general narrowing strategy modulo a set of axioms
Ax; in particular the only such one for the AC case. Furthermore, we showed
in [56] that there is no other such complete strategy that can terminate on an
input term when folding variant narrowing does not. It transforms the, up to
now theoretically possible but practically hopeless, mechanism of narrowing
modulo axioms Ax into a practically usable automated deduction method,
which has already been exploited in a wide range of applications as explained
in Section 5.8.
This chapter extends and unifies within a common theoretical framework
our earlier contributions in [54, 53, 56], and is already published in [57]. Our
goal is to provide the most complete and accessible reference to this general
body of ideas by developing in detail its mathematical foundations and its
fundamental algorithms. The plan of the chapter, and its main contributions,
can be summarized as follows:
1. Comon-Lundh and Delaune’s notion of variant [32] is the fundamental
notion underlying the entire approach. After some preliminaries in Sec-
tion 5.1, in Section 5.2 we further refine this notion by formalizing the
E,Ax-variants of a term t as pairs (t′, θ), with θ a substitution and t′ an
E,Ax-canonical form for tθ, and making explicit the preorder relation
of generalization that holds between such pairs and the corresponding
notion of most general variants in such a preorder.
2. We then give, in Section 5.3, general notions of narrowing strategy
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and precise definitions of what it means for a strategy to be: (i) vari-
ant complete, i.e., it computes a complete set of variants (and possibly
also minimal, in the sense of the preorder relation of generalization ex-
plained above), and (ii) optimally variant-terminating, i.e., it will ter-
minate iff there is a finite complete set of variants. Note that we are not
interested in efficient narrowing evaluation strategies (as widely studied
in the literature of narrowing) and not even on the standard complete-
ness results for narrowing strategies, so we define variant completeness
and variant termination notions. These are the essential requirements
that will guide us in the search for the desired strategy. To illustrate
how tight these essential requirements are, so that none of the known
strategies satisfy them, we show that basic narrowing, both in the free
case (Ax = ∅) and in the AC case, fails to satisfy properties (i) and/or
(ii).
3. A key contribution is the parametric notion of folding narrowing of
Section 5.4. The essential idea is to associate to any narrowing strat-
egy S a corresponding “folding” version of it. That is, S is a local
strategy, i.e., in the sense of which narrowing steps are allowed from a
term, whereas S	 is a global strategy, i.e., in the sense of tracking vari-
ants and avoiding repeated generation of variants. We prove that for
any complete strategy S, its folding version S	 is always variant com-
plete, which is property (i) in (2) above. The presentation of folding
narrowing in [56] has been improved in this chapter.
4. What about minimality, and about the termination property (ii) in
(2)? Another key contribution is the variant narrowing strategy (V N),
which takes into account properties of confluence, termination and co-
herence of the rules E modulo the axioms Ax to restrict the narrowing
steps from each term. We prove that V N is variant complete. However,
although V N is not variant-terminating, we show that its folding ver-
sion V N	 is variant complete and optimally variant-terminating, thus
variant minimal. The variant narrowing of [54] has been completely
redesigned in this chapter.
5. Although all the above results hold for any theory E ∪ Ax with E
confluent, terminating, sort-decreasing, and coherent modulo Ax, the
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case when E ∪ Ax has the finite variant property (FV) in the sense of
[32], that is, when any term t has a finite, complete set of variants, is of
particular interest, since then the folding variant narrowing strategy is
guaranteed to terminate and to compute a complete and minimal set of
variants for any input term t. This case is studied in detail in Section
5.5. In particular, we study a number of sufficient and/or necessary
conditions for E ∪ Ax to enjoy FV.
6. A related practical question is: given E∪Ax, how can we check whether
it has the finite variant property? Under appropriate assumptions on
E ∪Ax, we give an algorithm in Section 5.6 that can be used to check
FV. The key idea is to view FV as a generalized termination property.
Our algorithm extends and adapts to the variant generation case ideas
from the dependency pairs method [12], which is a well-known tech-
nique for proving termination of rewriting (modulo axioms). Note that
we do not really extend the dependency pairs technique to narrowing:
we simply reuse the dependency pairs technique to approximate that
there are no infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequences. The same
methods can also be used for disproving FV for a given theory E ∪Ax.
The algorithm of [53] has been improved in this chapter, since we were
computing bounds for the depth of the narrowing tree in [53] that are
not necessary in our improved presentation.
7. Section 5.7 studies in detail one key application of folding variant nar-
rowing, namely, to provide a finitary unification algorithm when E∪Ax
enjoys FV. This is very useful for many applications, for example in
the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Also, in practice, if E ∪ Ax
and E ′ ∪ Ax′ both enjoy FV, their union E ∪ E ′ ∪ Ax ∪ Ax′ is often
FV, either because of disjointness, or because it is quite easy to show it
by checking the required conditions. That is, variant-based unification
is a quite modular approach, although we do not discuss modularity
issues in this chapter.
8. Section 5.8 discusses a number of applications of folding variant nar-
rowing and of variant-based unification, including: (i) cryptographic
protocol verification modulo equational properties; (ii) proof techniques
for termination of rewriting modulo axioms; and (iii) proof techniques
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for proving confluence and coherence of rewrite rules modulo axioms.
5.1 Preliminaries: R,Ax-rewriting
Since Ax-congruence classes can be infinite, →R/Ax-reducibility is undecid-
able in general. Therefore, R/Ax-rewriting is usually implemented [78] by
R,Ax-rewriting. We assume the following properties on R and Ax:
1. Ax is regular and sort-preserving; furthermore, for each equation t = t′
in Ax, all variables in Var(t) have a top sort.
2. Ax has a finitary and complete unification algorithm.
3. The rewrite rules R are sort-decreasing, confluent, and terminating.
Definition 1 (Rewriting modulo) [124] Let (Σ, Ax,R) be an order-sorted
rewrite theory satisfying properties (1)–(3). We define the relation →R,Ax on
TΣ(X ) by t→p,R,Ax t′ (or just t→R,Ax t′) iff there is a non-variable position
p ∈ PosΣ(t), a rule l → r in R, and a substitution σ such that t|p =Ax lσ
and t′ = t[rσ]p.
Note that, since Ax-matching is decidable,→R,Ax is decidable. Notions such
as confluence, termination, irreducible terms, and normalized substitution,
are defined in a straightforward manner for→R,Ax. Note that since R is sort-
decreasing, confluent, and terminating, i.e., the relation →R/Ax is confluent
and terminating, and →R,Ax⊆→R/Ax, the relation →!R,Ax is decidable, i.e.,
it terminates and produces a unique term (up to Ax-equivalence) for each
initial term t, denoted by t↓R,Ax. Of course t →R,Ax t′ implies t →R/Ax t′,
but the converse does not need to hold in general. To prove completeness of
→R,Ax w.r.t. →R/Ax we need the following additional coherence assumption;
we refer the reader to [62, 124, 79] for coherence completion algorithms.
4. →R,Ax is Ax-coherent [78], i.e., ∀t1, t2, t3 we have t1 →R,Ax t2 and t1 =Ax
t3 implies ∃t4, t5 such that t2 →∗R,Ax t4, t3 →+R,Ax t5, and t4 =Ax t5. See
Figure 5.1 for a graphical illustration.
Let us explain in detail the practical meaning of Ax-coherence, at least for
















it is by its absence. Consider Example 1 where symbol + is declared AC.
Now consider the equation b + b = 0. This equation, if not completed by
another equation, is not coherent modulo AC. What this means is that there
will be term contexts in which the equation should be applied, but it cannot
be applied. Consider, for example, the term b + (a + b). Intuitively, we
should be able to apply to it the above equation to simplify it to the term
a + 0 in one step. However, since we are using the weaker rewrite relation
→E,Ax instead of the stronger but much harder to implement relation→E/Ax,
we cannot! The problem is that the equation cannot be applied (even if we
match modulo AC) to either the top term b+(a+b) or the subterm a+b. We
can however make our equation coherent modulo AC by adding the extra
equation b + b + Y = 0 + Y , which, using also the equation X + 0 = X,
we can slightly simplify to the equation b + b + Y = Y . This extended
version of our equation will now apply to the term b + (a + b), giving the
simplification b+(a+b) −→E,Ax a. Technically, what coherence means is that
the weaker relation →E,Ax becomes semantically equivalent to the stronger
relation →E/Ax.
Coherence can be handled implicitly or explicitly, i.e., either the match-
ing mechanism is modified to take care of this issue or the rules are explicitly
extended, which is the option shown above; see [122] for a comparison be-
tween implicit and explicit extensions. For rewriting, implicit extensions are
sufficient in many cases, as the implicit Ax-coherence completion provided
by the Maude tool [29] for any combination of associativity (A), commu-
tativity (C), and identity (U) axioms. For narrowing, implicit extension is
more complicated and it is sufficient in common cases such as combinations
of C, AC, and ACU axioms to consider explicit single-variable extensions,
i.e., given an equation s = t one considers s + x = t + x where x is a new
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variable. The method is as follows for AC. For any symbol f which is AC,
and for any equation of the form f(u, v) = w in E, we add also the equation
f(f(u, v), X) = f(w,X), where X is a new variable not appearing in u, v, w.
In an order-sorted setting, we should give to X the biggest sort possible, so
that it will apply in all generality. As an additional optimization, note that
some equations may already be coherent modulo AC, so that we need not
add the extra equation. For example, if the variable X has the biggest possi-
ble sort it could have, then the equation X + 0 = X of Example 1 is already
coherent, since X will match “the rest of the +-expression,” regardless of
how big or complex that expression might be, and of where in the expression
a constant 0 occurs.
The following theorem in [78, Proposition 1] that generalizes ideas in [102]
and has an easy extension to order-sorted theories, links→R/Ax with→R,Ax.
Theorem 8 (Correspondence) [102, 78] Let (Σ, Ax,R) be an order-sorted
rewrite theory satisfying properties (1)–(4). Then t1 →!R/Ax t2 iff t1 →!R,Ax t3,
where t2 =Ax t3.
Finally, we provide the notion of decomposition of an equational theory into
rules and axioms.
Definition 2 (Decomposition) [54] Let (Σ, E) be an order-sorted equa-
tional theory. We call (Σ, Ax,E) a decomposition of (Σ, E) if E = E ∪ Ax
and (Σ, Ax,E) is an order-sorted rewrite theory satisfying properties (1)–(4)
above.
Note that we abuse notation and call (Σ, Ax,E) a decomposition of an order-
sorted equational theory (Σ, E) even if E 6= E ∪ Ax but E is the explicitly
extended Ax-coherent version of a set E ′ such that E = E ′ ∪ Ax.
5.2 Variants
Given an equational theory E , the E-variants of a term t are pairs (t′, θ) such
that tθ =E t′. This notion can be very useful for reasoning about t modulo
E , e.g., unification modulo E of two terms t and t′ can be understood as
an appropriate intersection of sets of E-variants for t and t′ (as shown in
Section 5.7).
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Definition 3 (Variants) [32] Given a term t and an order-sorted equa-
tional theory (Σ, E), we say that (t′, θ) is an E-variant of t if tθ =E t′, where
Dom(θ) ⊆ Var(t) and Ran(θ) ∩ Var(t) = ∅.
Example 2 Let us consider the following equational theory for both the
exclusive-or operator and the cancellation equations for public encryption and
decryption. The exclusive-or symbol is ⊕ and the symbols pk and sk are used
for public and private key encryption, respectively. This equational theory is
useful for protocol verification (see [91]) and it is relevant here because there
are no unification procedures available in the literature which are directly ap-
plicable to it, e.g., unification algorithms for exclusive-or such as [8] do not
directly apply when extra equations are added.
X ⊕ Y = Y ⊕X
X ⊕ (Y ⊕ Z) = (X ⊕ Y )⊕ Z
X ⊕ 0 = X
X ⊕X = 0
pk(K, sk(K,M)) = M
sk(K, pk(K,M)) = M
Given the term M ⊕ M , we have that: (i) (0, id),
(ii) (0, {M 7→ pk(K, sk(K,M ′))}), and (iii) (0, {M 7→ M ′ ⊕ M ′ ⊕ M ′′})
are some of its variants. Given the term X⊕Y , we have that: (i) (X⊕Y, id),
(ii) (0, {X 7→ U, Y 7→ U}), (iii) (Z, {X 7→ 0, Y 7→ Z}), and
(iv) (Z, {X 7→ Z, Y 7→ 0}) are some of its variants.
Suppose that a rewrite theory (Σ, Ax,E) is a decomposition of (Σ, E).
Given a term t, we can obtain a tighter notion of variant of t (also called an
E,Ax-variant of t) as a pair (t′, θ) with t′ an E,Ax-canonical form of the term
tθ. That is, the variants of a term now give us all the irreducible patterns
that instances of t can reduce to.
Definition 4 (Complete set of variants) [32] Let (Σ, Ax,E) be a decom-
position of an order-sorted equational theory (Σ, E). A complete set of E,Ax-
variants (up to renaming) of a term t is a subset V of E-variants of t such
that, for each substitution σ, there is a variant (t′, θ) ∈ V and a substitu-
tion ρ such that: (i) t′ is E,Ax-irreducible, (ii) (tσ)↓E,Ax =Ax t′ρ, and (iii)
(σ↓E,Ax)|Var(t) =Ax (θρ)|Var(t).
114
Example 3 The equational theory (Σ, E) of Example 2 has a decomposition
into E consisting of the oriented equations below, and Ax the associativity
and commutativity (AC) axioms for ⊕:
X ⊕ 0 = X (5.6)
X ⊕X = 0 (5.7)
X ⊕X ⊕ Y = Y (5.8)
pk(K, sk(K,M)) = M (5.9)
sk(K, pk(K,M)) = M (5.10)
Note that equations (5.6)–(5.7) are not AC-coherent, but adding equation
(5.8) is sufficient to recover that property (see [124, 43]). For term t =
M⊕M , the set {(0, id)} provides a complete set of E,Ax-variants, since any
possible variant of t is an instance of (0, id).
The following characterization of variants in terms of a variant semantics
for decompositions is useful in various applications discussed later in the
chapter.
Definition 5 (Variant Semantics) Let (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of
an equational theory (Σ, E) and t be a Σ-term. We define the set of (normal-
ized) E,Ax-variants of t as
[[t]]?E,Ax = {(t′, θ) | θ ∈ Subst(Σ,X ), tθ →!E,Ax t′′, and t′′ =Ax t′}.
Of course, some variants are more general than others, that is, there
is a natural preorder (t′, θ′) vE,Ax (t′′, θ′′) defining when variant (t′′, θ′′) is
more general than variant (t′, θ′). This is important, because even though
the set of E,Ax-variants of a term t may be infinite, the set of most general
variants (that is maximal elements in the generalization preorder up to Ax-
equivalence and variable renaming) may be finite. Our notion of being more
general takes into account not only the instantiation relation between the
two substitutions θ1 and θ2 and the two normal forms t1 and t2 of a term t,
but also whether θ2 is already an E,Ax-normalized substitution, since, for a
substitution θ, the less E,Ax rewrite steps, the better.
Definition 6 (Variant Preordering) Let (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition
of an equational theory (Σ, E) and t be a Σ-term. Given two variants (t1, θ1),
(t2, θ2) ∈ [[t]]?E,Ax, we write (t1, θ1) vE,Ax (t2, θ2), meaning (t2, θ2) is more
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general than (t1, θ1), iff there is a substitution ρ such that t1 =Ax t2ρ and
(θ1↓E,Ax)|Var(t) =Ax (θ2ρ)|Var(t). We write (t1, θ1) <E,Ax (t2, θ2) iff
(t1, θ1) vE,Ax (t2, θ2) and for every substitution ρ such that t1 =Ax t2ρ and
(θ1↓E,Ax)|Var(t) =Ax (θ2ρ)|Var(t), ρ is not a renaming.
We are, indeed, interested in equivalence classes for variant semantics to
provide a notion of semantic equality, written 'E,Ax, based on vE,Ax.
Definition 7 (Variant Equality) Let (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an
equational theory (Σ, E) and t be a Σ-term. For S1, S2 ⊆ [[t]]?E,Ax, we write
S1 vE,Ax S2 iff for each (t1, θ1) ∈ S1, there exists (t2, θ2) ∈ S2 s.t.
(t1, θ1) vE,Ax (t2, θ2). We write S1 'E,Ax S2 iff S1 vE,Ax S2 and S2 vE,Ax S1.
Despite the previous semantic notion of equivalence, we write (t1, θ1) =Ax
(t2, θ2) to denote that t1 =Ax t2 and θ1 =Ax θ2, and we provide a notion of
equality of variants up to renaming. Both relations =Ax and ≈Ax will be
useful.
Definition 8 (Ax-Equality) Let (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equa-
tional theory (Σ, E) and t be a Σ-term. For (t1, θ1), (t2, θ2) ∈ [[t]]?E,Ax, we
write (t1, θ1) ≈Ax (t2, θ2) if there is a renaming ρ such that t1ρ =Ax t2ρ and
(θ1ρ)|Var(t) =Ax (θ2ρ)|Var(t). For S1, S2 ⊆ [[t]]?E,Ax, we write S1 ≈Ax S2 if for
each (t1, θ1) ∈ S1, there exists (t2, θ2) ∈ S2 s.t. (t1, θ1) ≈Ax (t2, θ2), and for
each (t2, θ2) ∈ S2, there exists (t1, θ1) ∈ S1 s.t. (t2, θ2) ≈Ax (t1, θ1).
The preorder of Definition 6 allows us to define a most general and com-
plete set of variants that encompasses (modulo Ax and modulo renaming)
all the variants for a term t.
Definition 9 (Most General and Complete Variant Semantics) Let
(Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E) and t be a Σ-
term. A most general and complete variant semantics of t, denoted [[t]]E,Ax,
is a subset [[t]]E,Ax ⊆ [[t]]?E,Ax such that: (i) [[t]]?E,Ax vE,Ax [[t]]E,Ax, and (ii) for
each (t1, θ1) ∈ [[t]]E,Ax, there is no (t2, θ2) ∈ [[t]]E,Ax \ {(t1, θ1)} s.t.
(t1, θ1) vE,Ax (t2, θ2).
For any term t, [[t]]E,Ax characterizes the set of maximal elements of the
preorder ([[t]]?E,Ax,vE,Ax). The set [[t]]E,Ax is unique up to ≈Ax-equivalence.
By definition, [[t]]E,Ax ⊂ [[t]]?E,Ax and all the substitutions in [[t]]E,Ax are E,Ax-
normalized.
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Example 4 In the equational theory of Example 3, for terms t = M ⊕
sk(K, pk(K,M)) and s = X ⊕ sk(K, pk(K,Y )), we have that [[t]]E,Ax =
{(0, id)} and
[[s]]E,Ax = { (X ⊕ Y, id), (0, {X 7→ U, Y 7→ U}),
(Z, {X 7→ U, Y 7→ Z ⊕ U}), (Z, {X 7→ 0, Y 7→ Z}),
(Z, {X 7→ Z ⊕ U, Y 7→ U}), (Z, {X 7→ Z, Y 7→ 0}),
(Z1 ⊕ Z2,
{X 7→ U ⊕ Z1, Y 7→ U ⊕ Z2})}
These two sets are the most general ones w.r.t. vE,Ax.
In the next section, we study how to compute the variants of a term.
5.3 Narrowing Strategies and Optimal Variant
Termination
In this section, we introduce narrowing, narrowing strategies and their use
for variant generation. As already mentioned, we are not interested in opti-
mal evaluation narrowing strategies [9, 71], which is an extensive topic in the
literature on functional logic programming, and not even on the standard
completeness results for narrowing strategies. We are interested in narrow-
ing strategies that are terminating and complete for computing variants. A
comparison of the folding variant narrowing strategy, defined in this chap-
ter, with the related literature on optimal evaluation narrowing strategies is
outside the scope of this chapter.
Narrowing generalizes rewriting by performing unification at non-variable
positions instead of the usual matching. The essential idea behind narrow-
ing is to symbolically represent the rewriting relation between terms as a
narrowing relation between more general terms with variables.
Definition 10 (Narrowing modulo) [78, 91] Let R = (Σ, Ax,R) be an
order-sorted rewrite theory. Let CSUAx(u = u
′) be a finite and complete set
of Ax-unifiers for any pair of terms u, u′ with the same top sort. Let t be
a Σ-term and W be a set of variables such that Var(t) ⊆ W . The R,Ax-
narrowing relation on TΣ(X ) is defined as t p,σ,R,Ax t′ ( σ,R,Ax if p is un-
derstood,  σ if R,Ax are also understood, and  if σ is also understood)
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if there is a non-variable position p ∈ PosΣ(t), a rule l → r ∈ R prop-
erly renamed s.t. Var(l) ∩ W = ∅, and a unifier σ ∈ CSUW ′Ax(t|p = l) for
W ′ = W ∪ Var(l), such that t′ = (t[r]p)σ.
For convenience, in each narrowing step t σ t′ we only specify the part of
σ that binds variables of t. The transitive (resp. transitive and reflexive)
closure of  is denoted by  + (resp.  ∗). We may write t kσ t′ if there
are u1, . . . , uk−1 and substitutions ρ1, . . . , ρk such that t ρ1 u1 · · ·uk−1 ρk t′,
k ≥ 0, and σ = ρ1 · · · ρk.
Example 5 Consider Example 3. Given the term t = X ⊕ Y , there are
several narrowing steps that can be performed
X ⊕ Y  φ1,E,Ax Z using φ1 = {X 7→ 0, Y 7→ Z} and Equation (5.6)
X ⊕ Y  φ2,E,Ax Z using φ2 = {X 7→ Z, Y 7→ 0} and Equation (5.6)
X ⊕ Y  φ3,E,Ax Z using φ3 = {X 7→ Z ⊕ U, Y 7→ U}
and Equation (5.8)
X ⊕ Y  φ4,E,Ax Z using φ4 = {X 7→ U, Y 7→ Z ⊕ U}
and Equation (5.8)
X ⊕ Y  φ5,E,Ax 0 using φ5 = {X 7→ U, Y 7→ U} and Equation (5.7)
X ⊕ Y  φ6,E,Ax Z1 ⊕ Z2 using φ6 = {X 7→ U ⊕ Z1, Y 7→ U ⊕ Z2}
and Equation (5.8)
And some redundant narrowing steps with non-normalized substitutions due
to the prolific AC-unification such as
X ⊕ Y  φ7,E,Ax Z1 ⊕ Z2 using φ7 = {X 7→ Z1 ⊕ 0, Y 7→ Z2}
and Equation (5.6)
X ⊕ Y  φ8,E,Ax Z1 ⊕ Z2 using φ8 = {X 7→ Z1, Y 7→ 0⊕ Z2}
and Equation (5.6)
X ⊕ Y  φ9,E,Ax Z using φ9 = {X 7→ U ⊕ U, Y 7→ Z}
and Equation (5.8)
X ⊕ Y  φ10,E,Ax Z using φ10 = {X 7→ Z, Y 7→ U ⊕ U}
and Equation (5.8)
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X ⊕ Y  φ11,E,Ax Z1 ⊕ Z2 using φ11 = {X 7→ U ⊕ U ⊕ Z1, Y 7→ Z2}
and Equation (5.8)
X ⊕ Y  φ12,E,Ax Z1 ⊕ Z2 using φ12 = {X 7→ Z1, Y 7→ U ⊕ U ⊕ Z2}
and Equation (5.8)
Indeed, the narrowing search command of Maude [30] computes 124 different
narrowing steps from term t. When we consider narrowing sequences instead
of single steps, we can easily get a combinatorial explosion, since after any
of the narrowing steps: X ⊕ Y  φ6,E,Ax Z1⊕Z2, X ⊕ Y  φ8,E,Ax Z1⊕Z2, or
X⊕Y  φ11,E,Ax Z1⊕Z2, we have another 124 different narrowing steps. Also,
there are clearly many infinite narrowing sequences, such as the one repeat-
ing substitution φ6 again and again: X ⊕ Y  φ6,E,Ax Z1 ⊕ Z2 φ′6,E,Ax Z ′1 ⊕
Z ′2 φ′′6 ,E,Ax Z
′′
1⊕Z ′′2  E,Ax · · · where φ′6 = {Z1 7→ U ′⊕Z ′1, Z2 7→ U ′⊕Z ′2} and
φ′′6 = {Z ′1 7→ U ′′ ⊕ Z ′′1 , Z ′2 7→ U ′′ ⊕ Z ′′2}. Clearly, strategies that dramatically
reduce this search space, yet are complete, are surely needed.
5.3.1 Completeness of Narrowing w.r.t. Rewriting
Several notions of completeness of narrowing w.r.t. rewriting have been given
in the literature (e.g., [74, 78, 91]).
Theorem 9 (Completeness of Full Narrowing Modulo) [78] Let
(Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). Let t1 be a
Σ-term and σ be an E,Ax-normalized substitution. If t1σ →E,Ax t2 →E,Ax
· · · →E,Ax tn such that tn = (t1σ)↓E,Ax, then there exist terms t′2, . . . , t′n and
E,Ax-normalized substitutions θ1, . . . , θn and ρ s.t. t1 θ1,E,Ax t′2 θ2,E,Ax · · ·
 θn,E,Ax t′n, σ|Var(t1) =Ax (θ1 · · · θnρ)|Var(t1), and ti =Ax t′iρ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We can easily extend the previous result to allow non-normalized substitu-
tions.
Lemma 8 (Completeness) Let (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equa-
tional theory (Σ, E). Let t1 be a Σ-term and θ be any substitution. If
t1θ →!E,Ax t2, then there exists a term t′2 and two E,Ax-normalized sub-





Proof. Let θ¯ = θ↓E,Ax. By coherence, confluence and termination of →E,Ax,
t1θ →!E,Ax t2 implies ∃t3 : t1θ¯ →!E,Ax t3 and t3 =Ax t2. By Theorem 9,
there exists a term t′3 and two E,Ax-normalized substitutions σ and ρ s.t.
t1 ∗σ,R,E t′3, θ¯|Var(t1) =Ax (σρ)|Var(t1), and t3 =Ax t′3ρ. 2
As a direct consequence of Lemma 8 we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 (Complete Variant Semantics by Full Narrowing) Let
(Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). Then for each
term t, the set
[[t]]FullE,Ax = {(t′, θ) | t ∗θ,E,Ax t′ ∧ t′ = t′↓E,Ax}
is a complete set of variants, i.e., [[t]]?E,Ax vE,Ax [[t]]FullE,Ax.
Note that, although [[t]]?E,Ax vE,Ax [[t]]FullE,Ax, not all (t′, θ) ∈ [[t]]FullE,Ax need to
be most general, i.e., [[t]]FullE,Ax is not necessarily a most general complete set of
variants as shown by Example 5. Therefore, full narrowing gives us a way of
computing a complete variant semantics, [[t]]FullE,Ax, from which we would like
to obtain a subset S ⊆ [[t]]FullE,Ax such that S is a most general and complete
variant semantics, i.e., S = [[t]]E,Ax. The key question, then, is:
Can we compute the set [[t]]E,Ax of most general E-variants of a
term t effectively?
This is not entirely obvious. Full (i.e., unrestricted) E,Ax-narrowing may
never terminate and the set [[t]]FullE,Ax can easily be infinite, even though a fi-
nite set of most general elements for it exists. The solution, of course, is that
we should look for adequate narrowing strategies that have better proper-
ties than full E,Ax-narrowing so that if [[t]]E,Ax is finite, then the narrowing
strategy will terminate and will compute [[t]]E,Ax.
5.3.2 Narrowing Strategies and Their Properties
In order to obtain an appropriate narrowing strategy that enjoys better prop-
erties than full E,Ax-narrowing and allows to compute [[t]]E,Ax, we need to
characterize what a narrowing strategy is and which properties it must sat-
isfy. E.g., the notion of variant-completeness rather than the standard full
narrowing completeness becomes essential.
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First, we define the notion of a narrowing strategy and several useful prop-
erties. Given a narrowing sequence α : (t0 p0,σ0,R,Ax t1 · · · pn−1,σn−1,R,Ax tn),
we denote by αi the narrowing sequence αi : (t0 p0,σ0,R,Ax t1 · · ·
 pi−1,σi−1,R,Ax ti) which is a prefix of α. Given an order-sorted rewrite theory
R, we denote by FullR(t) the (possibly infinite) set of all narrowing sequences
starting at term t.
Definition 11 (Narrowing Strategy) A narrowing strategy S is a func-
tion of two arguments, namely, a rewrite theory R = (Σ, Ax,R) and a term
t ∈ TΣ(X ), which we denote by SR(t), such that SR(t) ⊆ FullR(t). We re-
quire SR(t) to be prefix closed, i.e., for each narrowing sequence α ∈ SR(t)
of length n, and each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we also have αi ∈ SR(t).
Note that this definition of a narrowing strategy is very general and does
not consider any aspect about efficient narrowing strategies at all, see [9] for
efficient narrowing strategies.
Each narrowing strategy is trivially sound w.r.t. rewriting. We say that
a narrowing strategy S is complete w.r.t. rewriting if it satisfies Theorem 9
above, concretized as follows.
Definition 12 (Completeness of a Narrowing Strategy) Let R =
(Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). A narrowing
strategy SR is called complete iff for each pair of terms t1 and t2 and each
E,Ax-normalized substitution θ such that t1θ →!E,Ax t2, there exists a term t′2
and two E,Ax-normalized substitutions σ and ρ s.t. (t1 ∗σ,E,Ax t′2) ∈ SR(t),
θ|Var(t1) =Ax (σρ)|Var(t1), and t2 =Ax t′2ρ.
In this chapter we are interested in a notion of completeness of a narrow-
ing strategy slightly different than previous notions, which we call variant-
completeness. First, we extend the variant semantics to narrowing strategies
and consider only narrowing sequences to normalized terms.
Definition 13 (Narrowing Variant Semantics) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be
a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E) and SR be a narrowing strat-
egy. We define the set of narrowing variants of a term t w.r.t. SR as
[[t]]SRE,Ax = {(t′, θ) | (t ∗θ,E,Ax t′) ∈ SR(t) and t′ = t′↓E,Ax}.
Now, we can define our notion of variant-completeness.
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Definition 14 (Variant Completeness and Minimality) Let
R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). A narrow-
ing strategy SR is called E,Ax-variant-complete (or just variant-complete) iff
for any Σ-term t we have that [[t]]E,Ax 'E,Ax [[t]]SRE,Ax. The narrowing strategy
SR is called E,Ax-variant-minimal (or just variant-minimal) iff, in addi-
tion, for any Σ-term t we have that [[t]]E,Ax ≈Ax [[t]]SRE,Ax and for each pair of
variants (t1, θ1), (t2, θ2) ∈ [[t]]SRE,Ax such that (t1, θ1) 6=Ax (t2, θ2), we have that
(t1, θ1) 6≈Ax (t2, θ2).
In practice, the set SR(t) of narrowing sequences from a term t will be
generated by an algorithm ASR . That is, ASR is a computable function
such that, given a pair (R, t), it enumerates the set SR(t). Even when R =
(Σ, Ax,E) is a decomposition of an equational theory, the strategy SR is
variant-complete, and [[t]]E,Ax is finite on an input term t, it may happen that
[[t]]SRE,Ax is not finite. Furthermore, even if [[t]]
SR
E,Ax is finite, its enumeration
using the algorithm ASR may not terminate. We are of course interested in
variant-complete narrowing strategies that will always terminate on an input
term t whenever [[t]]E,Ax is finite. This leads to the following notion of variant
termination for an algorithm AS , further restricting the class of algorithms
we are interested in.
Definition 15 (Optimal Variant Termination) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be
a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E) and SR be an E,Ax-variant-
complete narrowing strategy. An algorithm ASR for computing SR is variant-
terminating iff ASR(t) terminates on input (R, t) iff [[t]]SRE,Ax is finite. An algo-
rithm ASR is optimally variant-terminating iff both ASR is variant-termina-
ting and [[t]]SRE,Ax is variant-minimal for every Σ-term t.
By abuse of language, we say that a narrowing strategy S is variant-termina-
ting (resp. optimally variant-terminating) whenever AS is. The term “opti-
mally variant-terminating” is justified as follows.
Proposition 1 Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational
theory (Σ, E). Let SR be an E,Ax-variant-complete narrowing strategy and
S ′R be an optimally variant-terminating narrowing strategy. Then, for each
Σ-term t such that SR(t) terminates, then S ′R(t) also terminates.
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Proof. If SR(t) terminates, then [[t]]SRE,Ax is necessarily finite. Therefore,
[[t]]
S′R
E,Ax is also necessarily finite, since S ′R is variant-minimal. Therefore,
S ′R(t) also terminates. 2
Therefore, if a variant-complete narrowing strategy SR is optimally
variant-terminating, then whenever any other narrowing strategy S ′R enjoy-
ing the same variant-completeness property terminates on a term t, SR is
guaranteed to terminate on t as well. Such an optimally variant-terminating
strategy would be a powerful tool, improving over many narrowing strate-
gies defined previously in the literature, as shown in the next section. Later,
in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 below, we introduce a narrowing strategy that is
optimally variant-terminating under some conditions.
5.3.3 Basic Narrowing (Modulo) is neither Variant-Complete
nor Optimally Variant-Terminating
In this section we show that basic narrowing modulo AC is not variant-
complete. Furthermore, we show that even basic narrowing without axioms
is not optimally variant-terminating, thus showing that there is room for
improvement even in the free case. We extend the standard definition of
basic narrowing given in [73] to the modulo case.
Definition 16 (Basic Narrowing modulo Ax) Let (Σ, Ax,R) be an
order-sorted rewrite theory. Given a term t ∈ TΣ(X ), a substitution ρ, and
a set W of variables such that Var(t) ⊆ W and Var(ρ) ⊆ W , a basic nar-
rowing step modulo Ax for 〈t, ρ〉 is defined by 〈t, ρ〉 b p,θ,R,Ax 〈t′, ρ′〉 iff there
is p ∈ PosΣ(t), a rule l→ r ∈ R properly renamed s.t. Var(l) ∩W = ∅, and
θ ∈ CSUW ′Ax(t|pρ = l) for W ′ = W ∪ Var(l) such that t′ = t[r]p, and ρ′ = ρθ.
Basic narrowing modulo AC is incomplete w.r.t. innermost rewriting
modulo AC [123] despite its completeness in the free case [94], i.e., there
are innermost rewriting sequences modulo AC that are not lifted to basic
narrowing sequences modulo Ax. In particular, basic narrowing modulo AC
is not variant-complete.
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Example 6 The following full narrowing sequence relevant for the unifica-
tion problem X1 +X2
?
= 0 of Example 1:
X1 +X2 ρ1,E,AxX ′ +X ′′
using ρ1 = {X1 7→ a+X ′, X2 7→ a+X ′′} and rule (5.3)
X ′ +X ′′ ρ2,E,Ax 0
using ρ2 = {X ′ 7→ b,X ′′ 7→ b} and rule (5.2)
is not a basic narrowing sequence modulo AC, since after the first step it
results in a variable X and no further basic narrowing step modulo AC is
possible:
〈X1 +X2, id〉 b τ1,E,Ax 〈X, τ1〉
using τ1 = {X1 7→ a+X ′, X2 7→ a+X ′′, X 7→ X ′ +X ′′} and rule (5.3)
Since the pair (0, ρ1ρ2) is a variant of X1 + X2 not subsumed by any basic
narrowing sequence generated from X1 +X2, basic narrowing modulo AC is
not variant-complete.
Moreover, basic narrowing in the free case is actually not optimally
variant-terminating, as shown by the following example.
Example 7 Consider the rewrite theory R = (Σ, ∅, E) where E is the set
of confluent and terminating rules E = {f(x) → x, f(f(x)) → f(x)} and
Σ contains only the unary symbol f and a constant a. The term t = f(x)
has only one variant: [[f(x)]]E,Ax = {(x, id)}. Indeed, the theory has the
finite variant property (see Example 15 in Section 5.5, or also [53]). Basic
narrowing performs the following two narrowing steps:
(i) 〈f(x), id〉 b {x 7→x′},E 〈x′, {x 7→ x′}〉 and
(ii) 〈f(x), id〉 b {x 7→f(x′)},E 〈f(x′), {x 7→ f(x′)}〉.
However, the second narrowing step leads to the following non-terminating
basic narrowing sequence:
〈f(x), id〉 b {x 7→f(x′)},E 〈f(x′), {x 7→ f(x′)}〉
b {x′ 7→f(x′′)},E 〈f(x′′), {x 7→ f(f(x′′)), x′ 7→ f(x′′)}〉
· · ·
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and basic narrowing is unable to terminate and provide the finite number of
variants associated to the term t.
In the next section we define a variant-complete narrowing strategy.
5.4 Folding Variant Narrowing
In order to compute the variants of a term, we can simply keep track of all
the variants generated so far by narrowing, since we know that for any de-
composition there is a (possibly infinite) set of most general variants (modulo
axioms and modulo renaming) and sooner or later full narrowing will gener-
ate those most general variants, thanks to Corollary 1. In this section, we
define a narrowing strategy called folding narrowing, which works in this way
and achieves variant-completeness. Note that the folding narrowing strategy
is parametric on another complete narrowing strategy, which will allow us
later to define more concise narrowing strategies for obtaining the variants.
Also note that only when a term has a finite number of most general variants,
a narrowing strategy can be optimally variant-terminating for that term; this
is studied in detail in Section 5.5 below.
First, we need to introduce the notion of variant preordering with nor-
malization, which is very close to Definition 6, in order to capture when a
newly generated variant is subsumed by a previously generated one.
Definition 17 (Normalized Variant Preordering) Let (Σ, Ax,E) be a
decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E) and t be a Σ-term. Given two
variants (t1, θ1), (t2, θ2) ∈ [[t]]?E,Ax, we write (t1, θ1) v!E,Ax (t2, θ2), meaning
(t2, θ2) is a more general variant of t than (t1, θ1), iff
(t1↓E,Ax, θ1) vE,Ax (t2, θ2).
We define in Definition 18 below the folding narrowing strategy, which is
based on the different levels of reachable states, denoted as Frontierv!E,Ax(I)i,
and the relation v!E,Ax for identifying variants subsumed by previously gen-
erated ones. We are presenting a specialized version of the folding reachable
transition system of [51] rolled together with our folding narrowing strategy.
Given a decomposition R = (Σ, Ax,E) of an equational theory (Σ, E) and
a narrowing strategy SR, we extend SR to variants as follows: given a term
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t and a substitution ρ, SR((t, ρ)) = {(t, ρ) ∗σ,E,Ax(t′, ρσ) | (t ∗σ,E,Ax t′) ∈
SR(t)}.
Definition 18 (Folding Narrowing Strategy) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a
decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E) and SR a narrowing strategy.




{(y, ρσ) | (∃(z, ρ) ∈ Frontierv!E,Ax(I)n : (z, ρ) σ,E,Ax(y, ρσ))∧
(@k ≤ n, (w, τ) ∈ Frontierv!E,Ax(I)k : (y, ρσ) v
!
E,Ax (w, τ))}
The folding SR-narrowing strategy, denoted by S	R(t), is defined as
S	R(t) = {t kσ,E,Ax t′ | ((t, id) kσ,E,Ax(t′, σ)) ∈ SR(t)∧
(t′, σ) ∈ Frontierv!E,Ax(I)k}
We write Full	R to denote the folding version of the full narrowing strategy
FullR. The following example shows the advantages of folding full narrowing
for computing variants, for instance w.r.t. basic narrowing modulo AC.
Example 8 Considering Example 7. Using the Full	R strategy, we only get
step (i), since step (ii) is subsumed by step (i). That is, (f(x′), {x 7→
f(x′)}) v!E,∅ (x′, {x 7→ x′}), since f(x′)↓E,Ax = x′. So even though basic
narrowing does not terminate for this equational theory, Full	R does.
The following example shows what steps are performed by Full	R and its
termination on our running example.
Example 9 Using the theory from Example 3, for t = X ⊕ Y we get the
following Full	R steps. First, we show the narrowing steps with normalized
substitutions.
(i) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ1(Z, φ1), using Equation (5.6) and substitution φ1 =
{X 7→ 0, Y 7→ Z},
(ii) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ2(Z, φ2), using Equation (5.6) and substitution φ2 =
{X 7→ Z, Y 7→ 0},
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(iii) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ3(Z, φ3), using Equation (5.8) and substitution φ3 =
{X 7→ Z ⊕ U, Y 7→ U},
(iv) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ4(Z, φ4), using Equation (5.8) and substitution φ4 =
{X 7→ U, Y 7→ Z ⊕ U},
(v) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ5(0, φ5), using Equation (5.7) and substitution φ5 =
{X 7→ U, Y 7→ U},
(vi) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ6(Z1 ⊕ Z2, φ6), using Equation (5.8) and φ6 = {X 7→
U ⊕ Z1, Y 7→ U ⊕ Z2}.
Non-normalized narrowing steps such as
(X ⊕ Y, id) φ6(Z, φ7), using Equation (5.8) and φ7 = {X 7→
U ⊕ U, Y 7→ Z}
are also computed by Full	R but all are finally subsumed by a variant with the
normalized version of the same substitution, e.g., (Z, φ7) vE,Ax (Z, φ1). Note
that Full	R terminates after generating all narrowing steps above:
1. There are no further steps possible from (i)-(iv), since any instantia-
tion of Z for which a narrowing step is possible would mean that the
computed substitution is not normalized.
2. There is no further step possible from (v), since 0 is a normal form.
3. There are no further steps possible from (vi), since we are back at the
beginning, i.e, (Z1 ⊕ Z2, φ6) v!E,Ax (t, id), and can repeat all of the steps
possible from (t, id), but all of the results are subsumed by the same step
we already have from (t, id).
Note that by the use of the folding definition we get only the shortest
paths to each possible term (depending on the substitution), since longer
paths are simply subsumed by shorter ones using vE,Ax.
Any folding narrowing strategy is sound as it is a further restriction of
the narrowing strategy. We prove that any folding narrowing strategy S	 is
variant-complete provided the given narrowing strategy S that is restricted
by folding is complete according to Definition 12. First, we provide two
auxiliary definitions and an auxiliary result.
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Definition 19 Given a decomposition (Σ, Ax,E), a term t, and two narrow-
ing sequences α1 : t ∗σ1,E,Ax t1 and α2 : t ∗σ2,E,Ax t2, we write α1 vE,Ax α2
if there is a substitution θ such that (σ1↓E,Ax)|Var(t) =Ax (σ2θ)|Var(t) and
t1 =Ax t2θ. We write α1 ≈Ax α2 if there is a renaming substitution ρ such
that σ1|Var(t) =Ax (σ2ρ)|Var(t) and t1 =Ax t2ρ.
Definition 20 (Most General Narrowing Sequence) Given a decompo-
sition (Σ, Ax,E), a narrowing sequence α : t ∗θ,E,Ax(tθ)↓E,Ax is called a most
general narrowing sequence if for any narrowing sequence
α′ : t ∗θ′,E,Ax(tθ′)↓E,Ax such that α vE,Ax α′, then α ≈Ax α′.
Lemma 9 Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory
(Σ, E). Let SR be a complete narrowing strategy. If α : t ∗σ,E,Ax(tσ)↓E,Ax and
α is most general, then there is a narrowing sequence α′ : t ∗σ′,E,Ax(tσ′)↓E,Ax
such that α′ ∈ S	R(t) and α ≈Ax α′.
Proof. By contradiction. Let α : t σ1,E,Ax t1 · · · tk−1 σk,E,Ax tk = (tσ)↓E,Ax.
Since there is no narrowing sequence α′ : t ∗σ′,E,Ax(tσ′)↓E,Ax such that α′ ∈
S	R(t) and α′ ≈Ax α, by completeness of SR there is an alternative narrowing
sequence β : t θ1,E,Ax u1 · · ·un−1 θn,E,Ax un = (tθ)↓E,Ax in S	R(t) with θ =
θ1 · · · θn and n ≤ k such that (tn, σ1 · · ·σn) v!E,Ax (un, θ1 · · · θn), i.e., there is
a substitution ρ such that tn↓E,Ax =Ax unρ and ((σ1 · · ·σn)↓E,Ax)|Var(t) =Ax
(θ1 · · · θnρ)|Var(t). Note that ρ cannot be a renaming, since ρ being a renam-
ing implies β ≈Ax α. Then, by confluence, there is a rewriting sequence
starting from un that reaches tσ↓E,Ax, i.e., (unρσn+1 · · ·σk)→∗E,Ax (tσ)↓E,Ax.
But this rewriting sequence can be lifted to a narrowing sequence, i.e., by
completeness of SR there is a narrowing sequence β′ : un ∗τ,E,Ax t′′ and
a substitution ρ′ such that (σn+1 · · · σk)↓E,Ax|Var(un) =Ax (τρ′)|Var(un) and
(tσ)↓E,Ax =Ax t′′ρ′. Then, we can concatenate both narrowing sequences
β; β′ : t ∗θ,E,Ax un ∗τ,E,Ax t′′ such that (σ1 · · ·σnσn+1 · · ·σk)↓E,Ax|Var(t) =Ax
(θ1 · · · θnρτρ′)|Var(t) and (tθ)↓E,Ax =Ax t′′ρ′ρ. Since ρ is not a renaming, the
narrowing sequence β; β′ is more general than α. But this contradicts that α
is a most general narrowing sequence and, thus, the conclusion follows. 2
Theorem 10 (Variant Completeness of Folding Narrowing) LetR =
(Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). Let t1 be
a Σ-term and θ be an E,Ax-normalized substitution. Let SR be a com-
plete narrowing strategy. If t1θ →!E,Ax t2 then there exist a term t′2 and
128
two E,Ax-normalized substitutions σ and ρ s.t. (t1 ∗σ,E,Ax t′2) ∈ S	R(t1),
θ|Var(t1) =Ax (σρ)|Var(t1), and t2 =Ax t′2ρ.
Proof. Given t1θ →!E,Ax t2, by completeness of narrowing (Theorem 9), there
exist a term t′2 and two E,Ax-normalized substitutions σ and ρ such that
(α : t1 ∗σ,E,Ax t′2) ∈ SR(t1), θ|Var(t1) =Ax (σρ)|Var(t1), and t2 =Ax t′2ρ. Let us
assume that α is most general, since there is always at least one most general
narrowing sequence. Then, by Lemma 9, there exists (β : t1 ∗φ,E,Ax u) ∈
SR(t1) such that α ≈Ax β and the conclusion follows. 2
We can effectively compute a complete set of variants by folding narrowing
in the following way.
Corollary 2 (Computing the Variants) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decom-
position of an equational theory (Σ, E). Let t be a Σ-term. Let SR be a com-
plete narrowing strategy. If (t′, σ) ∈ [[t]]E,Ax, then there are t′′, σ′, and ρ such
that (t ∗σ′,E,Ax t′′) ∈ S	R(t), t′′ is →E,Ax-irreducible, σ′ is →E,Ax-normalized,
ρ is a renaming, t′ =Ax t′′ρ, and σ|Var(t) =Ax (σ′ρ)|Var(t).
We can conclude that the folding full-narrowing strategy is a variant-
complete narrowing strategy.
Corollary 3 Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory
(Σ, E). The folding full-narrowing strategy Full	R is variant-complete, i.e.,
for each Σ-term t, [[t]]E,Ax 'E,Ax [[t]]
Full	R
E,Ax .
Note that folding full-narrowing is not variant-minimal (and thus not
optimally variant-terminating).
Example 10 Consider the following decomposition without axioms
f(s(X)) = g(X) g(s(X)) = 0 f(s(s(0))) = 0.
For term f(X), we have that {(f(X), id), (g(X ′), {X 7→ s(X ′)}), (0, {X 7→
s(s(X ′′))})} is the set of most general variants. However, folding full-narrow-
ing will generate those three variants plus (0, {X 7→ s(s(0))}), which is sub-
sumed by variant (0, {X 7→ s(s(X ′′))})}:
1. The variant (f(X), id) without any narrowing step.
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2. Variants with one narrowing step: (g(X ′), {X 7→ s(X ′)}) and
(0, {X 7→ s(s(0))}), i.e., (f(X) {X 7→s(X′)},E,Ax g(X ′)) ∈ Full	R and
(f(X) {X 7→s(s(0))},E,Ax 0) ∈ Full	R.
3. The variant (0, {X 7→ s(s(X ′′))}) with two narrowing steps:
(f(X) {X 7→s(X′)},E,Ax g(X ′) {X′ 7→s(X′′)},E,Ax 0) ∈ Full	R
In the next section, we refine the folding narrowing strategies and improve
over the folding full-narrowing strategy for computing variants.
5.4.1 Variant Narrowing Strategy
We have shown that the folding full-narrowing strategy Full	R is variant-
complete. However, there is another interesting aspect about narrowing
strategies:
Are there strategies more effective than full-narrowing which can
be extended to folding narrowing in order to compute variants?
We answered this question in the positive in our paper [54] with the notion
of variant narrowing strategy, but we improve the presentation here.
Let us first motivate with two ideas why a narrowing strategy which is an
alternative to full narrowing can be very useful for a decomposition. First, the
completeness of a narrowing strategy w.r.t. a decomposition is restricted to
normalized substitutions. Therefore, we are interested in narrowing strategies
that provide only narrowing sequences with normalized substitutions. Basic
narrowing was an attempt at this but, as we show in Example 6, it is incom-
plete for the modulo case as well as (possibly) non-terminating for computing
variants, as shown in Example 7. Here we present a narrowing strategy that
computes only normalized substitutions without losing completeness. Sec-
ond, applying narrowing E,Ax to perform (E∪Ax)-unification without any
restriction, as done in FullR, is very wasteful, because as soon as a rewrite
step →E,Ax is enabled in a term that has also narrowing steps  E,Ax, such
a rewrite step should always be taken before any further narrowing steps
are applied, thanks to confluence and coherence modulo Ax. This idea is
consistent with the implementation of rewriting logic [124] and, therefore,
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the relation →!E,Ax; E,Ax makes sense as an optimization of  E,Ax (see
[70] for discussion about this idea in a context without axioms). However,
this is still a naive approach, since a rewrite step and a narrowing step sat-
isfy a more general property, which is the reason for being able to take the
rewrite step and avoiding the narrowing step. Namely, for a decomposition
R = (Σ, Ax,E), if two narrowing steps t σ1,E,Ax t1 and t σ2,E,Ax t2 are
possible and we have that σ1 vAx σ2 (i.e., σ2 is more general than σ1), then
it is enough to take only the narrowing step using σ2. These improvements
are formalized as follows. First, we introduce a partial order between nar-
rowing steps, defining when a narrowing step is more general than another
narrowing step.
Definition 21 (Preorder and equivalence of narrowing steps) Let
R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of (Σ, E). Let us consider two nar-
rowing steps α1 : t σ1,E,Ax s1 and α2 : t σ2,E,Ax s2. We write α1 Ax α2
if σ1|Var(t) vAx σ2|Var(t) and α1 ≺Ax α2 if σ1|Var(t) <Ax σ2|Var(t) (i.e., σ2 is
strictly more general than σ1). We write α1 'Ax α2 if σ1|Var(t) 'Ax σ2|Var(t).
The relation α1 'Ax α2 between two narrowing steps from t defines a set of
equivalence classes between such narrowing steps. In what follows we will be
interested in choosing a unique representative α ∈ [α]'Ax in each equivalence
class of narrowing steps from t. Therefore, α will always denote a chosen
unique representative α ∈ [α]'Ax.
The relationAx provides an improvement on narrowing executions, since
narrowing steps with more general computed substitutions will always be se-
lected instead of narrowing steps with more instantiated computed substitu-
tions. Also, this relation ensures that, when both a rewriting step and a nar-
rowing step are available, the rewriting step will always be chosen. Finally,
the relation 'Ax provides another improvement, since only one narrowing
(or rewriting) step is chosen in each equivalence class, reducing the width
of the narrowing tree even more. The very last improvement is to restrict
to normalized computed substitutions, as motivated at the beginning of this
section.
Definition 22 (Variant Narrowing) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposi-
tion of (Σ, E). Given a Σ-term t, we define the variant narrowing strategy
VNR(t) = {t ∗σ,E,Ax s}, where: (i) σ|Var(t) is E,Ax-normalized and (ii) each
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narrowing step u ρ,E,Ax v is defined as the narrowing step α : u ρ,E,Ax v
such that α is maximal w.r.t. the order Ax, and α is the chosen unique
representative of its 'Ax-equivalence class.
Example 11 Consider Example 3. For the term t = X⊕Y⊕X⊕Y , there are
nearly 150 full narrowing steps, since subterm X⊕Y had 124 narrowing steps
as explained in Example 5 and there are even more combinations. However,
variant narrowing recognizes that this term is not yet normalized, i.e., X ⊕
Y ⊕X⊕Y → 0, and such a rewriting step is more general than any narrowing
step. Thus, variant narrowing performs only a rewriting step and avoids such
an exceptionally large number of narrowing steps. Note that there are two
other rewrite steps X⊕Y ⊕X⊕Y → Y ⊕Y and X⊕Y ⊕X⊕Y → X⊕X and
variant narrowing will choose one of these three as the unique representative
of the 'AC-equivalence class of rewrite steps.
We denote the extended folding version of variant narrowing, i.e., folding
variant narrowing, by VN	R. The condition in Definition 22 that σ|Var(t) is
E,Ax-normalized (in contrast to σ being E,Ax-normalized) is essential for
a correct behavior of the strategy, as shown below.
Example 12 Consider the following decomposition (Σ, ∅, E) where E con-
tains f(a, b,X)→ f(a, b), symbol f is AC, and X is a variable. Consider the
term t = f(a, a, a, b, b, b), whose normal form is f(a, b), i.e.,
f(a, a, a, b, b, b) →E,Ax f(a, b). Any rewriting sequence leading to its normal
form does not consider a normalized substitution, i.e., the first rewriting step
of any rewriting sequence will use substitution {X 7→ f(a, a, b, b)}. There-
fore, we cannot restrict ourselves to normalized substitution w.r.t. rewriting
steps.
On the other hand, consider now the term s = f(Y1, Y2) and the narrowing
step f(Y1, Y2) ρ2,E,Ax f(a, b) with ρ2 = {Y1 7→ f(a, b, Y3), X 7→ f(Y2, Y3)}.
The unifier ρ2 is not normalized, since f(a, b, Y3)↓E,Ax = f(a, b). Note that
we cannot normalize the substitution, since it would not correspond to any
narrowing step and we simply discard this narrowing step because there is an-
other more general narrowing step (i.e., (f(a, b), ρ2↓E,Ax) vAx (f(a, b), ρ1)).
Note that the ability to discard narrowing steps in confluent, terminating,
and coherent systems whose computed substitution is not normalized is a key
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point for achieving termination for variant generation. The set of most gen-
eral unifiers computed by all the narrowing steps is as follows:
ρ1 = {Y1 7→ f(a, b), X 7→ Y2}
ρ2 = {Y1 7→ f(a, b, Y3), X 7→ f(Y2, Y3)}
ρ3 = {Y2 7→ f(a, b), X 7→ Y1}
ρ4 = {Y2 7→ f(a, b, Y3), X 7→ f(Y1, Y3)}
ρ5 = {Y1 7→ a, Y2 7→ b}
ρ6 = {Y1 7→ a, Y2 7→ f(b, Y3), X 7→ Y3}
ρ7 = {Y1 7→ b, Y2 7→ a}
ρ8 = {Y1 7→ b, Y2 7→ f(a, Y3), X 7→ Y3}
ρ9 = {Y1 7→ f(a, Y3), Y2 7→ b,X 7→ Y3}
ρ10 = {Y1 7→ f(a, Y3), Y2 7→ f(b, Y4), X 7→ f(Y3, Y4)}
ρ11 = {Y1 7→ f(b, Y3), Y2 7→ a,X 7→ Y3}
ρ12 = {Y1 7→ f(b, Y3), Y2 7→ f(a, Y4), X 7→ f(Y3, Y4)}
Note that the relation →!E,Ax; E,Ax is (appropriately) simulated by
 +E,Ax, since in the relation  +E,Ax rewriting steps are always given prior-
ity over narrowing steps.
Lemma 10 (Normalization of Variant Narrowing) LetR = (Σ, Ax,E)
be a decomposition of (Σ, E). Let t be a Σ-term. If t is not E,Ax-irreducible,
then, relative to the unique choice of α ∈ [α]'Ax in Definition 21 , there is a
unique  E,Ax-narrowing sequence from t performing only rewriting steps.
Proof. Immediate, since t is not E,Ax-irreducible and the theory is confluent
and sort-decreasing. 2
The following result ensures that variant narrowing is complete.
Theorem 11 (Completeness of Variant Narrowing) Let R =
(Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of (Σ, E). If α : t ∗σ,E,Ax(tσ)↓E,Ax such that
σ|Var(t) is E,Ax-normalized and α is a most general narrowing sequence, then
there exists σ′ such that t ∗σ′,E,Ax(tσ′)↓E,Ax, and σ|Var(t) ≈Ax σ′|Var(t).
Proof. If α : t ∗σ,E,Ax(tσ)↓E,Ax such that σ|Var(t) is E,Ax-normalized and
α is a most general narrowing sequence, then it is sufficient to show that the
computed substitution at each step in α is maximal w.r.t. vAx.
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We prove this by contradiction. Let us consider a narrowing step i ∈
{1, . . . , n} in α, i.e. ti σi,E,Ax ti+1, such that σi is not maximal w.r.t. vAx.
That is, there is an alternative narrowing step from ti, i.e., ti τ,E,Axw,
with a strictly more general substitution τ , i.e., there is a substitution τ ′
s.t. σi|Var(ti) =Ax (ττ ′)|Var(ti) and τ ′ is not a renaming. Note that, since
α is most general, there is no narrowing sequence w ∗φ,E,Ax tn and substi-
tution φ′ such that σ|Var(t) =Ax (σ1 · · ·σi−1τφφ′)|Var(t). Then, we have that
tiσi →E,Ax ti+1 and that there is a term w′ such that tiσi →E,Ax w′ and
w′ =Ax wτ ′. By confluence, there is a term u such that ti+1 →∗E,Ax u
and w′ →∗E,Ax u. But then, for any narrowing sequence u ∗µ,E,Ax u′ such
that µ|Var(ti+1) =Ax (σi+1 · · ·σn)|Var(ti+1), there is a whole narrowing sequence
t ∗σ′,E,Ax(tσ′)↓E,Ax such that σ′|Var(t) = (σ1 · · ·σi−1τµ)|Var(t). This implies
that σ <Ax σ
′, since (σi · · ·σn)|Var(ti) =Ax (τµτ ′)|Var(ti). Therefore, we have
a contradiction because σ′ is strictly more general than σ. 2
Note that the previous theorem is only valid when E is confluent2 modulo
Ax, and not just ground confluent [119] modulo Ax, as shown by the following
example.
Example 13 Let us consider the following rewrite theory without axioms,
which is terminating and ground confluent but not confluent:
f(X) = 0 f(X) = g(X) g(0) = 0 g(s(X)) = g(X)
If we consider the term f(X) and the narrowing step taking the first equa-
tion, then we compute the most general substitution, i.e. f(X) id,E,Ax 0.
However, if we consider f(X) and the narrowing step that takes the sec-
ond equation, i.e., f(X) id,E,Ax g(X), we will compute an infinite number
of substitutions, i.e., ∀n ≥ 0 : g(X) ∗{X 7→sn(0)},E,Ax 0, and none of them is
more general than the identity substitution computed with the first equation.
The following interesting result holds for folding variant narrowing, but
not for folding full-narrowing.
Theorem 12 (Minimality of Folding Variant Narrowing) Let
R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of (Σ, E). If α : t ∗σ,E,Ax(tσ)↓E,Ax with
2Note that a decomposition already requires confluence instead of ground confluence.
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σ|Var(t) being E,Ax-normalized and α′ : t ∗σ′,E,Ax(tσ′)↓E,Ax with σ′|Var(t) be-
ing E,Ax-normalized such that σ|Var(t) <Ax σ′|Var(t), and α′ is a most general
narrowing sequence, then there is a narrowing sequence β : t ∗θ,E,Ax(tθ)↓E,Ax
in VN	R such that α
′ ≈Ax β but there is no narrowing sequence
β′ : t ∗θ′,E,Ax(tθ′)↓E,Ax in VN	R such that α ≈Ax β′.
Proof. The first statement is proved by the most generality of α′ and The-
orem 11, i.e., there is β : t ∗θ,E,Ax(tθ)↓E,Ax in VN	R such that α′ ≈Ax β.
The second statement is proved by contradiction, i.e., we asume that there
is β′ : t ∗θ′,E,Ax(tθ′)↓E,Ax in VN	R such that α ≈Ax β′. For simplicity, we
assume that α′ ∈ VN	R and use α′ instead of β in the rest of the proof. Let
α and α′ be as follows:




2 · · · t′m−1 σ′m,E,Ax t′m = (tσ′)↓E,Ax
and
α : t σ1,E,Ax t1 σ2,E,Ax t2 · · · tn−1 σn,E,Ax tn = (tσ)↓E,Ax
Let us consider the first narrowing step i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in α, i.e. ti−1 σi,E,Axti,
where there is a substitution τ such that σi|Var(ti) =Ax (σ′iτ)|Var(ti) and τ is not
a renaming. Since (σ1 · · · σi−1)|Var(t) ≈Ax (σ′1 · · ·σ′i−1)|Var(t), by coherence and
confluence, there are two terms w and w′ such that
tσ1 · · · σi−1 →∗E,Ax w, tσ′1 · · ·σ′i−1 →∗E,Ax w′, and w ≈Ax w′. Let ρ be such
that (σ1 · · ·σi−1)|Var(t) =Ax (σ′1 · · ·σ′i−1ρ)|Var(t) and w =Ax w′ρ. We can
add substitution σ′i to have rewrite sequences tσ1 · · ·σi−1σ′i →∗E,Ax wσ′i and
tσ′1 · · ·σ′i−1ρσ′i →∗E,Ax wσ′i. By completeness of narrowing, there exist substi-
tutions φ and φ′ and a most general narrowing sequence α′′ : ti−1 ∗φ,E,Ax u
such that σ′i|Var(ti−1) =Ax (φφ′)|Var(ti−1), and wσ′i =Ax uφ′. But then there are
two narrowing steps from term ti−1, ti−1 σi,E,Ax ti and the first step of α′′
s.t. the first step of α′′ has a substitution more general than σi. But the VNR
strategy would have chosen the first step of α′′ instead of the narrowing step
ti−1 σi,E,Ax ti and this contradicts that there is β′ : t ∗θ′,E,Ax(tθ′)↓E,Ax in
VN	R such that α ≈Ax β′. 2
Now, we know that VN	R is an efficient variant-complete and variant-
minimal strategy, so we can use it to effectively compute variants.
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Corollary 4 Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory
(Σ, E). The folding variant narrowing strategy VN	R is variant-complete and
variant-minimal, i.e., for any Σ-term t, [[t]]E,Ax ≈Ax [[t]]
VN	R
E,Ax.
Finally, we return to our running example for the VN	R strategy.
Example 14 Consider Example 9. For t = X⊕Y we get the following VN	R
steps with normalized substitutions:
(i) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ1(Z, φ1), using Equation (5.6) and substitution φ1 =
{X 7→ 0, Y 7→ Z},
(ii) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ2(Z, φ2), using Equation (5.6) and substitution φ2 =
{X 7→ Z, Y 7→ 0},
(iii) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ3(Z, φ3), using Equation (5.8) and substitution φ3 =
{X 7→ Z ⊕ U, Y 7→ U},
(iv) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ4(Z, φ4), using Equation (5.8) and substitution φ4 =
{X 7→ U, Y 7→ Z ⊕ U},
(v) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ5(0, φ5), using Equation (5.7) and substitution φ5 =
{X 7→ U, Y 7→ U},
(vi) (X ⊕ Y, id) φ6(Z1 ⊕ Z2, φ6), using Equation (5.8) and φ6 = {X 7→
U ⊕ Z1, Y 7→ U ⊕ Z2}.
Note that VN	R terminates (as Full
	
R does) after generating all these narrow-
ing steps.
In the following, we study under which conditions the folding variant
narrowing strategy is optimally variant-terminating, providing the best nar-
rowing strategy for computing variants in the modulo case but also in the
free theory, improving beyond basic narrowing.
5.5 The Finite Variant Property
An interesting case is when we know a priori that any Σ-term has a finite
number of most general variants.
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Definition 23 (Finite variant property) [32] Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a
decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). Then (Σ, E), and thus R, has
the finite variant property (FV) iff for each Σ-term t, the set [[t]]E,Ax is finite.
We call R a finite variant decomposition of (Σ, E) iff R has the finite variant
property.
The following corollary is immediate for finite variant decompositions.
Corollary 5 Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational the-
ory (Σ, E) and SR be an E,Ax-variant-complete narrowing strategy. S	R is
variant-terminating iff R is a finite variant decomposition of (Σ, E).
Proof. Given a Σ-term t, for each (t′, σ) ∈ [[t]]E,Ax, by Corollary 2, there
are t′′, σ′, and ρ such that (t ∗σ′,E,Ax t′′) ∈ S	R(t), t′′ is →E,Ax-irreducible,
σ′|Var(t) is →E,Ax-normalized, ρ is a renaming, t′ =Ax t′′ρ, and σ|Var(t) =Ax
(σ′ρ)|Var(t). Since [[t]]E,Ax is finite and it contains the most general variants
w.r.t. vE,Ax, for each possible variant (u, φ) ∈ [[t]]?E,Ax, there is a node (u′, φ′)
in the narrowing tree such that (u, φ) vE,Ax (u′, φ′) and, thus, the narrowing
tree generated by S	R(t) has a bounded depth. 2
The folding variant narrowing VN	R is variant-minimal and the following
corollary holds for finite variant decompositions.
Corollary 6 If R = (Σ, Ax,E) is a finite variant decomposition of (Σ, E),
then VN	R is optimally variant-terminating.
Proof. By Corollary 4, VN	R is variant-minimal and, thus, the narrowing
tree generated by VN	R contains all and only all the variants of the set [[t]]E,Ax
for a given Σ-term t. Therefore, the narrowing tree is always the shortest
tree possible for generating the set of most general variants [[t]]E,Ax and we
conclude that VN	R is optimally variant-terminating. 2
5.5.1 Computing Variants for Theories with the Finite
Variant Property
Comon and Delaune characterize the finite variant property in terms of the
following boundedness property, which is equivalent to FV.
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Lemma 11 [32] Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational
theory (Σ, E). R has the finite variant property if and only if for every term
t, there is a finite set Θ(t) of substitutions such that
∀σ,∃θ ∈ Θ(t),∃τ : (σ↓E,Ax)|Var(t) =Ax (θτ)|Var(t)∧(tσ)↓E,Ax =Ax ((tθ)↓E,Ax)τ
Definition 24 (Boundedness property) [32] Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a
decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). R has the boundedness prop-
erty (BP) iff for every term t there exists an integer n, denoted by #E,Ax(t),
such that for every E,Ax-normalized substitution σ the normal form of tσ is
reachable by an E,Ax-rewriting sequence whose length can be bounded by n
(thus independently of σ), i.e.,
∀t, ∃n,∀σ, t(σ↓E,Ax) ≤n−→E,Ax (tσ)↓E,Ax.
Lemma 11 and Definition 24 allow the following result.
Theorem 13 [32] Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational
theory (Σ, E). Then, R satisfies the boundedness property if and only if R is
a finite variant decomposition of (Σ, E).
Obviously, if for a term t, the minimal length of a rewrite sequence to the
canonical form of an instance tσ, with σ normalized, cannot be bounded, the
theory does not have the finite variant property. It is easy to see that for the
addition equations
0 + Y = Y s(X) + Y = s(X + Y )
the term t = X + Y , and the family of substitutions σn = {X 7→ sn(0)},
n ∈ N, this is the case, and therefore, since FV ⇔ BP , the addition theory
lacks the finite variant property.
Example 15 Consider again Example 7 consisting of the rewrite theory R =
(Σ, ∅, E) where E is the set of confluent and terminating rules E = {f(x)→
x, f(f(x))→ f(x)} and Σ contains only the unary symbol f and a constant
a. The theory has the finite variant property as it does have the boundedness
property, since for any term t and a normalized substitution θ, a bound for t
is given by the number of f symbols in the term.
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Proposition 2 (Computing the Finite Variants) [54] Let
R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a finite variant decomposition of an order-sorted equa-
tional theory (Σ, E). Let t be a Σ-term and #E,Ax(t) = n. Then, (s, σ) ∈
[[t]]E,Ax if and only if there is a narrowing sequence t 
≤n
σ,E,Ax s such that s is
→E,Ax-irreducible and σ is →E,Ax-normalized.
Example 16 Consider again Example 3. For this theory, narrowing clearly
does not terminate because Z1 ⊕ Z2 {Z1 7→X1⊕Z′1, Z2 7→X1⊕Z′2},E,Ax Z ′1 ⊕ Z ′2 and
this can be repeated infinitely often. This equational theory has the bounded-
ness property, as it is shown to have FV in Example 26 below. A bound for
this theory is the number of ⊕ symbols in the term, so that the narrowing tree
can be restricted to depth 1 for the term t = Z1⊕Z2. Let us explain in detail
why the bound is the number of ⊕ symbols. Given the narrowing sequence
Z1⊕Z2 {Z17→X1⊕Z′1,Z27→X1⊕Z′2},E,Ax Z ′1⊕Z ′2 {Z′17→X′1⊕Z′′1 ,Z′27→X′1⊕Z′′2 },E,Ax Z ′′1⊕Z ′′2
(5.11)
we have the variant (Z ′′1⊕Z ′′2 , ρ) with ρ = {Z1 7→X1⊕X ′1⊕Z ′′1 , Z2 7→X1⊕X ′1⊕
Z ′′2 , Z
′
1 7→X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′1 , Z ′2 7→X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′2}. Also, the normalization sequence corre-
sponding to tρ that mimics the narrowing sequence (5.11) is
X1 ⊕X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′1 ⊕X1 ⊕X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′2 →E,Ax X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′1 ⊕X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′2 →E,Ax Z ′′1 ⊕ Z ′′2
(5.12)
However, we can also reduce tρ to the same normal form of (5.12) using only
one application of (5.8) and the following normalized substitution ρ = {X 7→
X1 ⊕X ′1, Y 7→ Z ′′1 ⊕ Z ′′2}:
X1 ⊕X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′1 ⊕X1 ⊕X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′2 →E,Ax Z ′′1 ⊕ Z ′′2 (5.13)
The trick is that rule (5.8) allows combining all pairs of canceling terms and
thus gets rid of all of them at once. That is why the theory has the finite
variant property.
At this point, we have three different ways of computing variants that we
would like to discuss with some examples:
1. Computing the narrowing tree associated to a term t up to the bound
#E,Ax(t) and extracting the variants from the narrowing tree.
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2. Computing the narrowing tree using Full	R and extracting the variants
from the narrowing tree.
3. Computing the narrowing tree using VN	R and extracting the variants
from the narrowing tree.
VN	R is the best approach, since the other two approaches are cruder and
can be massively inefficient. This can be illustrated as follows.
Example 17 Consider again Example 3 and the term u = X ⊕ Y ⊕X ⊕ Y ,
whose most general variant is (0, id). As explained in Example 11, this term
can be normalized in one rewriting step. However, the approaches (1)–(3)
work very differently.
1. Since we showed that the narrowing bound is the number of ⊕ symbols,
we have #E,Ax(u) = 3. The full narrowing tree up to bound 3 is huge
and we do not include it here (see Examples 5, 9, and 11).
2. Full	R will behave a little better by producing only narrowing sequences
of length 1, since it will compute the rewriting step to the term 0 among
the 150 narrowing steps, but all these extra narrowing steps are unnec-
essary. Again, we are not including here the Full	R narrowing tree (see
Examples 5, 9, and 11).
3. Only VN	R performs just one rewriting step to the normal form, being
optimal in both length and number of sequences (see Example 11).
In the following section, we study conditions for checking whether a theory
has the finite variant property or not.
5.5.2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for FV
Deciding whether an equational theory has the finite variant property is a
nontrivial task, since we have to decide whether we can stop generating nor-
malized substitution instances by narrowing for each term. We present here
an algorithm for checking whether a decomposition of an equational theory
has the finite variant property (FV) which is based on two notions: (i) a
new notion, called variant-preservingness (VP), that ensures that an intu-
itive bottom-up generation of variants is complete; and (ii) the property that
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there are no infinite sequences when we restrict ourselves to such intuitive
bottom-up generation of variants (FVNS). In what follows, we show that
(V P ∧FV NS)⇒ FV . Note that the folding variant narrowing VN	R will be
used for effectively computing the variants but a different narrowing strat-
egy will be used for a bottom-up generation of variants in the procedure of
detecting whether a theory has the finite variant property (FV).
Variant-preservingness (VP) ensures that we can perform an intuitive
bottom-up generation of variants. The following notion is useful for the
definition of VP.
Definition 25 (Variant-pattern) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition
of (Σ, E). We call a term f(t1, . . . , tn) a variant-pattern if all subterms
t1, . . . , tn are →E,Ax-irreducible. We say that a term t has a variant-pattern
if there is a variant-pattern t′ s.t. t′ =Ax t.
It is worth pointing out that whether a term has a variant-pattern is de-
cidable, assuming a finitary and complete Ax-matching procedure: given a
term t, t has a variant-pattern t′ iff there is a symbol f ∈ Σ with arity k
and variables X1, . . . , Xk of the appropriate top sorts and there is a substi-
tution θ such that t =Ax f(X1, . . . , Xk)θ and θ is E,Ax-normalized, where
t′ = f(X1, . . . , Xk)θ. We can simplify this procedure when term t is rooted
by an AC symbol to say that we only have to consider the same AC symbol
at the root of t, instead of every symbol. And we can simplify this procedure
even more when term t is rooted by a free function symbol (i.e., such a sym-
bol does not satisfy any axiom of Ax) to say that t has a variant-pattern if
it is already a variant-pattern, i.e., every argument of the root symbol must
be E,Ax-irreducible.
Variant-preservingness induces a bottom-up variant generation process;
note that bottom-up variant generation is not the same as innermost nar-
rowing.
Definition 26 (Variant-preserving) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposi-
tion of (Σ, E). We say that R is variant-preserving (VP) if for any variant-
pattern t, either t is →E,Ax-irreducible or there is a →E,Ax step at the top
position with a →E,Ax-normalized substitution.
Note that a theory can have the finite variant property even if it is not
variant-preserving.
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Example 18 Consider the decomposition of Example 12. This theory is not
variant-preserving, e.g., given the term t = f(X, Y ) and any normalized sub-
stitution θ ∈ {X 7→ f(an), Y 7→ f(bn, Z)} for n ≥ 2, there is no normalized
reduction for tθ. However, the theory does have the boundedness property,
and therefore FV, since for any term rooted by f (which is the only non-
constant symbol), its normal form can be obtained in at most one step.
The following example motivates why narrowing sequences have to be
restricted for a bottom-up variant generation.
Example 19 Consider the decomposition f(f(X)) = X without axioms.
This theory is well-known to be non-terminating for narrowing, e.g.,
c(f(X), X) {X 7→f(X′)},E,Ax c(X ′, f(X ′)) {X′ 7→f(X′′)},E,Ax c(f(X ′′), X ′′) · · ·
Although the theory is non-terminating for narrowing, it is FV. When we
consider all possible instances of the term c(f(X), X) for normalized substi-
tutions, we obtain the term c(f(X), X) itself and the sequence c(f(X), X)
 {X 7→f(X′)},E,Ax c(X ′, f(X ′)). The theory does have the boundedness prop-
erty, and therefore FV, since for any term t and a normalized substitution θ,
a bound for t is the number of f symbols in the term.
Therefore, for a bottom-up generation of variants in a finite decomposi-
tion, not all the narrowing sequences are relevant, as shown in the previous
example, and thus we must identify the relevant ones associated to the notion
of variant pattern.
Definition 27 (Shortest Rewrite Sequence) Given a decomposition
(Σ, Ax,E), a rewrite sequence t0 →p1,E,Ax t1 · · · →pn,E,Ax tn is called shortest
if there is no sequence t0 →mE,Ax t′m such that m < n and tn =Ax t′m.
Definition 28 (Variant-preserving sequences) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a
decomposition of (Σ, E). A rewrite sequence α : t0 →p1,E,Ax t1 · · · →pn,E,Ax tn
is called variant-preserving if, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti−1|pi has a variant-pattern
and α is a shortest rewrite sequence. A narrowing sequence t0 p1,σ1,E,Ax t1 · · ·
 pn,σn,E,Ax tn, σ = σ1 · · ·σn, is called variant-preserving if σ is
E,Ax-normalized and t0σ →p1,E,Ax t1σ · · · →pn,E,Ax tn is variant-preserving.
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The set of variant-preserving sequences is not computable in general.
However, we provide sufficient conditions in Section 5.6. Note that we are not
going to use variant-preserving narrowing sequences for computing variants
but only for deciding whether a theory has the finite variant property.
Example 20 The infinite narrowing sequence of Example 19 is not variant-
preserving, since for any finite prefix of length greater than 1 the computed
substitution is non-normalized. The only variant-preserving sequences for the
term c(f(X), X) are the term itself and the one-step sequence with substitu-
tion {X 7→ f(X ′)}.
Example 21 For Example 3, the narrowing sequence
Z1⊕Z2 {Z17→X1⊕Z′1,Z2 7→X1⊕Z′2},E,Ax Z ′1⊕Z ′2 {Z′17→X′1⊕Z′′1 ,Z′2 7→X′1⊕Z′′2 },E,Ax Z ′′1⊕Z ′′2
is not a variant-preserving sequence, since the alternative rewrite sequence
X1 ⊕X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′1 ⊕X1 ⊕X ′1 ⊕ Z ′′2 →E,Ax Z ′′1 ⊕ Z ′′2 is shorter.
The following result provides sufficient conditions for the finite variant
property.
Theorem 14 (Sufficient conditions for FV) Let R = (Σ, E,R) be a de-
composition of (Σ, E). If (i) R is variant-preserving (VP), and (ii) there is
no infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequence (FVNS), then R satisfies
the finite variant property.
Proof. Since we assume that the Ax unification algorithm is finitary, and
therefore the narrowing tree is finitely branching, by Ko¨nig’s Lemma the tree
of variant-preserving narrowing sequences is finite. Given a term t, we de-
note by #(t) the length of the longest variant-preserving narrowing sequence
from t. We prove that, for any substitution σ, t(σ↓E,Ax)→≤nE,Ax (tσ)↓E,Ax by
induction on n = #(t).
• (n = 0) Then t is irreducible and, for any substitution σ, t(σ↓E,Ax) is
also irreducible.
• (n > 0) Let t = f(t1, . . . , tk) and σ be a substitution. Let us assume
that tσ is eventually reduced at the top in every variant-preserving
rewrite sequence. Otherwise, we can prove by structural induction
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and the boundedness property that the bound for t is the sum of the
bounds for the arguments t1, . . . , tk. We have #(ti) < #(t). By in-
duction hypothesis, for any substitution σ, ti(σ↓E,Ax) is bounded by
#(ti) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let us pick any variant (t′i, ρi) for each ti,
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that σ vAx (ρ1 · · · ρk). Let t′ = f(t′1, . . . , t′k). By
variant-preservingness, there is a rule l → r ∈ E and a normalized
substitution θ such that t′ =Ax lθ. Since #(r) < #(t), we can apply the
induction hypothesis and, for any substitution σ′, r(σ′↓E,Ax) is bounded
by #(r). Since θ is normalized, rθ is also bounded by #(r). Note that
#(t1) + · · ·+ #(tk) + #(tr) < #(t). Thus, for any substitution σ, tσ is
bounded by #(t). 2
Note that variant-preservingness is not a necessary condition for FV, as
shown in Example 18. However, there are many theories where lack of variant
preservingness causes loss of FV, as illustrated below.
Example 22 Consider again Example 3, which as we show in Example 26
below is an FV decomposition, but let us assume now that some variables in
rules (5.7) and (5.8) of that example are restricted to a subsort Element, so
that they cannot match any term rooted by ⊕. That is, we have two sorts
Xor and Element such that ⊕ : Xor Xor → Xor and all other symbols a, b,
0, pk( , ), and sk( , ) are defined on sort Element and not on sort Xor. The
new equations are as follows:
X:Xor ⊕ 0 = X:Xor
X:Element⊕X:Element = 0 (5.14)
X:Element⊕X:Element⊕ Y :Xor = Y :Xor (5.15)
Let us consider the term t = a⊕ (b⊕ (a⊕ b)). Rule (5.14) cannot be applied
at any position, and only rule (5.15) can be applied at the top. However,
there is no possible application with a normalized substitution and thus term
t cannot be reduced to its normal form in one step, i.e., a⊕(b⊕(a⊕b))→E,Ax
b ⊕ b →E,Ax 0. Indeed, note that given a term s = X:Xor ⊕ Y :Xor and any
normalized substitution σ, the number of reduction steps for sσ to reach its
normal form clearly depends on the number of ⊕ symbols introduced by σ,
and therefore this modified example fails to satisfy FV.
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Although VP is not a necessary condition, the absence of infinite variant-
preserving narrowing sequences is a necessary condition for FV.
Theorem 15 (Necessary condition for FV) Let R = (Σ, E,R) be a de-
composition of (Σ, E). If there is an infinite variant-preserving narrowing
sequence, then R does not have the finite variant property.
Proof. Let us consider an infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequence.
We can take any finite prefix t ∗σ,E,Ax s and build a variant-preserving rewrite
sequence tσ →∗E,Ax (tσ)↓E,Ax. Note that σ|Var(t) is E,Ax-normalized by defi-
nition. Thus, we obtain an infinite number of rewrite sequences with increas-
ing length. Since the theory is terminating for rewriting and the computed
substitutions are normalized, the rewrite sequences are increasing in length be-
cause the computed substitutions are increasing in depth. Since these rewrite
sequences are the shortest ones, this contradicts the boundedness property. 2
5.6 Checking the Finite Variant Property
In the following we show that the property of being variant-preserving is
clearly checkable, but the absence of infinite variant-preserving narrowing
sequences is not computable in general. In Section 5.6.2, we approximate
the absence of infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequences by a checkable
condition using the dependency pairs technique of [62] for the modulo case.
5.6.1 Checking Variant-Preservingness
The following class of equational theories is relevant. The notion of Ax-
descendants is a straightforward extension of the standard notion of descen-
dant for rules.
Definition 29 (Descendants) [119] Let A : t
p→l→r s and q ∈ Pos(t). The
set q\\A of descendants of q in s w.r.t. A is defined as follows:
q\\A =

{q} if q < p or q ‖ p (i.e., q 6≤ p and p 6≤ q),
{p.p3.p2 | r|p3 = l|p1} if q = p.p1.p2 with p1 ∈ PosX (l),




































IfQ ⊆ Pos(t) thenQ\\A denotes the set⋃q∈Q q\\A. The notion of descendant
extends to rewrite sequences in the obvious way. If Q is a set of pairwise
disjoint positions in t and A : t→∗ s, then the positions in Q\\A are pairwise
disjoint. The notion of descendant is extended to an equational theory Ax
as follows.
Definition 30 (Ax-descendants) Let Ax be a set of regular and
sort-preserving Σ-equations. Let
↔
Ax = {u → v | u = v or v = u ∈ Ax}.
Given two terms t =Ax s, i.e., A : t→∗↔
Ax
s, and a set Q of pairwise disjoint
positions in t, the Ax-descendants of Q in s are Q\\s = Q\\A.
Now we can introduce the relevant notion of upper-Ax-coherence, de-
picted in Figure 5.2. Note that dotted arrows imply they are involved in an
existential quantifier.
Definition 31 (Upper-Ax-coherence) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decompo-
sition of (Σ, E). We say R is upper-Ax-coherent iff for all t1, t2, t3, t1 p→E,Ax
t2, t1 =Ax t3, p > Λ, and p\\t3 = ∅ imply that for all p′ ≤ p such that
p′\\t3 = ∅, there exist t′3, t4, t5 such that t1 p
′→E,Ax t′3, t2 →∗E,Ax t4, t′3 →∗E,Ax t5,
and t4 =Ax t5.
Assuming Ax-coherence (defined by Condition (4) in Section 5.1 and depicted
in Figures 5.1 and 5.3, both identical but using R,Ax or E,Ax labels), check-
ing upper-Ax-coherence consists in considering each term t in each equation
t = t′ ∈ Ax (or its reverse), finding a position p ∈ Pos(t) s.t. p > Λ and a
substitution σ s.t. tσ|p is →E,Ax-reducible and then, if p = p1. · · · .pk, then,
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for i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, tσ|pi must be →E,Ax-reducible. In general, upper-
Ax-coherence is much more demanding than Ax-coherence, as shown below.
Example 23 Let us consider the equational theory E = {g(f(X))→ d, a→
c} and Ax = {g(f(f(a))) = g(b)}. For the term t = g(f(f(a))), subterm a
is reducible, t =Ax g(b), but subterms f(f(a)) and f(a) are not reducible and
thus the theory is not upper-Ax-coherent. However, the theory is trivially
Ax-coherent because of the use of symbol g at the top of both sides of the
equation in Ax.
Note that upper-AC-coherence and AC-coherence coincide, since the ax-
ioms of associativity and commutativity can never satisfy t1 =AC t3, p > Λ,
and p\\t3 = ∅. We can now provide an algorithm for checking variant-
preservingness.
Theorem 16 (Checking Variant-preservingness) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E)
be a decomposition of (Σ, E) that is upper-Ax-coherent. R has the variant-
preserving property iff for all l → r, l′ → r′ ∈ E (possibly renamed s.t.
Var(l) ∩ Var(l′) = ∅) and for each X ∈ Var(l), the term t = lθ, where
θ = {X 7→ l′} is an order-sorted substitution, satisfies that either: (i) t does
not have a variant-pattern, or (ii) otherwise there is a normalized reduction
on t.
Proof. The only if part is immediate by definition. For the if part, we con-
sider a term t = f(t1, . . . , tk) such that t1, . . . , tk are→E,Ax-irreducible terms.
If t is →E,Ax-irreducible, we are done. Otherwise, there is a rule l → r ∈ E
and a substitution θ such that t = lθ. If θ is →E,Ax-normalized, we are done.
Otherwise, we prove below that there is a rule l′ → r′ ∈ E and a substitution
θ′ such that t = l′θ′ and θ′ is →E,Ax-normalized.
Let l → r ∈ E and θ be such that θ has the maximum number of redexes
possible for t. Let n be such a maximum number. We prove the fact by
induction on n.
(n = 0) This means that θ is →E,Ax-normalized and we are done.
(n > 0) Let X 7→ u be one of the non-normalized bindings in θ. Let p be
one of the topmost positions in u with an actual redex, i.e., there is
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a rule lˆ → rˆ ∈ E and a substitution σ such that u|p =Ax lˆσ. We can
take the maximum prefix uˆ of u with no redexes and build a substitution
θˆ = {X 7→ uˆ[lˆ]p}. Let us assume that uˆ[lˆ]p is properly renamed so that
Var(uˆ[lˆ]p) ∩ Var(l) = ∅. There is a substitution ρ such that θ =Ax θˆρ.
Since the terms t1, . . . , tk are irreducible, lˆ is not a subterm of any of
them and there is a context C[ ] of t and another context Cˆ[ ] of lθˆ
such that C[ ] =Ax Cˆ[ ] and lˆ must overlap with Cˆ[ ]. Then, p = Λ,
because of coherence, i.e., if u|p is a redex, then u must also be a redex.
Just note that a coherence completion algorithm adds rules of the form
C[lσ] → C[rσ] for any rule l → r where C[ ] and σ are determined by
the equational theory Ax. Now, by the condition given in the Theorem,
there is a normalized substitution on lθˆ, i.e., there is a rule l′ → r′
and a substitution τ such that lθˆ =Ax l
′τ and τ is →E,Ax-normalized.
Finally, when we consider the term l′τρ, we can apply the induction
hypothesis because ρ contains less redexes than θ and obtain that there
is a rule l′′ → r′′ and a substitution τ ′ such that t =Ax l′τρ =Ax l′′τ ′
and τ ′ is →E,Ax-normalized. 2
The upper-Ax-coherence condition is necessary, as shown below.
Example 24 The theory of Example 23 satisfies the conditions of The-
orem 16 except upper Ax-coherence. That is, when the left-hand sides
g(f(X)) and a are used to build the term g(f(a)), this term does not have
a variant-pattern, as required by Theorem 16. Similarly, when the properly
renamed left-hand sides g(f(X)) and g(f(X ′)) are used to build the term
g(f(g(f(X ′)))), this term does not have a variant-pattern either. However,
according to Definition 26, we have to test also the variant-pattern g(b). Al-
though this term is reducible, it is not →E,Ax-reducible with a normalized
substitution. Thus the equational theory is not variant-preserving.
Let us first show an example of a theory that is not variant-preserving.
Example 25 Let us consider again Example 12. Let us check this rewrite
theory with the condition from Theorem 16. Using the rule given with the
renamed version f(a, b,X ′) → f(a, b) we get lθ = f(a, b, a, b,X ′), which has
a variant-pattern, namely f(f(a, a,X ′), f(b, b)) where the extra appearances
of f inside are to show which are the irreducible subterms. Also, there is no
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reduction with a normalized substitution, since the only reduction possible is
by using the given rule, with X renamed to V and the substitution σ = {V 7→
f(a, b,X ′)} which is not normalized. So this theory is not variant-preserving.
Let us prove that the exclusive or theory has the variant-preservingness
property.
Example 26 Let R = (Σ, E,R) be the exclusive or theory from Example 3
(without pk, sk), i.e., with only (5.6)–(5.8) used as rules. Using Theorem 16
we find that this theory is variant-preserving. All the combinations of rules
not involving (5.8) as the first rule do not have a variant-pattern, let us just
show one of the combinations of rule (5.8) with itself where l = X ⊕X ⊕ Y
and l′ = X ′ ⊕X ′ ⊕ Y ′. We get two terms, one for each of the substitutions
θ1 = {X 7→ l′} and θ2 = {Y 7→ l′}. We get lθ1 = X ′ ⊕X ′ ⊕ Y ′ ⊕X ′ ⊕X ′ ⊕
Y ′ ⊕ Y , which does not have a variant-pattern. On the other hand, lθ2 =
X⊕X⊕X ′⊕X ′⊕Y ′ does have a variant-pattern, but has also a normalized
reduction with another renaming of rule (5.8), namely V ⊕ V ⊕W → W ,
and substitution σ = {V 7→ X ⊕X ′,W 7→ Y ′}. Note that the theory has the
finite variant property (FV), since it is VP and the right hand sides of all
the equations are constants or variables, which trivially satisfies the FVNS
property.
5.6.2 Checking Finiteness of Variant-Preserving Narrowing
Sequences
In this section, we approximate the absence of infinite variant-preserving
narrowing sequences by a checkable condition using the dependency pairs
technique of [62] for the modulo case. Note that we do not really extend
the dependency pairs technique to narrowing, since we do not allow extra
variables in right-hand sides of rules; see [5] for an extension of the depen-
dency pairs technique to narrowing, and [99] for termination of narrowing
using the dependency pair technique. Termination of narrowing is a much
harder problem than that of termination of rewriting [6] and we do not prove
that narrowing or folding variant narrowing terminate; indeed recall that we
are only interested in termination of the variant generation process rather
than termination of narrowing strategies in general. In this section, we reuse
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the dependency pair technique and approximate the property of the absence
of infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequences by avoiding any possible
cycle in function calls. For avoiding cycles we use the dependency graph and
adapt the notion of dependency pair chain to the variant case.
First, we need to extend the notion of a defined symbol. An equation
u = v is called collapsing if v ∈ X or u ∈ X . We say a theory is collapse-
free3 if all its equations are non-collapsing.
Definition 32 (Defined Symbols for Rewriting Modulo Equations)
[62] Let (Σ, Ax,R) be an order-sorted rewrite theory with Ax collapse-free.
Then the set of defined symbols D is the smallest set such that D = {root(l) |
l→ r ∈ R} ∪ {root(v) | u = v ∈ Ax or v = u ∈ Ax, root(u) ∈ D}.
In order to correctly approximate the dependency relation between de-
fined symbols in the theory, we need to extend the equational theory in the
following way.
Definition 33 (Adding Instantiations) [62] Given an order-sorted
rewrite theory R = (Σ, Ax,R) with Ax collapse-free, let InsAx(R) be a set
containing only rules of the form lσ → rσ (where σ is a substitution and
l → r ∈ R). InsAx(R) is called an instantiation of R for the equations
Ax iff InsAx(R) is the smallest set such that: (a) R ⊆ InsAx(R), (b) for
all l → r ∈ R, all v such that u = v ∈ Ax or v = u ∈ Ax, and all
σ ∈ CSUAx(v = l), there exists a rule l′ → r′ ∈ InsAx(R) and a variable
renaming ρ such that lσ =Ax l
′ρ and rσ =Ax r′ρ.
Note that when Ax = ∅ or Ax contains only AC or C axioms, InsAx(R) = R.
Dependency pairs are obtained as follows. Since we are dealing with the
modulo case, it will be notationally more convenient to use terms directly in
dependency pairs, without the usual capital letters for the top symbols.
Definition 34 (Dependency Pair) [62] Let R = (Σ, Ax,R) be an order-
sorted rewrite theory with Ax collapse-free. Let InsAx(R) be the instantia-
tions of R for the equations Ax. If l→ C[g(t1, . . . , tm)] is a rule of InsAx(R)
3Note that regularity does not imply collapse-free, e.g., equation (5.6) of Example 3 is
regular but also collapsing. Note also that if Ax contains collapsing axioms such as the
identity axiom (5.6), it may be possible to use the variant based technique in [42] (see also
the discussion in Section 5.8) to transform a decomposition (Σ, Ax,R) into a semantically
equivalent one (Σ, Ax0, R ∪ −→A clps) where Ax0 is collapse-free and −→A clps are rewrite rules
for the collapse axioms.
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with C a context and g a defined symbol in InsAx(R), then 〈l, g(t1, . . . , tm)〉
is called a dependency pair of R.
Example 27 (Abelian Group) The following presentation of the Abelian
group theory, called R∗ = (Σ, Ax,E), has been shown to satisfy the finite
variant property in [32]. The operators Σ are ∗ , ( )−1, and 1. The set of
equations Ax consists of associativity and commutativity for ∗ . The rules
E are:
x ∗ 1 → x (5.16)
1−1 → 1 (5.17)
x ∗ x−1 → 1 (5.18)
x−1 ∗ y−1 → (x ∗ y)−1 (5.19)
(x ∗ y)−1 ∗ y → x−1 (5.20)
x−1
−1 → x (5.21)
(x−1 ∗ y)−1 → x ∗ y−1 (5.22)
x ∗ (x−1 ∗ y) → y (5.23)
x−1 ∗ (y−1 ∗ z) → (x ∗ y)−1 ∗ z (5.24)
(x ∗ y)−1 ∗ (y ∗ z) → x−1 ∗ z (5.25)
The AC-dependency pairs for this rewrite theory are as follows.
(5.19)a: 〈x−1 ∗ y−1 , (x ∗ y)−1〉
(5.19)b: 〈x−1 ∗ y−1 , x ∗ y〉
(5.22)a: 〈(x−1 ∗ y)−1 , x ∗ y−1〉
(5.22)b: 〈(x−1 ∗ y)−1 , y−1〉
(5.20)a: 〈(x ∗ y)−1 ∗ y , x−1〉
(5.24)a: 〈x−1 ∗ y−1 ∗ z , (x ∗ y)−1 ∗ z〉
(5.24)b: 〈x−1 ∗ y−1 ∗ z , (x ∗ y)−1〉
(5.24)c: 〈x−1 ∗ y−1 ∗ z , x ∗ y〉
(5.25)a: 〈(x ∗ y)−1 ∗ y ∗ z , x−1 ∗ z〉
(5.25)b: 〈(x ∗ y)−1 ∗ y ∗ z , x−1〉
We have used the AProVE tool [63] to generate the dependency pairs.
AProVE first applies the coherence algorithm of [62] to this example, which
is unnecessary here and thus we drop the dependency pairs created that way.
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The relevant notions from the dependency pairs technique are chains of de-
pendency pairs and the dependency graph.
Definition 35 (Chain) [12] Let R = (Σ, Ax,R) be an order-sorted rewrite
theory with Ax collapse-free. A sequence of dependency pairs 〈s1, t1〉〈s2, t2〉 · · ·
〈sn, tn〉 of R is an R-chain if there is a substitution σ such that tjσ →∗R,Ax
sj+1σ holds for every two consecutive pairs 〈sj, tj〉 and 〈sj+1, tj+1〉 in the
sequence.
Definition 36 (Dependency Graph) [12] Let R = (Σ, Ax,R) be an
order-sorted rewrite theory with Ax collapse-free. The dependency graph of
R is the directed graph whose nodes (vertices) are the dependency pairs of
R and there is an arc (directed edge) from 〈s, t〉 to 〈u, v〉 if 〈s, t〉〈u, v〉 is a
chain.
Chains are not computable in general and an approximation must be
performed. The notions of connectable terms and the estimated dependency
graph as defined in [12] provide a useful approximation of the dependency
graph. The estimated dependency graph can be computed using the Cap
and Ren procedures [12]: For any term t ∈ TΣ(X ), let Cap(t) replace each
proper subterm rooted by a defined symbol by a fresh variable and let Ren(t)
independently rename all occurrences of variables in t by fresh variables. Note
that such an estimated dependency graph has been used in all examples in
this section.
Example 28 The dependency graph for Example 27 is shown in Figure 5.4.
It was created with AProVE [63]. We see that there are self-loops on (5.19)b,
(5.22)b, (5.24)a, (5.24)c and (5.25)a. (5.19)a has a loop with (5.22)a, (5.22)a
has a loop with (5.24)b, and so on. It is a very highly connected graph.
The most important notion for the absence of infinite narrowing sequences
is that of a cycle in the dependency graph.
Definition 37 (Cycle) [12] A nonempty set P of dependency pairs is called
a cycle if, for any two dependency pairs 〈s, t〉, 〈u, v〉 ∈ P, there is a nonempty
path from 〈s, t〉 to 〈u, v〉 and from 〈u, v〉 to 〈s, t〉 in the dependency graph that





































































Figure 5.4: Dependency graph of Abelian group
As already demonstrated in the previous section, not all the rewriting
(narrowing) sequences are relevant for the finite variant property, so that
we can restrict the dependency graph only to variant-preserving rewriting
(narrowing) sequences.
Definition 38 (Variant-preserving chain) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a
variant-preserving decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). A chain of
dependency pairs 〈s1, t1〉〈s2, t2〉 · · · 〈sn, tn〉 of R is a variant-preserving chain
if there is a substitution σ such that σ is →E,Ax-normalized and the following
rewrite sequence s1σ →E,Ax C1[t1]σ →∗E,Ax C1[s2]σ →E,Ax C1[C2[t2]]σ →∗E,Ax
· · · →∗E,Ax C1[C2[· · ·Cn−1[sn]]]σ →E,Ax C1[C2[· · ·Cn−1[Cn[tn]]]]σ obtainable
from the chain 〈s1, t1〉〈s2, t2〉 · · · 〈sn, tn〉 is variant-preserving.
The notions of a cycle, dependency graph, and estimated dependency graph
are easily extended to the variant-preserving case. The following result ap-
proximates the absence of infinite narrowing sequences. We simply approxi-
mate such property by avoiding any cycle. We do not use any of the depen-
dency pair processors of the dependency pair framework (see [12, 64]) and
we do not require any term ordering. Obviously, there may be more specific
techniques based on termination of narrowing for deciding the termination
of variant-preserving narrowing sequences but this is left for future work.
Proposition 3 (Finiteness Check of the VP Narrowing sequences)
Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a variant-preserving decomposition of an equational
theory (Σ, E). Let Ax contain only linear, non-collapsing equations. If the
estimated dependency graph does not contain any variant-preserving cycle,
then there are no infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequences.
Proof. We prove this result by contradiction. Assume that the estimated
dependency graph does not contain any variant-preserving cycle but there
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Figure 5.5: Variant-preserving dependency graph
is an infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequence α : t0 p1,σ1,E,Ax t1 · · ·
 pn,σn,E,Ax tn · · · . From α we can obtain an infinite number of finite variant-
preserving rewrite sequences of the form t0θi →p1,E,Ax t1θi · · · →pi,E,Ax tiθi
with θi = σ1 · · ·σi. For each variant-preserving rewrite sequence t0θi →p1,E,Ax
t1θi · · · →pi,E,Ax tiθi, there is a variant-preserving chain corresponding to
such rewrite sequence. Since the number of dependency pairs is finite, there
is a natural number k such that for the variant-preserving rewrite sequence
t0θk →p1,E,Ax t1θk · · · →pk,E,Ax tkθk, the variant-preserving chain associated
to it is a cycle. Thus, the conclusion follows, because we assume that there
is no variant-preserving cycle. 2
Note that the conditions that the axioms are non-collapsing and linear are
necessary for completeness of the dependency graph, we refer the reader to
[62] for explanations.
Example 29 (AG variant-preserving dependency pair graph) We
can show the variant-preserving dependency graph of Example 27 in Fig-
ure 5.5. One can see in the picture that all the cycles have disappeared, be-
cause they involved non-normalized substitutions, or terms without a variant-
pattern, or could be shortened. Detailed reasons are provided next.
For the dependency pair (5.19)b and its self-loop we need a substitution
σ for which (X ∗ Y )σ =AC (X ′−1 ∗ Y ′−1)σ. But then, e.g., σ = {X 7→
X ′−1, Y 7→ Y ′−1} and the left-hand side of the dependency pair becomes
(X ′−1)−1 ∗ (Y ′−1)−1, which does not have a variant-pattern, as (X ′−1)−1 is
reducible, so the self-loop is not a variant-preserving sequence and thus not
a variant-preserving chain.
For the dependency pairs (5.24)a, i.e., 〈s1, t1〉 = 〈X−1 ∗ Y −1 ∗ Z, (X ∗
Y )−1 ∗ Z〉, and (5.25)a, i.e., 〈s2, t2〉 = 〈(X ′ ∗ Y ′)−1 ∗ Y ′ ∗ Z ′, X ′−1 ∗ Z ′〉 let
us consider both directions. For one direction we have ((X ∗Y )−1 ∗Z)σ =AC
((X ′ ∗Y ′)−1 ∗Y ′ ∗Z ′)σ so for example σ = {Z 7→ Y ′ ∗Z ′, X 7→ X ′, Y 7→ Y ′}.
Then s1σ =AC X
′−1 ∗Y ′−1 ∗Y ′ ∗Z ′ which has a variant-pattern and for which
the rewriting sequence is X ′−1∗Y ′−1∗Y ′∗Z ′ → (X ′∗Y ′)−1∗Y ′∗Z ′ → X ′−1∗Z ′.
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Figure 5.6: Variant-preserving dependency graph for Diffie-Hellman
Nevertheless, it is not a variant-preserving sequence as there is a shorter
rewriting sequence using rule (5.23), X ′−1 ∗ Y ′−1 ∗ Y ′ ∗ Z ′ → X ′−1 ∗ Z ′, so
there is no variant-preserving chain here.
Similarly for the chain from (5.24)a to (5.25)b as the only difference is in
t2, so that t2σ = X
′−1 but that will be padded with the context of ∗ ([], Z ′)
(where [] is the hole) and so the same shorter rewriting sequence exists.
In the other direction, from (5.25)a to (5.24)a, we have (X ′−1 ∗Z ′)σ =AC
(X−1 ∗ Y −1 ∗ Z)σ so then for example σ = {Z ′ 7→ Y −1Z,X ′ 7→ X} and
s2σ =AC (X ∗ Y ′)−1 ∗ Y ′ ∗ Y −1 ∗ Z which has a variant-pattern and the
rewriting sequence (X ∗Y ′)−1 ∗Y ′ ∗Y −1 ∗Z → X−1 ∗Y −1 ∗Z → (X ∗Y )−1 ∗
Z. The alternative rewriting sequence applying the rules in reverse order is
(X ∗ Y ′)−1 ∗ Y ′ ∗ Y −1 ∗ Z → (X ∗ Y ′ ∗ Y )−1 ∗ Y ′ ∗ Z → (X ∗ Y )−1 ∗ Z which
is not shorter, so this is a variant-preserving sequence and thus we have a
variant-preserving chain.
Let us first introduce a representation of the Diffie-Hellman theory and
then show the VP property for the theories of Abelian groups and Diffie-
Hellman exponentiation, and also the finite variant property for the Diffie-
Hellman theory.
Example 30 (Diffie-Hellman) We get a rewrite theory representing the
Diffie-Hellman theory, called RDH, by extending the theory R∗ from Exam-
ple 27 by adding a new binary symbol exp and the following two rules:
exp(x, 1) → x (5.26)
exp(exp(x, y), z) → exp(x, y ∗ z) (5.27)
We can compute the dependency pairs and the associated graph using the
results we already have from Example 29. Also note, that the rewrite theories
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R∗ and RDH both have the variant-preserving property, which we will check
in Example 31, respectively Example 32. The following additional dependency
pairs are required:
(5.27)a : 〈exp(exp(x, y), z) , exp(x, y ∗ z)〉
(5.27)b : 〈exp(exp(x, y), z) , y ∗ z〉
As shown in Figure 5.6, for rule (5.27) there are a lot of possibilities to go
from (5.27)b, but the longest possible path has length 2. Let us show that
there is actually a chain for the path from (5.27)b via (5.25)a to (5.19)a.
After substituting as needed for this in the left-hand side of (5.27) we get
exp(exp(X, (U ∗ V )−1), V ∗W−1)→ exp(X, (U ∗ V )−1 ∗ V ∗W−1), let us call
this term t. Then from there we have t→ exp(X,U−1 ∗W−1)→ exp(X, (U ∗
W )−1) and alternatively t→ exp(X, (U ∗V ∗W )−1∗V )→ exp(X, (U ∗W )−1)
which is not shorter. So this is really a variant-preserving chain and the
longest chain from (5.27)b is length 2.
We show VP for our Abelian group representation next.
Example 31 Let us check variant-preservingness for R∗ by using Theo-
rem 16. For rule (5.16) and any other rule there is no variant-pattern for
lθ where θ substitutes another left-hand side into X. The reason is that the
constant 1 needs to stay isolated, since otherwise a rewrite is possible, and so
the left-hand side that was inserted stays together and is reducible. As rule
(5.17) does not have any variable, the property holds trivially.
For all following rules let us note that instantiating a variable that is
a subterm of an inverse operator −1 with a left-hand side of another rule,
immediately results in a term that has no variant-pattern as that left-hand
side stays together underneath. Thus the rules (5.18)–(5.22) do not need
to be considered as all variables appear at least once underneath an inverse
operator.
In this vein for rule (5.23) we only need to consider the terms created when
instantiating Y . Only combination with (5.18),(5.20), (5.23), and (5.25)
results in a term that has a variant-pattern. Let us show for example (5.23)
with (5.25) (renamed to primed variables). The resulting term is X ∗X−1 ∗
(X ′ ∗ Y ′)−1 ∗ Y ′ ∗ Z ′ which can be reduced by rule (5.24) (renamed to doubly
primed variables) with substitution {X ′′ 7→ X, Y ′′ 7→ X ′∗Y ′, Z ′′ 7→ X∗Y ′∗Z ′}
which is normalized.
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For rule (5.24) the only useful (i.e., with a chance of having a variant-
pattern) instantiations are for Z, but also as there are already two appear-
ances of a term headed by the inverse only left-hand sides with no inverse
have a chance at having a variant-pattern. That only leaves rule (5.16) which
results in term X−1 ∗Y −1 ∗X ′ ∗1 which also does not have a variant-pattern.
Finally, for rule (5.25) we only need to instantiate the variable Z. There
are variant-patterns for the combinations with (5.18), (5.20), (5.23), and
(5.25), let us just show the last of these combinations, (5.25) with itself. The
resulting term is (X ∗ Y )−1 ∗ Y ∗ (X ′ ∗ Y ′)−1 ∗ Y ′ ∗ Z ′, which has a variant-
pattern but also can rewrite with rule (5.24) (renamed with two primes) with
the normalized substitution {X ′′ 7→ X ∗ Y, Y ′′ 7→ X ′ ∗ Y ′, Z ′′ 7→ Y ∗ Y ′ ∗ Z ′}.
Therefore, R∗ has the variant-preserving property.
Based on VP for Abelian groups we can check VP for Diffie-Hellman. It
also turns out that Diffie-Hellman has the finite-variant property.
Example 32 Variant-preservingness of the Diffie-Hellman theory RDH can
be shown using Theorem 16 based upon the variant-preservingness of R∗
shown in Example 31. Let us just observe that RDH is obtained by just adding
a new symbol exp and rules for it. Putting this into any variable of any of
the prior rules results in a term that has no variant-pattern. The other way
around, any left-hand side put into any of the variables of the left-hand sides
of one of the two new rules results in a term that has no variant-pattern. So
RDH has the variant-preserving property, too.
The proof of our final result for this section is trivial: since if there are no
cycles in the estimated dependency graph, then we know for sure that there
is no infinite variant-preserving rewrite sequence.
Theorem 17 (Approximation for the finite variant property) Let
R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a variant-preserving decomposition of an equational the-
ory (Σ, E) such that Ax contains only linear, non-collapsing equations. If the
estimated dependency graph does not contain any variant-preserving cycle,
then R has the finite variant property.
Proof. By Proposition 3 and Theorem 15. 2
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5.6.3 Disproving the Finite Variant Property
If there are infinite variant-preserving narrowing sequences, we are done,
because the finite variant property does not hold by Theorem 15. We can
give a simple sufficient condition, a consequence of Theorem 15.
Theorem 18 (Non-termination of narrowing) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be
a variant-preserving decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). Let Ax
contain only linear, non-collapsing equations. If the estimated dependency
graph does contain a variant-preserving chain 〈s, t〉〈s, t〉 such that s vAx t,
called a self-cycle, and the Cap and Ren procedures were not necessary
for obtaining term t, then there is an infinite variant-preserving narrowing
sequence starting from term s.
Proof. The estimated dependency graph contains the chain 〈s, t〉〈s, t〉 for
the dependency pair 〈s, t〉. The dependency pair 〈s, t〉 comes from a rule
s→ C[t]p. Let σ be such that s =Ax tσ. Since the Cap and Ren procedures
have not been applied to term t, we have the infinite narrowing sequence
s Λ,id,E,AxC[t]p p,σ,E,AxC[C ′[t′]p]p p.p,σ′,E,AxC[C ′[C ′′[t′′]p]p]p · · · where C ′
and C ′′ are properly renamed versions of C, t′ and t′′ are properly renamed
versions of t, and σ′ is a properly renamed version of σ. 2
Example 33 (ACUNh) [32] Let us present the ACU example with nilpo-
tence and homomorphism as discussed by Comon and Delaune.4 This is
RACUNh, with + AC, which has the variant-preserving property:
X + 0 → X (5.28)
X +X → 0 (5.29)
X +X + Y → Y (5.30)
h(0) → 0 (5.31)
h(X + Y ) → h(X) + h(Y ) (5.32)
For the last rule we get three dependency pairs:
(5.32)a : 〈h(x+ y) , h(x) + h(y)〉
(5.32)b : 〈h(x+ y) , h(x)〉
(5.32)c : 〈h(x+ y) , h(y)〉
4There is another, alternative term rewriting system representing this theory, which
suffers from the same problems.
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It is easy to see that there are self-cycles in (5.32)b and (5.32)c using the
substitution x 7→ x1 + z1, which also allows going back and forth between







By Theorem 15, this theory does not have the finite variant property, as also
proved in a different way in [32].
5.7 Variant-based Equational Unification
The intimate connection between variants and E-unification is then as follows.
Definition 39 For R = (Σ, Ax,E) with poset of sorts (S,≤) being a decom-
position of an equational theory (Σ, E), we extend (Σ, Ax,E) and (S,≤) to
(Σ̂, Ax, Ê) and (Ŝ,≤) as follows:
1. we add a new sort Truth to Ŝ, not related to any sort in Σ,
2. we add a constant operator tt of sort Truth to Σ̂,
3. for each top sort of a connected component [s], we add an operator eq
: [s] × [s] → Truth to Σ̂, and
4. for each top sort [s], we add a variable X:[s] and an extra rule
eq(X:[s], X:[s])→ tt to Ê.
Then, given any two Σ-terms t, t′, if θ is an E-unifier of t and t′, then the
E,Ax-canonical forms of tθ and t′θ must be Ax-equal and therefore the pair
(tt, θ) must be a variant of the term eq(t, t′). Furthermore, if the term
eq(t, t′) has a finite set of most general variants, then we are guaranteed that
the set of most general E-unifiers of t and t′ is finite.
Corollary 7 Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) with poset of sorts (S,≤) be a finite vari-
ant decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). The equational theory
(Σ̂, Ax, Ê) with poset of sorts (Ŝ,≤) of Definition 39 is a finite decompo-
sition.
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Proof. Given a term eq(t, t′), for any variant (u, σ) ∈ [[eq(t, t′)]]E,Ax, either
u = tt or u = eq(v, v′) such that (v, φ) ∈ [[t]]E,Ax and (v′, φ′) ∈ [[t′]]E,Ax for
some substitutions φ and φ′. Since [[t]]E,Ax and [[t
′]]E,Ax are finite, we conclude
that [[eq(t, t′)]]E,Ax is finite. 2
Let us make explicit the relation between variants and E-unification.
Given a decomposition (Σ, Ax,E) of an equational theory, two Σ-terms t1
and t2 such that W∩ = Var(t1) ∩ Var(t2) and W∪ = Var(t1) ∪ Var(t2),
and two sets V1 and V2 of variants of t1 and t2, respectively, we define
V1 ∩ V2 = {(u1σ, θ1σ ∪ θ2σ ∪ σ) | (u1, θ1) ∈ V1 ∧ (u2, θ2) ∈ V2 ∧ ∃σ : σ ∈
CSUW∪Ax (u1 = u2) ∧ (θ1σ)|W∩ =Ax (θ2σ)|W∩}.
Proposition 4 (Variant-based Unification) Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a
decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). Let t1, t2 be two Σ-terms. Then,
ρ is an E-unifier of t1 and t2 iff ∃(t′, ρ) ∈ [[t1]]?E,Ax ∩ [[t2]]?E,Ax.
Proof. (⇒) If ρ is an E-unifier of t1 and t2, then (t1ρ)↓E,Ax =Ax (t2ρ)↓E,Ax.
Let t′1 = (t1ρ)↓E,Ax and t′2 = (t2ρ)↓E,Ax. We also have that (t′1, ρ) ∈ [[t1]]?E,Ax,
(t′2, ρ) ∈ [[t1]]?E,Ax, (t′1, ρ) ∈ [[t2]]?E,Ax, and (t′2, ρ) ∈ [[t2]]?E,Ax.
(⇐) If ∃(t′, ρ) ∈ [[t1]]?E,Ax ∩ [[t2]]?E,Ax, then t′ =Ax (t1ρ)↓E,Ax =Ax (t2ρ)↓E,Ax
and clearly ρ is an E-unifier of t1 and t2. 2
Proposition 5 (Minimal and Complete E-unification) Let R =
(Σ, Ax,E) with poset of sorts (S,≤) be a decomposition of an equational the-
ory (Σ, E). Let t, t′ be two Σ-terms. Then, U = {θ | (tt, θ) ∈ [[eq(t, t′)]]Ê,Ax}
is a minimal and complete set of E-unifiers for t = t′, where eq and tt are
new symbols as defined in Definition 39 and Ê = E ∪ {eq(X:[s], X:[s]) →
tt | s ∈ S}.
Proof. We have to prove that for each E-unifier ρ of t and t′, there is an
E-unifier σ in U such that ρ vE σ. First, it is clear by definition of eq and tt
that Ê satisfies properties (1)–(4) (see Section 5.1). Let U∗ = {θ | (tt, θ) ∈
[[eq(t, t′)]]?Ê,Ax}. If ρ is an E-unifier of t and t′, then ρ ∈ U∗, since for t¯ =
(tρ)↓E,Ax and t¯′ = (t′ρ)↓E,Ax, we have that t¯ =Ax t¯′ and eq(t¯, t¯′) →Ê,Ax tt.
If ρ ∈ U∗, then ρ is an E-unifier of t and t′, since eq(tρ, t′ρ) →∗
Ê,Ax
tt
and, by properties (1)–(4), we have that there are t¯, t¯′ s.t. t¯ = (tρ)↓E,Ax,
t¯′ = (t′ρ)↓E,Ax, and the following rewrite step exists eq(t¯, t¯′)→Ê,Ax tt.
160
Now, completeness means that for each E-unifier ρ of t and t′, there is
an E-unifier σ in U such that ρ|t,t′ vE σ|t,t′; and minimality means that for
each E-unifier σ in U there is no σ′ in U such that σ|t,t′ vAx σ′|t,t′. Finally,
by completeness and minimality of [[eq(t, t′)]]Ê,Ax w.r.t. [[eq(t, t
′)]]?Ê,Ax, we
conclude completeness and minimality of U w.r.t U∗. 2
Finally, it is clear that when we consider a finite variant decomposition,
we obtain a decidable, finitary unification algorithm.
Corollary 8 (Finitary E-unification) LetR = (Σ, Ax,E) be a finite vari-
ant decomposition of an equational theory (Σ, E). Then, for any two given
terms t, t′, U = {θ | (tt, θ) ∈ [[eq(t, t′)]]Ê,Ax} is a finite, minimal, and com-
plete set of E-unifiers for t = t′, where Ê, eq, and tt are defined in Defini-
tion 39.
Note that the opposite does not hold: given two terms t, t′ that have a
finite, minimal, and complete set of E-unifiers, the equational theory R =
(Σ, E) may not have a finite variant decomposition (Σ, Ax,E). An example
is the unification under homomorphism (or one-side distributivity), where
there is a finite number of unifiers of two terms but the theory does not
satisfy the finite variant property (see Example 33); the key reason for this is
that the term eq(t, t′) may have an infinite number of variants, even though
there is only a finite set of most general variants of the form (tt, θ).
Once we have clarified the intimate relation between variants and equa-
tional unification, we can consider how to compute a complete set of variants
of a term using the variant minimality of VN	R. The minimality property of
Definition 14 motivates the following corollary.
Corollary 9 Let R = (Σ, Ax,E) be a decomposition of an equational theory
(Σ, E). For any two terms t, t′ with the same top sort, the set S = {θ |




} is a complete set of E-unifiers for t = t′, where
Ê, eq, and tt are defined in Definition 39. If, in addition, R is a finite
decomposition, then the set S is a finite set of E-unifiers for t = t′.
5.8 Applications
A first obvious application is in the area of unification algorithms. The key
distinction is one between dedicated algorithms for a given theory T , for
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which a special-purpose algorithm exists, and generic algorithms such as
folding variant narrowing, which can be applied to a wide range of theories
not having a dedicated algorithm. The tradeoff is one of flexibility versus
performance: a dedicated unification algorithm for a given theory T uses in-
timate knowledge of the theory’s details and is typically much more efficient;
but a special-purpose algorithm has to be developed for each such T , and
combinations, though possible, are computationally expensive. By contrast,
variant-based unification, being a generic method, is much more flexible and,
as already mentioned and illustrated by several of our examples, if T and
T ′ enjoy FV, T ∪ T ′ often does so as well, so that obtaining unification
algorithms for combined theories is typically easy and does not require an
explicit combination infrastructure. Of course, both methods should be used
together: dedicated algorithms should be used whenever possible; variant-
based unification can then be used to extend the range of theories that can
be treated as follows: as soon as the theory Ax has a dedicated unification
algorithm under minimal assumptions on Ax, we can automatically derive a
unification algorithm for any theory T = E ∪ Ax such that E is confluent,
terminating, sort-decreasing and coherent modulo Ax, and such an algorithm
is guaranteed to be finitary if T enjoys FV.
This is exactly the approach that has been followed for analyzing cryp-
tographic protocols modulo algebraic properties in the Maude-NPA tool
[48, 113]. Such protocols can be modeled as rewrite theories P = (Σ, E,R),
where the algebraic properties of the cryptographic functions are specified by
equations E, and the protocol’s transition rules are specified by the rewrite
rules R. If E can be decomposed as G ∪ Ax, where G is confluent, termi-
nating, sort-decreasing and coherent modulo Ax and Ax has a finitary uni-
fication algorithm, we can perform symbolic reachability analysis on P by
narrowing its symbolic states with the transition rules R modulo E, where
E-unification can be carried out by folding variant narrowing with G mod-
ulo Ax and therefore does not need a dedicated E-unification algorithm. In
this way, the Maude-NPA has been able to analyze a substantial collection
of cryptographic protocols modulo their algebraic properties, see [48]. What
makes the application of folding variant narrowing to cryptographic proto-
col verification interesting is its flexibility for accepting different equational
theories specified by the user and its order-sorted nature, which is essential
for realistic protocol specification. The following paragraph from the conclu-
162
sions of a survey of algebraic properties used in cryptographic protocols [34]
summarizes the actual situation in protocol verification:
In this survey, we have identified many algebraic properties that
are particularly relevant for the analysis of cryptographic proto-
cols. ... Many recent results consider some algebraic properties.
However, the existing results presented in this survey have two
main weaknesses. Firstly, they are mostly theoretical: very few
practical implementations enable to automatically verify proto-
cols with algebraic properties. Secondly, in most of the cases,
each paper develops an ad hoc decision procedure for a particu-
lar property.
Besides being the first practical narrowing strategy we are aware of for
narrowing modulo axioms, the usefulness of folding variant narrowing goes
way beyond the case of providing finitary unification algorithms for FV the-
ories, such as those used in the Maude-NPA tool to analyze cryptographic
protocols, and even beyond the case of providing a complete unification algo-
rithm for equational theories modulo axioms. As demonstrated by its recent
applications to termination algorithms modulo axioms in [42], and to al-
gorithms for checking confluence and coherence of rewrite theories modulo
axioms, such as those used in the most recent Maude CRC and ChC tools
[44], computing the E∪Ax-variants of a term may be just as important as
computing E∪Ax-unifiers. In particular, even for theories such as the theory
of associativity, which lacks a finitary unification algorithm and a fortiori
cannot be FV, the variants of a term (particularly in an order-sorted setting,
and for terms typically used in left-hand sides of rules) can be finite quite of-
ten in practice and can provide a method to prove termination, and to check
the local confluence and the coherence of rewrite rules, modulo associativity.
The key idea of why variant narrowing is important for termination, con-
fluence, and coherence proofs, as demonstrated in [42] and in [44], is the fol-
lowing. Suppose that R ∪ Ax is a collection of rewrite rules modulo axioms
Ax for which we want to prove, say, termination, or confluence, or coherence
with some equations E (see [44] for an explanation of the coherence case).
We may not have any tools checking such properties that can work modulo
the given set of axioms Ax. For example, we are not aware of any termi-
nation tools that can handle termination modulo the commonly occurring
163
theory ACU of associativity, commutativity and identity. What can we do?
We can decompose Ax as a disjoint union E ∪ Ax′, where E is confluent,
terminating, sort-decreasing and coherent modulo Ax′, and where we have
methods to prove, e.g., termination or confluence modulo Ax′. For example,
ACU decomposes in this way as U ∪ AC and enjoys FV. As shown in [42],
we can transform R∪Ax into a semantically equivalent5 theory R̂∪E ∪Ax′,
where now the set of rules is R̂ ∪ E, modulo the much simpler axioms Ax,
where R̂ specializes each rule in R to the family of variants of their left-hand
sides. If E ∪Ax′ has the finite variant property, we are sure that R̂ will be a
finite set; but in practice R̂ can often be finite without the FV assumption.
For example, Ax can be the theory A of associativity, for which unification
is not even finitary. We can view A as a rule and decompose it as A ∪ ∅. In
an order-sorted setting, it turns out that many theories R̂ ∪ A of practical
interest can be decomposed as (R̂ ∪ A) ∪ ∅ with R̂ finite, even though we
know a priori that this is not possible in general, since A is not FV and does
not even have a finitary unification algorithm. For example, we can often
prove confluence modulo associativity of an equational specification in this
way, while the usual approach to generate critical pairs may not be feasible
because of the potentially infinite number of such pairs modulo A.
5.9 Related Work
Narrowing is a fundamental rewriting technique useful for many purposes,
including equational unification and equational theorem proving [74], combi-
nations of functional and logic programming [65, 69, 95], partial evaluation
[4], symbolic reachability analysis of rewrite theories understood as transition
systems [91], and symbolic model checking [51].
It is known that narrowing modulo axioms provides a complete unification
algorithm [78], using full narrowing, which is hopelessly ineffient. The good
completeness properties for standard narrowing extend naturally to similar
completeness properties for narrowing modulo axioms. For effective strate-
gies, like the basic narrowing strategy [74], it turns out that it is incomplete
even modulo associativity-commutativity already [32], assuming the standard
5This semantic equivalence is very strong: that the original theory will be, e.g., termi-
nating, confluent, and so on modulo Ax iff the transformed theory is so modulo Ax′.
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definition of basic narrowing given in [73] is extended in a straightforward
way to the modulo case.
With an empty set of axioms (the free case), basic narrowing is complete
for unification in the sense of lifting all innermost rewriting sequences into
basic narrowing sequences (see [94]). There are works such as [74, 7], which
investigate conditions under which basic narrowing terminates, as well. In-
deed, except for [78, 123], we are not aware of any studies about narrowing
strategies in the modulo case. Furthermore, as work in [32, 123] shows, nar-
rowing modulo axioms such as associativity-commutativity (AC) can very
easily lead to non-terminating behavior.
The dependency pairs method [12] is a well-known technique for proving
termination of rewriting (modulo axioms). It is extended to narrowing in [5],
see [99] for termination of narrowing using the dependency pair technique.
Termination of narrowing is a much harder problem than that of termina-
tion of rewriting [6] indeed. The AProVE tool [63] is a way to generate




COMBINATION OF THEORIES: A CASE
STUDY IN MAUDE-NPA
This chapter is based on [113] and is joint work with Santiago Escobar,
Catherine Meadows and Jose´ Meseguer. There is a growing interest in formal
methods and tools to analyze cryptographic protocols modulo algebraic prop-
erties of their underlying cryptographic functions. It is well-known that an
intruder who uses algebraic equivalences of such functions can mount attacks
that would be impossible if the cryptographic functions did not satisfy such
equivalences. In practice, however, protocols use a collection of well-known
functions, whose algebraic properties can naturally be grouped together as a
union of theories E1∪ . . .∪En. Reasoning symbolically modulo the algebraic
properties E1∪ . . .∪En requires performing (E1∪ . . .∪En)-unification. How-
ever, even if a unification algorithm for each individual Ei is available, this
requires combining the existing algorithms by methods that are highly non-
deterministic and have high computational cost. In this chapter we present
an alternative method to obtain unification algorithms for combined theories
based on variant narrowing. Although variant narrowing is less efficient at
the level of a single theory Ei, it does not use any costly combination method.
Furthermore, it does not require that each Ei has a dedicated unification al-
gorithm in a tool implementation. We illustrate the use of this method in
the Maude-NPA tool by means of several protocols, including a well-known
protocol requiring the combination of three distinct equational theories.
In recent years there has been growing interest in the formal analysis
of protocols in which the cryptographic algorithms satisfy different algebraic
properties [27, 33, 88, 48]. Applications such as electronic voting, digital cash,
anonymous communication, and even key distribution, all can profit from
the use of such cryptosystems. Thus, a number of tools and algorithms have
been developed that can analyze protocols that make use of these specialized
cryptosystems [88, 85, 17, 11, 36].
Less attention has been paid to combinations of algebraic properties.
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However, protocols often make use of more than one type of cryptosystem.
For example, the Internet Key Exchange protocol [72] makes use of Diffie-
Hellman exponentiation (for exchange of master keys), public and private
key cryptography (for authentication of master keys), shared key cryptogra-
phy (for exchange of session keys), and exclusive-or (used in the generation
of master keys). All of these functions satisfy different equational theories.
Thus it is important to understand the behavior of algebraic properties in
concert as well as separately. This is especially the case for protocol anal-
ysis systems based on unification, where the problem of combining unifica-
tion algorithms [13, 114] for different theories is known to be highly non-
deterministic and complex, even when efficient unification algorithms exist
for the individual theories, and even when the theories are disjoint (that is,
share no common symbols).
The Maude-NPA protocol analysis tool, which relies on unification to
perform backwards reachability analysis from insecure states, makes use of
two different techniques to handle the combination problem. One is to use
a general-purpose approach to unification called variant narrowing [56] (see
also Chapter 5), which, although not as efficient as special purpose unifica-
tion algorithms, can be applied to a broad class of theories that satisfy the
finite variant property [32] (see Section 5.5). A second technique, applicable
to special purpose algorithms or to theories that do not satisfy the finite
variant property, uses a more general framework for combining unification
algorithms.
One advantage of using variant narrowing is that there are well-known
methods and tools for checking that a combination of theories has the finite
variant property, including checking its local confluence and termination, and
also its satisfaction of the finite variant property itself [52] (see Section 5.6).
Furthermore, under appropriate assumptions some of these checks can be
made modularly (see, e.g., [100] for a survey of modular confluence and ter-
mination proof methods). This makes variant narrowing easily applicable
for unification combination and very suitable for experimentation with dif-
ferent theories. Later on, when the theory is better understood, it may be
worth the effort to invest the time to implement and integrate more efficient
special-purpose algorithms.
In this chapter we describe several case studies involving the use of variant
narrowing to apply Maude-NPA to the analysis of several protocols involving
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exclusive-or and other theories; including our running example protocol that
involves three theories: (i) an associative-commutative theory satisfied by
symbols used in state construction, (ii) a cancellation theory for public key
encryption and decryption, and (iii) the equational theory of the exclusive-or
operator. This theory combination is illustrated in the analysis of a version
of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [85], denoted NSL⊕, in which one
of the concatenation operators is replaced by an exclusive-or [25].
In one of the other example protocols (Wired Equivalent Privacy pro-
tocol [1]), we find an attack with Maude-NPA. Then, we look at another
version of the protocol which is supposed to fix that attack, which Maude-
NPA indeed proves to be secure.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we give
an overview of Maude-NPA. In Section 6.2 we recall variant narrowing and
explain how it is used in Maude-NPA, referring to Chapter 5 for some results.
In Section 6.3 we describe our use of Maude-NPA on the three examples: (i)
the NSL⊕ protocol (in Section 6.3.1), (ii) a key exchange protocol based on
exclusive-or and a central server (see Section 6.3.2) by Tatebayashi, Mat-
suzaki and Newman [118], and (iii) the Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol
(WEP) standard by IEEE [1] using exclusive-or and other theories (see Sec-
tion 6.3.3). Additionally, in Section 6.3.4 we look at a version of WEP which
fixes the attack present in the original version, and prove the security of the
revised protocol with Maude-NPA. In Section 6.4 we discuss related work,
and in Section 6.5 we present some additional discussion.
6.1 Protocol Specification and Analysis in Maude-NPA
Given a protocol P , we first explain how its states are modeled algebraically.
The key idea is to model such states as elements of an initial algebra TΣP/EP ,
where ΣP is the signature defining the sorts and function symbols for the
cryptographic functions and for all the state constructor symbols and EP is a
set of equations specifying the algebraic properties of the cryptographic func-
tions and the state constructors. Therefore, a state is an EP-equivalence class
[t] ∈ TΣP/EP with t a ground ΣP-term. However, since the number of states
TΣP/EP is in general infinite, rather than exploring concrete protocol states
[t] ∈ TΣP/EP we explore symbolic state patterns [t(x1, . . . , xn)] ∈ TΣP/EP (X)
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on the free (ΣP , EP)-algebra over a set of variables X. In this way, a state
pattern [t(x1, . . . , xn)] represents not a single concrete state but a possibly in-
finite set of such states, namely all the instances of the pattern [t(x1, . . . , xn)]
where the variables x1, . . . , xn have been instantiated by concrete ground
terms.
Let us introduce a motivating example that we will use to illustrate our
approach based on exclusive–or. We use an exclusive–or version borrowed
from [25] of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [85] which we denote
NSL⊕. In our analysis we use the protocol based on public key encryp-
tion, i.e., operators pk and sk satisfying the equations pk(P, sk(P,M)) =
M and sk(P, pk(P,M)) = M and the messages are put together using con-
catenation and exclusive–or. Note that we use a representation of public-key
encryption in which only principal P can compute sk(P,X) and everyone
can compute pk(P,X). For exclusive–or we have the associativity and com-
mutativity (AC) axioms for ⊕, plus the equations1 X ⊕ 0 = X, X ⊕ X =
0, X ⊕X ⊕ Y = Y.
1. A→ B : pk(B,NA;A)
A sends to B, encrypted under B’s public key, a communication request
containing a nonceNA that has been generated byA, concatenated with
its name.
2. B → A : pk(A,NA;B ⊕NB)
B answers with a message encrypted under A’s public key, containing
the nonce of A, concatenated with the exclusive–or combination of a
new nonce created by B and its name.
3. A→ B : pk(B,NB)
A responds with B’s nonce encrypted under B’s public key.
A and B agree that they both know NA and NB and no one else does.
In the Maude-NPA [47, 48], a state in the protocol execution is a term t
of sort state, t ∈ TΣP/EP (X)state. A state is a multiset built by an associative
and commutative union operator & . Each element in the multiset can
be a strand or the intruder knowledge at that state (intruder knowledge is
1The third equation follows from the first two. It is needed for coherence modulo AC.
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wrapped by { }). A strand [58] represents the sequence of messages sent and
received by a principal executing the protocol and is indicated by a sequence








k ] where each msgi is
a term of sort Msg (i.e., msgi ∈ TΣP (X)Msg), msg− represents an input
message, and msg+ represents an output message. In Maude-NPA, strands
evolve over time and thus we use the symbol | to divide past and future in a
strand, i.e., [msg±1 , . . . ,msg
±
j−1 | msg±j ,msg±j+1, . . . ,msg±k ] where msg±1 , . . . ,




j+1, . . . ,msg
±
k are the future
messages (msg±j is the immediate future message). The intruder knowledge
is represented as a multiset of facts unioned together with an associative and
commutativity union operator _,_. There are two kinds of intruder facts:
positive knowledge facts (the intruder knows m, i.e., m∈I), and negative
knowledge facts (the intruder does not yet know m but will know it in a
future state, i.e., m/∈I), where m is a message expression. Facts of the form
m/∈I make sense in a backwards analysis, since one state can have m∈I and
a prior state can have m/∈I.
The strands associated to the three protocol steps above are given next.
There are two strands, one for each principal in the protocol. Note that the
first message passing A → B : pk(B,NA;A) is represented by a message in
Alice’s strand sending (pk(B, n(A, r);A))+, together with another message in
Bob’s strand that receives (pk(B,N ;A))−. When a principal cannot observe
the contents of a concrete part of a received message (e.g., because a key is
necessary to look inside), we use a generic variable for such part of the mes-
sage in the strand (as with variable N of sort Nonce above, and similarly for
X, Y below). We encourage the reader to compare the protocol in strand no-
tation to the above presentation of the protocol. We also omit the initial and
final nil in strands, which are needed in the tool but clutter the presentation.
- (Alice) :: r :: [(pk(B, n(A, r);A))+, (pk(A, n(A, r);B ⊕ Y ))−, (pk(B, Y ))+]
- (Bob) :: r′ :: [(pk(B,X;A))−, (pk(A,X;B ⊕ n(B, r′)))+, (pk(B, n(B, r′)))−]
Note that r, r′ are used for nonce generation (they are special variables han-
dled as unique constants in order to obtain an infinite number of available
constants).
There are also strands for initial knowledge and actions of the intruder,
such as concatenation, deconcatenation, encryption, decryption, etc. Con-
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catenation by the intruder is described by the strand [(X)−, (Y )−, (X;Y )+],
for example. We will show the full list of intruder capabilities in Section 6.3.1.
Our protocol analysis methodology is then based on the idea of back-
ward reachability analysis, where we begin with one or more state patterns
corresponding to attack states, and want to prove or disprove that they are
unreachable from the set of initial protocol states. In order to perform such
a reachability analysis we must describe how states change as a consequence
of principals performing protocol steps and of intruder actions. This can be
done by describing such state changes by means of a set RP of rewrite rules,
so that the rewrite theory (ΣP , EP , RP) characterizes the behavior of protocol
P modulo the equations EP . The following rewrite rules describe the general
state transitions, where each state transition implies moving rightwards the
vertical bar of one strand:
SS & [L | M−, L′] & {M∈I, IK} → SS & [L,M− | L′] & {IK}
SS & [L | M+, L′] & {IK} → SS & [L,M+ | L′] & {IK}
SS & [L | M+, L′] & {M /∈I, IK} → SS & [L,M+ | L′] & {M∈I, IK}
variables L,L′ denote lists of input and output messages (m+,m−) within a
strand, IK denotes a set of intruder facts (m∈I,m/∈I), and SS denotes a set
of strands. An unbounded number of sessions is handled by another rewrite
rule introducing an extra strand [m±1 , . . . ,m
±
j−1 | m+j ,msg±j+1, . . . ,m±k ] for an
intruder knowledge fact of the form mj∈I. See [47] for further information.
The way to analyze backwards reachability is then relatively easy, namely
to run the protocol “in reverse.” This can be achieved by using the set of
rules R−1P , where v −→ u is in R−1P iff u −→ v is in RP . Reachability analysis
can be performed symbolically, not on concrete states but on symbolic state
patterns [t(x1, . . . , xn)] by means of narrowing modulo EP (see Definition 10
in Section 5.3, and [78, 91]).
EP-unification precisely models all the different ways in which an intruder
could exploit the algebraic properties EP of P to break the protocol; there-
fore, if an initial state can be shown unreachable by backwards reachability
analysis modulo EP from an attack state pattern, this ensures that, even if
the intruder uses the algebraic properties EP , the attack cannot be mounted.
Therefore, efficient support for EP-unification is a crucial feature of symbolic
reachability analysis of protocols modulo their algebraic properties EP .
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6.2 A Unification Algorithm for XOR ∪ pk-sk ∪ AC
In general, combining unification algorithms for a theory E = E1∪E2∪. . .∪En
is computationally quite expensive, and typically assumes that the symbols in
Ei and Ej are pairwise disjoint for each i 6= j. This is due to the substantial
amount of non–determinism involved in the inference systems supporting
such combinations (see [13]). In our NSL⊕ example, E = E1∪E2∪E3, where
E1 is the XOR theory, E2 is the theory pk-sk given by the two public key
encryption equations pk(K, sk(K,M)) = M and sk(K, pk(K,M)) = M , and
E3 is the AC theory for each of the state constructors _,_ and & , explained
in Section 6.1. To further complicate the matter, we need to combine not just
untyped unification algorithms, but typed, and more precisely order-sorted
ones.
Fortunately, the variant–narrowing–based approach that we use in this
chapter avoids all these difficulties by obtaining the (XOR ∪ pk-sk ∪ AC)-
unification algorithm as an instance of the variant narrowing methodology
supported by Maude-NPA. The point is that if an equational theory E has
the finite variant property [32], then a finitary E-unification algorithm can be
obtained by variant narrowing [56, 54], as already explained in Section 5.4.1.
In our case, the equations in the theory pk-sk are confluent and terminating
and, furthermore, have the finite variant property. Likewise, the equations in
the XOR theory presented in Section 6.1 are confluent, terminating and co-
herent modulo the AC axioms of ⊕ and also have the finite variant property.
Finally, the theory of AC for the state-building constructors _,_ and & is
of course finitary and can be viewed as a trivial case of a theory with the
finite variant property (decomposed with no rules and only axioms). Note
that all these three equational theories are disjoint, i.e., they do not share
any symbols. The good news is that the following disjoint union theory
XOR ∪ pk-sk ∪ AC with ΣNSL⊕ being the entire (order-sorted) signature
of our NSL⊕ protocol example is also confluent, terminating and coherent
modulo the AC axioms2, and satisfies the finite variant property:
2All these conditions are easily checkable. Indeed, coherence modulo the combined
AC axioms is immediate, and we can use standard methods and tools to check the local
confluence and termination of the combined theory; similarly, the method described in [52]
can be used to check the finite variant property of the combined theory. Alternatively, one
can use modular methods to check that a combined theory satisfies all these properties
under certain assumptions: see [100] for a good survey of modularity results for confluence
and termination. Likewise, the finite variant property can also be checked modularly under
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1. Rules :
• pk(K, sk(K,M)) = M , sk(K, pk(K,M)) = M ,
• X ⊕ 0 = X, X ⊕X = 0, X ⊕X ⊕ Y = Y ,
2. Axioms : AC for ⊕, AC for _,_ and AC for &
Therefore, Maude-NPA can analyze the NSL⊕ protocol using variant nar-
rowing. In the following we will recall the notions of Chapter 5 that are
crucial for the use of variant narrowing in this chapter, to allow the reader
to read this chapter without having to have read the previous chapter in full.
Let us now motivate the key notions in an intuitive fashion. All definitions
linked below are from Chapter 5.
• The decomposition (Σ, Ax,E) of an equational theory (Σ, E) is such
that E = E ∪ Ax, with a number of extra conditions to assure that
the decomposition behaves like the original equational theory when
executed, see Definition 2 for details.
• An E,Ax-variant of a term t is a pair (t′, σ) such that t′ is the E,Ax-
canonical form of tσ.
• The variant semantics of a term, [[t]]?E,Ax, is the set of all normalized
variants of t, see Definition 5.
• For comparing variants, we write (t1, θ1) vE,Ax (t2, θ2) to denote that
variant (t2, θ2) is more general than variant (t1, θ1).
• We call [[t]]E,Ax the most general and complete variant semantics of t
when: (i) it is a subset of the variant semantics [[t]]?E,Ax from above, and
(ii) every possible variant of t is an instance of at least one element of
[[t]]E,Ax, see Definition 9 for all the details.
• Note that, by definition, all the substitutions in [[t]]E,Ax are E,Ax-
normalized. Moreover, [[t]]E,Ax is unique up to equivalence modulo Ax
and provides a very succinct description of [[t]]?E,Ax.
• We get a minimal and complete E-unification procedure by intersecting
the variant semantics of the terms in question, the details are given in
Proposition 5.
appropriate assumptions, but a discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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• The finite variant property for an equational theory decomposed as
E ∪ Ax means that for each term t, [[t]]E,Ax is a finite set. See details
in Section 5.5
• For a theory with the finite variant property we have a finitary E-
unification algorithm (giving a finite, minimal, and complete set of
unifiers modulo the theory), by the intersection of the most general
and complete variant semantics of the terms of interest. This is shown
in detail in Corollary 8.
Let us now look at an example using these notions, in particular that of
a variant semantics [[t]]?E,Ax.
Example 34 Let us consider the equational theory XOR∪ pk-sk, which, to-
gether with AC for _,_ and & is used for our NSL⊕ protocol presented in
Section 6.1. This equational theory is relevant because none of our previously
defined unification procedures is directly applicable to it, e.g. unification al-
gorithms for exclusive–or such as [68] do not directly apply if extra equations
are added.
For (Σ, Ax,E) a decomposition of XOR ∪ pk-sk, and for terms
t = M ⊕ sk(K, pk(K,M)) and s = X ⊕ sk(K, pk(K,Y )), we have that
[[t]]?E,Ax = {(0, id), . . .} and
[[s]]?E,Ax = {(X ⊕ Y, id),
(Z, {X 7→ 0, Y 7→ Z}), (Z, {X 7→ Z, Y 7→ 0}),
(Z, {X 7→ Z ⊕ U, Y 7→ U}), (Z, {X 7→ U, Y 7→ Z ⊕ U}),
(0, {X 7→ U, Y 7→ U}), (Z1 ⊕ Z2, {X 7→ U ⊕ Z1, Y 7→ U ⊕ Z2}),
(0, {X 7→ V ⊕W,Y 7→ V ⊕W}), . . .}
Note the similarities, and differences, between this example and Example 2.
A follow-up example looks at the most general and complete variant se-
mantics [[t]]E,Ax.
Example 35 Continuing Example 34 it is obvious that the following variants
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are most general w.r.t. vE,Ax: [[t]]E,Ax = {(0, id)} and
[[s]]E,Ax = {(X ⊕ Y, id),
(Z, {X 7→ 0, Y 7→ Z}), (Z, {X 7→ Z, Y 7→ 0}),
(Z, {X 7→ Z ⊕ U, Y 7→ U}), (Z, {X 7→ U, Y 7→ Z ⊕ U}),
(0, {X 7→ U, Y 7→ U}), (Z1 ⊕ Z2, {X 7→ U ⊕ Z1, Y 7→ U ⊕ Z2})}.
Actually, this example is just Example 4 revisited.
Currently, Maude-NPA restricts itself to a subset of theories satisfying
the finite variant property:
1. The axioms Ax can declare some binary operators in Σ to be commu-
tative (with the comm attribute), or associative-commutative (with the
assoc and comm attributes).
2. The set of rewrite rules E is strongly right irreducible, that is no instance
of the right-hand side of a rule in E by a normalized substitution can
be further simplified by the application the equations in E modulo Ax.
The reasons for restricting ourselves in this way is for efficiency and ease
of implementation. Maude currently supports unification modulo commuta-
tive and associative-commutative theories, as well as syntactic unification,
so this is what drives our choice of Ax. Furthermore, the restriction of E
to strongly right irreducible theories means that the depth of the narrowing
tree is bounded by the number of symbols in a term. Moreover, many of the
finite variant theories that arise in cryptographic protocol analysis satisfy
strong right irreducibility. These include encryption-decryption cancellation,
exclusive-or, and modular exponentiation. The major exception is Abelian
groups (other than those described by exclusive-or). We are currently work-
ing on implementing full variant narrowing in Maude-NPA to handle these
and other cases not currently covered by strong right irreducibility.
6.3 Finding attacks modulo XOR ∪ pk-sk ∪ AC in
Maude-NPA
Now we present the three different protocol case studies: NSL⊕, TMN, and
WEP. The following subsections deal with each of the protocols in that order,
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but note that there are two subsections for WEP: one which finds the attack
in the original protocol and another that verifies the security of a modified
version of the protocol. That last subsection also includes explanation about
how the Maude-NPA can prove the security of a protocol in the first place.
6.3.1 NSL⊕
We have analyzed the NSL⊕ protocol presented in Section 6.1 modulo its
equational theory XOR∪pk-sk∪AC in Maude-NPA using variant narrowing.
We now explain in more detail all the operations available to the intruder.
Its capabilities are all given in strand notation. Note that we are omitting
the position marker | which is assumed to be at the beginning.
(s1) [(X)−, (Y )−, (X;Y )+] Concatenation
(s2) [(X;Y )−, (X)+] Left-deconcatenation
(s3) [(X;Y )−, (Y )+] Right-deconcatenation
(s4) [(X)−, (Y )−, (X ⊕ Y )+] Exclusive–or
(s6) [(X)−, (sk(i,X))+] Encryption with i’s private key
(s7) [(X)−, (pk(A,X))+] Encryption with any public key
(s8) [(0)+] Generate the exclusive–or neutral element
(s9) [(A)+] Generate any principal’s name.
The attack state pattern from which we start the backwards narrowing
search in this example is given by one strand, representing Bob (b) wanting
to communicate with Alice (a)
:: r :: [(pk(b,X; a))−, (pk(a,X; b⊕ n(b, r)))+, (pk(b, n(b, r)))−|nil]
together with requiring the intruder (i) to have learned Bob’s nonce, i.e.,
n(b, r)∈I. What this represents is an attack in which Bob has properly exe-
cuted the protocol and believes to be talking to Alice, while the intruder has
obtained the nonce that Bob created and considers a secret shared between
Alice and him.
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Figure 6.1: Pictorial representation of the initial state, leading to an attack
on the NSL⊕ protocol
See Figure 6.1 for a pictorial representation of the strand space and mes-
sages sent and received, depicting the attack found by Maude-NPA. This
attack agrees with the one described in [25]. The figure has been created
with the help of the Maude-NPA GUI [111], with the exclusive–or symbol ⊕
textually represented as ∗ in the figure.
6.3.2 TMN - Key Exchange Protocol
The TMN protocol is a symmetric key distribution protocol [118, 86] initially
proposed by Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki and Newman. The purpose is for A and
B to share a key KB. The server also checks that neither KA nor KB have
been used in prior sessions. The Avispa [11] and XOR-ProVerif [81] (based on
ProVerif [17]) tools are both able to deal with this protocol as well, according
to [83].
The protocol has three principals, which are Alice (A), Bob (B) and the
server (S). There is only a single public key and private key pair in use
which belongs to the server, so we assume that the server is the only one
that can decrypt messages that are encrypted by it. We will write enc( ) for
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that encryption using the public key of S. The fresh symmetric keys that
are being exchanged are KA and KB. Here is the protocol:
1. A→ S : B, enc(KA)
A sends to S the pair containing the name of the intended communi-
cation partner B, and, encrypted by S’s public key, the freshly chosen
symmetric key KA.
2. S → B : A
S sends to B a notification that A wants to establish a shared key.
3. B → S : A, enc(KB)
B answers to S with the pair of the name A and, encrypted under S’s
public key, its own freshly chosen symmetric key KB.
4. S → A : B,KB ⊕KA
S sends to A the pair with the name of B, and the exclusive-or combi-
nation of the two keys provided by A and B, i.e., KB ⊕KA.
At the end of this protocol, A and B share the fresh key KB, as A can
compute KB = (KB⊕KA)⊕KA, as it knows KA. There is an attack on this
protocol by an intruder I that can be described as follows:
1. A→ S : B, enc(KA)
A starts a normal session with B.
2. S → I : A
I intercepts the message sent by S that was intended for B.
3. I(B)→ S : A, enc(KI)
I impersonates B and sends his own symmetric key to the server.
4. S → I : B,KI ⊕KA
Finally, the intruder intercepts the message intended for A, including
KI ⊕KA, and as the intruder knows KI , he can find KA by computing
KA = (KI ⊕KA)⊕KI . Finally, I can re-transmit the pair B,KI ⊕KA
to A.
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In our notation for Maude-NPA we have three strands, one for each of the
principals. Note that KA will be represented by a nonce n(A, r), similarly
for KB. The variables NA and NB are used to capture unknown nonces and
the pairing is made explicit using pair( , ):
- (Alice) :: r :: [(pair(B, enc(n(A, r))))+, (pair(B, n(A, r)⊕NB))−]




Let us show the capabilities of the intruder, and note that we are omitting
any leading or trailing nil and the position marker | which is assumed at the
beginning:
(s1) [(X)−, (Y )−, (X ⊕ Y )+] Exclusive–or
(s2) [(pair(X, Y ))−, (X)+] Left–projection
(s3) [(pair(X, Y ))−, (Y )+] Right–projection
(s4) [(X)−, (Y )−, (pair(X, Y ))+] Pairing
(s5) :: r :: [(n(i, r))+] Generate a key for i
(s6) [(N)−, (enc(N))+] Encrypt with S public key
(s7) [(A)+] Generate any principal’s name.
To find the attack that is listed above, we start the Maude-NPA with the
following attack state pattern, from which we start the backwards narrowing
search, representing Alice’s (a) attempt to communicate with Bob (b) where
the intruder is able to learn the nonce (i.e., key) of Alice, i.e., n(a, r)∈I:
:: r :: [(pair(b, enc(n(a, r))))+, (pair(b, n(a, r)⊕NB))−|nil]
See Figure 6.2 for a pictorial representation of the strand space and mes-
sages sent and received, depicting the attack found by Maude-NPA, which is
essentially the attack described above. The figure has been created with the
help of the Maude-NPA GUI [111], with the exclusive–or symbol ⊕ textually
represented as ∗ in the figure.
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Figure 6.2: Pictorial representation of the initial state, leading to an attack
on the TMN protocol
6.3.3 Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol
The Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol (WEP) is defined in [1]. The pur-
pose of WEP is to protect data during wireless transmission. The protocol
encrypts a message M to be sent from principal A to another principal B.
It is a single step protocol with no response:
1. A→ B : V, ([M,C(M)]⊕RC4(V,KAB))
A sends a vector V , paired with the exclusive-or combination of the
message with a checksum (i.e., [M,C(M)]) and RC4(V,KAB) where
RC4 is a public one-way algorithm using the initial vector V and a
symmetric key KAB.
The receiver can then compute the message M as it knows the key KAB
and gets V , so it can compute RC4(V,KAB) and then make use of the
exclusive-or cancellation property to get [M,C(M)]. Verification with
the checksum yields the message M .
The purpose is for no one, except for A and B, to be able to know M .
It turns out there is an attack, using the fact that V can be reused and one
message M1 can be sent to different recipients and thus endanger the secrecy
of a message M2 sent later:
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1. A→ B : V, ([M1, C(M1)]⊕RC4(V,KAB))
A sends the same message M1 to B.
2. A→ I : V, ([M1, C(M1)]⊕RC4(V,KAI))
Then, A send the same message M1 to I. Now, I is able to determine
RC4(V,KAI) as KAI is known. Then, by exclusive-or combining the
two payloads of 1 and 2 and adding RC4(V,KAI) it gets RC4(V,KAB)
as the result of the term ([M1, C(M1)]⊕RC4(V,KAB))⊕ ([M1, C(M1)]
⊕ RC4(V,KAI)) ⊕ RC4(V,KAI). With that in hand, all further mes-
sages that A sends to B can be accessed by the intruder.
3. A→ I : V, ([M2, C(M2)]⊕RC4(V,KAB))
Intercepting this message intended for B, the intruder can indeed com-
pute [M2, C(M2)] and thus M2 by simple exclusive-or combination:
([M2, C(M2)]⊕RC4(V,KAB))⊕RC4(V,KAB).
In our strand notation for Maude-NPA we give two possible strands, one
with just the single message as described above, and another one sending the
same message twice (similarly to [83]). Note that the secret messages will
be represented by nonces created by the sender, so we can be sure no one
knows them ahead of time, or can guess them. We also make the pairing of
a vector and the remainder of the message explicit, by using pair( , ):
- (Alice) :: r :: [(pair(V, ([n(A, r), c(n(A, r))]⊕ rc4(V, k(A,B)))))+]
- (Alice)
:: r′ :: [ (pair(V, ([n(A, r′), c(n(A, r′))]⊕ rc4(V, k(A,B)))))+,
(pair(V, ([n(A, r′), c(n(A, r′))]⊕ rc4(V, k(A,C)))))+]
Let us show the capabilities of the intruder, and note that we are omitting
any leading or trailing nil and the position marker | which is assumed to be
placed at the beginning:
(s1) [(X)−, (Y )−, (X ⊕ Y )+] Exclusive–or
(s2) [(A)−, (k(A, i))+] Symmetric keys for all principals with intruder i
(s3) [(pair(V,X))−, (V )+] Left–projection
(s4) [(pair(V,X))−, (X)+] Right–projection
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Figure 6.3: Pictorial representation of the initial state, leading to an attack
on the WEP protocol
(s5) [(V )−, (k(A,B))−, (rc4(V, k(A,B)))+] RC4 generation
(s6) [(N)−, (c(N))+] Checksum generation
(s7) [([N, c(N ′)])−, (N)+] Message extraction
(s8) [(A)+] Generate any principal’s name
To find the attack that is listed above, we start the Maude-NPA with the
following attack state pattern, from which we start the backwards narrowing
search, representing Alice’s (a) message to Bob (b) where the intruder is able
to learn the nonce (i.e., message) that Alice is sending, i.e., n(a, r)∈I:
:: r :: [(pair(v, ([n(a, r), c(n(a, r))]⊕ rc4(v, k(a, b)))))+|nil]
The Maude-NPA is able to find the attack described above in 20 back-
wards steps for this initial state. The attack is presented in Figure 6.3. That
figure has been created with the help of the Maude-NPA GUI [111], with the
exclusive–or symbol ⊕ textually represented as ∗ in the figure.
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6.3.4 Fixed Version of Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol
It is possible to fix the WEP protocol quite easily. The suggested fix is to
change the initial vector that is used for each message. The fix has been
proposed before, in [83], and the Maude-NPA is able to verify the security of
the fixed protocol, which is demonstrated in this section.
In the attempt to verify protocols the Maude-NPA tool explores the whole
state space of a protocol, starting its backwards exploration from a symbolic
description of a set of potential attack states and searching for an initial state
of the protocol. In general, this search state space is infinite and the search
would not terminate, and thus no decision about security of protocols could
be made. To deal with this issue the Maude-NPA is equipped with powerful
state space reduction techniques [49, 50], that enable the tool to cut the state
space down. The usual infinite state space actually gets reduced to a finite
state space most of the time but not always.3 In practice, this reduced state
space can often be fully explored in a moderate amount of time.
Of course, for these state space reductions to be worthwhile they need to
ensure that completeness is maintained, as otherwise the absence of attacks in
the reduced state space allows no conclusions about the existence or absence
of attacks in the full state space. The main, and oldest, state space reduction
technique in the tool is that of grammars. Grammars are used to cut down
the search space by identifying non-terminating search paths. Usually the
grammars alone are able to reduce the infinite state space to a finite one.
There are further techniques that remove unreachable states, which elimi-
nates the cost of exploring them, e.g., (i) the idea of public data, (ii) limiting
the dynamic introduction of new strands, (iii) prioritizing input messages,
and (iv) detecting inconsistent states early. There are also techniques for re-
moving redundant states, namely, (v) a subsumption partial order reduction,
and (vi) the super-lazy intruder [49, 50].
These techniques are needed for the efficiency as well as for achieving
full verification. As we will see in this example, no attack is found and the
(reduced) state space is finite and completely explored by the tool. By the
completeness of the state space reductions we can then conclude that there
actually is no attack and the protocol is proven secure modulo the given
3Since the Maude-NPA analyzes protocols assuming an unbounded number of sessions,
such analysis is in general undecidable.
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algebraic properties.
As described above, a fix for this protocol is to require all the vectors that
are used to be new, i.e., no vector can be re-used. We will only present the
protocol in strand notation, the change needed for the textbook notation is
then obvious. This new protocol definition uses a nonce as the vector and
thus no two vectors used by the participants will ever be the same.
- (Alice)
:: r, r2 :: [( pair(vec(n(A, r2), ([n(A, r), c(n(A, r))]
⊕ rc4(vec(n(A, r2), k(A,B)))))+]
- (Alice)
:: r′, r3, r4 :: [( pair(vec(n(A, r3), ([n(A, r′), c(n(A, r′))]
⊕ rc4(vec(n(A, r3), k(A,B)))))+,
( pair(vec(n(A, r4), ([n(A, r′), c(n(A, r′))]
⊕ rc4(vec(n(A, r4), k(A,C)))))+]
Let us show the additional capability of the intruder, and note that we
are omitting any leading or trailing nil and the position marker | which is
assumed to be placed at the beginning:
(s9) :: r :: [(vec(n(i, r)))+] Generate a fresh vector
We start the Maude-NPA with the same attack state pattern as in the
basic version of the protocol. Note how v still just represents any vector,
which we do not need to specify as a nonce. This pattern represents Alice’s
(a) message to Bob (b) where the intruder is able to learn the nonce (i.e.,
message) that Alice is sending, i.e., n(a, r)∈I:
:: r :: [(pair(v, ([n(a, r), c(n(a, r))]⊕ rc4(v, k(a, b)))))+|nil]
The search started from the above attack state pattern results in a finite
search space, without finding an attack. Therefore, the Maude-NPA has
verified that this fixed version of WEP is indeed secure.
In [83] it is shown that both the Avispa [11] and XOR-ProVerif [81] (based
on ProVerif [17]) tools are able to deal with this protocol, finding the attack
in the initial version presented in the previous subsection and showing its
absence in the fixed version presented here.
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6.4 Related Work
There is a substantial amount of research on formal verification of crypto-
graphic protocols. Much of it abstracts away from any equational theories
obeyed by the cryptographic operators, but there is a growing amount of
work addressing this problem. The earliest was the NRL Protocol Analyzer
[88], which, like Maude-NPA, was based on unification and backwards search,
implemented via narrowing over confluent equational theories. This was suf-
ficient to handle, for example, the cancellation of encryption and decryption,
although there were many theories of interest it did not address, such as
exclusive-or and other Abelian group operators.
More recently, tools have begun to offer support for specification and, to
some degree, analysis of protocols involving equational theories. These tools
include, for example, ProVerif [17], OFMC [15], and CL-Atse [121]. Both
OFMC and CL-Atse work in the bounded session model, while ProVerif uses
abstraction and unbounded sessions. Both OFMC and CL-Atse support
exclusive-or and Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. ProVerif can also be used
to analyze these, but the equational theories it is known to work well with
are more limited, e.g., not supporting associativity-commutativity or Diffie-
Hellman exponentiation. However, Ku¨sters and Truderung [81, 82] have de-
veloped algorithms that can, under certain restrictions, translate protocols
using exclusive-or or Diffie-Hellman exponentiation to protocols that can be
analyzed by ProVerif in a free algebra model; for exclusive-or they can han-
dle protocols satisfying the ⊕-linearity property. According to a study by
Lafourcade et al. [83], this produces analysis times that are only slightly
slower than analyses by OFMC and CL-Atse, mainly because of the transla-
tion time.
There is also a growing amount of theoretical work on cryptographic
protocol analysis using equational theories, e.g. [3, 26, 21, 28, 16]. This con-
centrates on the decidability of problems of interest to cryptographic proto-
col analysis, such as deducibility, which means that it is possible (e.g. for
an intruder) to deduce a term from a set of terms, and static equivalence,
which means that an intruder cannot tell the difference between two sets
of terms. However, there is much less work on the combination of differ-
ent theories, although Arnaud, Cortier, and Delaune [33] have considered
the problem in terms of decidability of the problem for combination of dis-
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joint theories, showing that if any two disjoint theories have decidable static
equivalence problems, then so does their combination. More recently Cheva-
lier and Rusinowitch analyze the security of cryptographic protocols via con-
straint systems and have also studied composition of theories. In [27], they
give a general method for combining disjoint theories that is based on the
Baader-Schulz combination algorithm for unification algorithms for differ-
ent theories [13]. This can be thought of as a constraint-based analogue of
the Maude-NPA combination framework, which is also based on the Baader-
Schulz combination algorithm [13].
6.5 Discussion
To gain high assurance about cryptographic protocols using formal methods
requires reasoning modulo the algebraic properties of the underlying crypto-
graphic functions. In symbolic analyses this typically necessitates performing
unification modulo such algebraic properties. However, since a protocol may
use a variety of different functions —so that different protocols typically re-
quire reasoning modulo different theories— it is unrealistic to expect that
a fixed set of unification algorithms will suffice for such analyses. That is,
combination methods that obtain unification algorithm for a composition of
theories out of a family of such algorithm for each of them, are unavoidable.
Standard methods for obtaining a unification algorithm for a combined the-
ory E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En [13] are computationally costly due to the high degree of
non-determinism in the combination method; furthermore, they require the
existence of a unification algorithm for each individual theory Ei, which in
practice may not be available in a tool’s infrastructure. In Chapter 6 we have
proposed an alternative method based on folding variant narrowing to obtain
a (E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En)-unification algorithm under simpler requirements. Specif-
ically, dedicated implementations of unification algorithms for each of the
theories Ei are not needed: in our example, only a dedicated AC-unification
algorithm was used: no dedicated algorithms for XOR or pk-sk were needed.
Furthermore, even though narrowing is less efficient than a dedicated algo-
rithm for each individual theory Ei, the costly computational overhead of a
standard combination method is avoided. The case studies presented have
shown that variant narrowing, as supported by the Maude-NPA, is indeed
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an effective method to deal with nontrivial combinations of equational theo-
ries; and for analyzing many protocols with even a modest infrastructure of
built-in unification algorithms.
We should emphasize that standard combination methods such as those
described in [13], and the alternative variant narrowing method presented
here are not rival methods. Instead they are highly complementary methods
which, when used in tandem, allow a tool to analyze a much wider range of
protocols than those analyzable by each method in isolation. Let us use our
example theory XOR∪pk -sk∪AC to illustrate this important point. Variant
narrowing decomposed this combined theory into: (i) three rewrite rules for
XOR and two rewrite rules for pk-sk plus, (ii) three instances of AC: one for
⊕, another for , and another for & . That is, variant narrowing with the
rules in (i) was performed modulo the axioms in (ii). But the axioms in (ii)
are themselves a combined theory (in fact, also combined with all the other
function symbols in the protocol specification as free function symbols). The
Maude infrastructure used by Maude-NPA has in fact used an order-sorted
version of a standard combination method in the style of [13] to support
unification with the combined axioms of (ii). Therefore, the advantages of
using standard combination methods and variant narrowing in tandem are
the following:
1. A given tool infrastructure can only have a finite number of predefined
(finitary) unification algorithms for, say, theories T1, . . . , Tk; however, it
should also be able to support any combination of such built-in theories
by a standard combination method.
2. A given protocol may require performing unification modulo a combi-
nation of theories E1 ∪ . . .∪En, but some of the Ei may not belong to
the library T1, . . . , Tk, so that the standard combination method cannot
be used.
3. However, if E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En can be refactored as a theory decomposition
(Σ, B,R) that: (i) it has the finite variant property; and (ii) B is a
combination of the theories T1, . . . , Tk supported by the current library,




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter first presents the conclusions of this dissertation, followed by a
discussion of future research directions.
7.1 Conclusions
Three aspects of browser security have been addressed in this dissertation:
(i) the machine-to-user communication, (ii) internal browser security con-
cerns and (iii) the machine-to-machine communication. First, we deal with
the machine-to-user communication for two browsers, IE and IBOS, by show-
ing a methodology of creating models for browsers that are amenable to for-
mal analysis of security properties in areas (i) and (ii). Regarding (i), this
methodology does find many possible attacks in IE for both the address bar
and the status bar. It also shows the absence of attacks for the address bar of
IBOS. As for (ii), we use the same methodology to look at internal browser
security in the case of IBOS and the same origin policy (SOP). There we
check that the SOP holds and are able to find a bug in the display memory
management.
For (iii), the machine-to-machine communication, we look into browser-
generic cryptographic protocols, and are able to analyze a number of them
modulo their algebraic properties. We find bugs in some protocols while
showing the security of others. To be able to analyze such protocols modulo
their algebraic properties we use a new generic method we have developed
in this dissertation which allows the effective computation of unifiers modulo
equational theories, based on a new narrowing strategy, which we call fold-
ing variant narrowing. Related to that we have presented a new automatic
method for checking the finite variant property for a given theory and paved
the way for further applications based on this new narrowing strategy.
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Comparing to existing methods, like the ProVerif tool [17] and its adap-
tations for analysis modulo specific algebraic theories like exclusive-or or
Diffie-Hellman [81, 82], it turns out that using the unification based on our
new narrowing strategy in the Maude-NPA tool [47, 48] is quite more gen-
eral. It simply does not need to be specifically tailored to the exact theory
modulo which the protocol is supposed to work.
The key advancements in this dissertation are: (i) the new methodol-
ogy for formal modeling and analysis of web browsers; (ii) the case studies
with that methodology on IE GUI and IBOS GUI and internals; (iii) a new
narrowing strategy called folding variant narrowing that is used for the com-
putation of unification modulo axioms; (iv) an automatic check for the finite
variant property; (v) cryptographic protocol case studies based on the new
unification algorithm; and (vi) paving the way for further automated deduc-
tion uses of folding variant narrowing.
7.1.1 Browser Analysis Conclusions
GUI logic flaws are a real and pressing security problem – these flaws can be
exploited to lure even security-conscious users to visit malicious web pages.
We have formulated GUI logic correctness as a new research problem, and
have proposed a systematic approach to pro-actively uncover logic flaws in
browser GUI design/implementation that lead to spoofing attacks.
Specifically, based upon an in-depth study of the logic of key subsets of
IE source code, we have developed a formal model of the browser logic and
have applied formal reasoning to uncover important new spoofing scenar-
ios. This has been done for both the status bar and the address bar. The
knowledge obtained from our approach offers an in-depth understanding of
potential logic flaws in the graphical interface implementation. The IE devel-
opment team has confirmed that all thirteen flaws reported by us are indeed
exploitable, and has fixed eleven of them in the latest build. Through this
work, we demonstrate the feasibility and the benefit of applying a rigorous
formal approach to GUI design and implementation.
Despite the fact that the analysis approach is systematic, it only pro-
vides relative completeness : relative to the kind of spoofing scenarios being
considered, the IE code subset currently modeled, and our search spaces.
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We have also developed a model of the logic of IBOS in which we have
proven the correctness of the address bar handling, just like we analyzed the
address bar for IE.
In that model of IBOS we have shown that the SOP holds, by analyzing
a number of properties that altogether imply SOP. However, we were able
to find a bug in the display memory management as originally designed as
well. We have proposed a straightforward fix and we have shown that in the
model this fix works correctly.
Finding flaws like these, or showing their absence, is important for the
level of trust a user can place on the browser being used. The kind of analysis
we do is of course not only relevant for IE and IBOS, but can provide valuable
insight into any browser, or any other highly networked application or GUI-
based application.
7.1.2 Folding Variant Narrowing Conclusions
We have presented a self-contained and extended exposition of the key con-
cepts, results, and algorithms for variant narrowing and variant-based uni-
fication; and we have illustrated the main ideas with a rich collection of
examples. What these new techniques achieve is to bring narrowing modulo
axioms from a theoretical possibility with hopeless practical prospects into a
practically useful technique with many potential applications, some of which
have already been exploited in actual tools such as the Maude-NPA, the
Maude Chuch-Rosser Checker (CRC) and Maude Coherence Checker (ChC)
tools; see the future work section for more applications.
7.1.3 Protocol Analysis Conclusions
The case studies presented have shown that folding variant narrowing, as
supported by the Maude-NPA, is indeed an effective method to deal with
nontrivial combinations of equational theories. Using Maude-NPA allows us
to analyze multiple cryptographic protocols, showcased by the four protocol




We split the future work into three subsections, dealing with browser analysis
in Section 7.2.1, folding variant narrowing in Section 7.2.2 and cryptographic
protocol analysis in Section 7.2.3
7.2.1 Browser Analysis Future Work
Regarding the IBOS web browser there are a few follow up projects that
would be useful. First, now that a design that has been analyzed in detail
exists, it would make sense to analyze the implementation using (semi-)
automatic source code verification tools [107, 109, 108]. Another way of
increasing the confidence in IBOS would be to actually use the proven secure
microkernel seL4 or to develop a new proof of security for IBOS’ underlying
microkernel.
Another important task ahead is to obtain a precise high-level specifi-
cation of more IE modules, and to extend our current formal models and
analyses to cover most IE functionality. For example, the model should ac-
commodate the tab browsing logic and the hosting mechanisms for document
types other than HTML, such as PDF, Microsoft Word, Macromedia Flash,
etc. Our methodology can be extended to tackling this pending challenge in
the future.
GUI logic flaws affect all web browsers, not just IE and IBOS. We believe
that the methodology presented in this dissertation can be equally applied
to systematically identify vulnerabilities in other browsers. More broadly,
non-browser applications, e.g., email clients and digital identity management
tools [93], have similar graphical interface integrity issues. Thus, ensuring
GUI logic correctness is a research direction with significant practical rele-
vance.
7.2.2 Folding Variant Narrowing Future Work
Folding variant narrowing has allowed work in the direction of asymmetric
unification, where the instantiation of one of the sides of a unification problem
must remain in canonical form. This does turn out to be very useful for
cryptographic protocol analysis and is, in some way, already done in many
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approaches but has not been formalized in a general way before. Together
with a number of colleagues we have just published work on this [46]. Once
this asymmetric unification problem was made explicit, work has also been
done on dedicated unification algorithms, e.g., for a combination of theories
with exclusive-or, that would have higher performance over our more generic,
narrowing based approach.
Folding variant narrowing has already been used in some automated de-
duction tools, specifically for checking the confluence and coherence of rewrite
theories modulo axioms in the Maude CRC and ChC tools [44] and to rea-
son about termination modulo combination of associativity, commutativity
and identity in the Maude Termination Tool [41]. Note that a variant based
approach can actually be used even for theories that do not have the finite
variant property as a given term may have a finite number of variants any-
way. In this way we envision many other applications of variant narrowing
in automated deduction.
A few issues with great potential for improvement are: (i) better variant
generation strategies and (ii) better algorithms for ensuring that a theory
has the finite variant property. For example, the current implementation of
folding variant narrowing and variant-based unification available in Maude
[40] and used by the Maude-NPA only supports a subclass of FV theories,
and could be substantially optimized in many ways. Here lazy narrowing
strategies may be useful but no notion of needed or demanded evaluation
step has been defined for the modulo case. Another promising direction is to
further advance the proof techniques for checking FV and implement tools for
such checking. There is recent work on extending techniques for termination
of rewriting to termination of narrowing which could be adapted to prove
FV. Modularity results for modular combination of theories enjoying the
finite variant property are also interesting, similarly to modularity results for
termination of basic narrowing [7].
Furthermore, a promising direction is the study of symbolic, narrowing-
based, reachability analysis techniques for rewrite theories R = (Σ, E ∪
Ax,R), where E is confluent, terminating, sort-decreasing and coherent mod-
ulo Ax and a finitary Ax-unification exists, but E∪Ax need not be FV. And
an even more ambitious future task is to extend these techniques to new
techniques for the development of finitary unification algorithms for theories
that have such algorithms but do not enjoy FV.
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7.2.3 Protocol Analysis Future Work
The Maude-NPA actually is currently restricted to only applying folding
variant narrowing to the case of theories that are strongly right irreducible.
It would be very useful to extend the Maude-NPA’s unification features to
the full capabilities of the folding variant narrowing theory as given here and
to remove the strongly right irreducible requirement. Indeed, current work
on the Maude implementation should make this possible in the near future.
A very important future direction is work in formal tools supporting
symbolic protocol analysis modulo equational properties. Such work should
include: (i) developing methods for expanding a tool’s built-in unification
infrastructure based on a finite number of predefined (finitary) unification
algorithms for theories T1, . . . , Tk (with any combination of them done by
standard combination methods), to make it as efficient and extensible as
possible; and (ii) improving and optimizing the methods for efficient variant
narrowing modulo such infrastructure. Good candidates for new theories Tj
to be added to the built-in infrastructure include commonly used theories,
with high priority given to theories that lack the finite variant properties.
For example, the theory of homomorphic encryption, which lacks the finite





OF THE IE MODEL
All the data source files for this chapter are available at [112]. We are using
Maude 2.6 for all of these experiments.
A.1 Status Bar - Explained Specification
In this section we list and describe the source code of the Maude model of





subsort Attribute < AttributeSet .
op nil : -> AttributeSet .
op _,_ : AttributeSet AttributeSet
-> AttributeSet [assoc comm id: nil] .
sort ObjectName .
subsort Qid < ObjectName .
op nil : -> ObjectName .
sort Object .
op <_|_> : ObjectName AttributeSet -> Object .
Objects have attributes that are stored as associative-commutative sets
and they do have an object name.
sort ClassName .
ops AbstractElement Anchor Button Form
Image InputField Label
: -> ClassName .
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sort URL .
ops maliciousUrl wantedUrl emptyUrl arbitraryUrl




: -> InputType .
op className:_ : ClassName -> Attribute .
op targetURL:_ : URL -> Attribute .
op upLink:_ : ObjectName -> Attribute .
op container:_ : ObjectName -> Attribute .
op inputType:_ : InputType -> Attribute .
endfm
Class names, URLs and the input type are all possible attributes of an
object. Also, each object has an uplink to a parent object and may have a





subsort Action < ActionList .
op noOp : -> Action .
op _;_ : ActionList ActionList
-> ActionList [assoc id: noOp] .
Actions are stored as a list, due to their nature of being executed in order.
sort MessageType .
sort RawMessageType .
subsort RawMessageType < MessageType .
ops MOUSEMOVE LBUTTONDOWN LBUTTONUP
: -> RawMessageType .
ops MOUSEOVER MOUSELEAVE : -> MessageType .
We differentiate between raw mouse messages, i.e., movement of the
mouse and the button being pressed and released, and mouse messages, like
mousing over an element or leaving an element on the screen.
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op onMouseMessage : ObjectName RawMessageType
-> Action .
op pumpMessage : ObjectName MessageType -> Action .
op fireJScriptNonClick : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op fireJScriptClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op bubbleHandleMessage : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op bubbleClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
op doClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op handleMessage : ObjectName MessageType -> Action .
op clickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
op cancelBubble : -> Action .
ops setStatusText FollowHyperlink : URL -> Action .
op eyeInspection : -> Action .
endfm
Actions can be to pass messages of different types to objects, to simulate
what JavaScript does1, the bubbling mechanism of passing the message on
to the parent HTML object, and click messages.
Also, setting of the status bar, following a hyper link and the user in-
specting the status bar are all explicitly shown as actions which allows our





subsort StateMultiSetElement < StateMultiSet .
op nil : -> StateMultiSet .
op __ : StateMultiSet StateMultiSet
-> StateMultiSet [assoc comm id: nil] .
sort ObjectMultiSet .
subsort Object < ObjectMultiSet .
op nil : -> ObjectMultiSet .
op __ : ObjectMultiSet ObjectMultiSet
-> ObjectMultiSet [assoc comm id: nil] .
1The JavaScript action does get translated to nothing later on, but it is included here
so that malicious use of JavaScript could be modeled if so desired. In the end we decided
to only care about static HTML.
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op {_} : ObjectMultiSet -> StateMultiSetElement .
op [_] : ActionList -> StateMultiSetElement .
op statusBar : URL -> StateMultiSetElement .
op memorizedUrl : URL -> StateMultiSetElement .
endfm
A multiset of objects is used to represent all the HTML objects; it is then
wrapped by curly braces to become a part of the state multi set. That state
multiset also includes the list of actions, wrapped by square brackets, the
actual status bar value, and the user memorized URL value.
mod GENERAL-MOUSE-RULES is
including STATE-MULTI-SET .
var A : Action . var AL : ActionList .
var M : MessageType . vars RM RM’ : RawMessageType .
vars O O’ O’’ : ObjectName .
vars Atts Atts’ : AttributeSet . vars Url Url’ : URL .
var C : ClassName . var OMS : ObjectMultiSet .
**** We are interested in two consecutive mouse
**** messages, be they moves or clicks, this means that
**** the ’old’ HTML object is always getting the first
**** message.
eq [ onMouseMessage(O, RM) ;
onMouseMessage(O, RM’) ; AL ]
= [ pumpMessage(O, RM) ; pumpMessage(O, RM’) ; AL ] .
If there are two mouse messages on the same HTML object, then they
can simply be pumped directly to that HTML object. If the messages are
for two different HTML objects O and O’ the next equation will take care of
them:
ceq [onMouseMessage(O,RM) ; onMouseMessage(O’,RM’) ;
AL] {OMS}
= [pumpMessage(O,RM) ; pumpMessage(O,MOUSELEAVE) ;
if not (childOfAnchor(O’, OMS))
then setStatusText(emptyUrl)
else noOp fi ;
pumpMessage(O’,RM’) ; pumpMessage(O’,MOUSEOVER) ;
AL] {OMS}
if O =/= O’ .
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On the other hand, for mouse messages on two different objects, a
MOUSELEAVE message on the first object is added after the first message and a
MOUSEOVER message on the second object is added after the second message.
Additionally, if the second object is not the child of an anchor, the status
bar is set to the empty URL; otherwise this step is skipped.
**** checking property of being a child of an anchor
**** (direct, or indirect, i.e., transitive)
op childOfAnchor : ObjectName ObjectMultiSet -> Bool .
eq childOfAnchor(O,
< O | upLink: O’ , Atts >
< O’ | className: C , upLink: O’’ , Atts’ > OMS)
= if C == Anchor
then true
else childOfAnchor(O,
< O | upLink: O’’ , Atts > OMS)
fi .
eq childOfAnchor(O, < O | upLink: nil , Atts >
OMS)
= false .
The check for being a child of an anchor is transitive and goes to the top,
until there are no further parent objects available, unless an anchor object is
found.
eq [pumpMessage(O, M) ; AL]
= [fireJScriptNonClick(O, M) ;
bubbleHandleMessage(O, M) ;
if M == LBUTTONUP then doClick(O) else noOp fi ;
AL] .
Pumping a message results in the JavaScript non-click message being
triggered (which, as mentioned before, will disappear; also see code later) and
the start of the bubble mechanism for that object and message. Afterwards,
if it was the mouse button being released, i.e., LBUTTONUP, then the method
for a click is started. Bubbling is described next:
rl [bubbleHandleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | upLink: O’ , Atts > OMS}
=> [handleMessage(O, M) ;






{< O | upLink: O’ , Atts > OMS} .
A bubble handle message is transformed to handling that message at the
current object, and, if there is a parent object, passing the bubble handle
message on to that object afterwards. The handling of a message can end the
bubbling mechanism by posting a cancelBubble into the list of actions. The
same happens to the bubbling of a click action instead of a handle message.
rl [bubbleClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | upLink: O’ , Atts > OMS}
=> [clickAction(O) ;
if O’ == nil then noOp
else bubbleClickAction(O’) fi ; AL]
{< O | upLink: O’ , Atts > OMS} .
eq [cancelBubble ; bubbleHandleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
= [AL] .
eq [cancelBubble ; bubbleClickAction(O) ; AL]
= [AL] .
eq [cancelBubble ; AL]
= [AL] [owise] .
Canceling the bubble removes the bubbling handle message as well as the
bubbling click action. Note that only the first action in the list of actions is
actively executed, these dormant bubbling actions can be removed easily and
there is no chance their actions could be executed already. The last equation,
which allows cancelBubble to be removed, is marked with [owise], which
means it will only be executed when none of the other equations is applicable.









eq [FollowHyperlink(Url) ; A ; AL]
= [FollowHyperlink(Url)] if A =/= noOp .
endm
The action of setting the status bar URL is completed by actually chang-
ing the URL in the status bar to the new URL. The user’s inspection of
the status bar copies the value of the status bar into the memorized URL
wrapper, and following a hyperlink ends the action execution by dropping
all further actions that should follow, as this is the point where the decision
can be made whether the URL the navigation actually goes to is the same
as the one in the user’s memory, the status bar, both, or neither of them.
We assume from now on that the JavaScript that is being used does
nothing too outrageous, like changing the class name or the whole DOM
tree, as we are ultimately interested in security in the absence of JavaScript
for the status bar anyway. This allows us to model any XHandleMessage




var AL : ActionList . var O : ObjectName .
var M : MessageType .
op AbstractElementHandleMessage
: ObjectName MessageType -> Action .
op AbstractElementDoClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op AbstractElementClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
eq [AbstractElementHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [AL] .
eq [AbstractElementClickAction(O) ; AL]
= [AL] .
eq [AbstractElementDoClick(O) ; AL]
= [fireJScriptClick(O) ; bubbleClickAction(O) ; AL] .
endm
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The HandleMessage and ClickAction of AbstractElement do nothing,
while the DoClick does start the JavaScript click and bubbles, i.e., continues,
the click action. Note that these will be overwritten in each more specific




var AL : ActionList . var O : ObjectName .
var M : MessageType . var Atts : AttributeSet .
var Url : URL . var OMS : ObjectMultiSet .
op AnchorHandleMessage : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op AnchorDoClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op AnchorClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
eq [handleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Anchor , Atts > OMS}
= [AnchorHandleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Anchor , Atts > OMS} .
eq [doClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Anchor , Atts > OMS}
= [AnchorDoClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Anchor , Atts > OMS} .
eq [clickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Anchor , Atts > OMS}
= [AnchorClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Anchor , Atts > OMS} .
ceq [AnchorHandleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
= [cancelBubble ; AL]
if M == LBUTTONDOWN .
crl [AnchorHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
{< O | targetURL: Url , Atts > OMS}
=> [setStatusText(Url) ; AL]
{< O | targetURL: Url , Atts > OMS}
if M == MOUSEOVER .
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ceq [AnchorHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [AL]
if M == MOUSELEAVE or M == MOUSEMOVE or
M == LBUTTONUP .
rl [AnchorClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | targetURL: Url , className: Anchor , Atts >
OMS}
=> [FollowHyperlink(Url) ; AL]
{< O | targetURL: Url , className: Anchor , Atts >
OMS} .
eq [AnchorDoClick(O) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementDoClick(O) ; AL ] .
endm
For the Anchor element the three standard actions get instantiated with
their specific Anchor version. If the message is a left button down, then the
Anchor handles it by stopping the bubbling mechanism as itself will take of
the click when it gets it. If the message is a mouse over message, it will
similarly just set the status bar text to its URL. If it is a mouse move, the
left button being released or the anchor is left (due to a move) then it just
does nothing and the bubble continues. On a click action it actually starts




var AL : ActionList . vars O O’ : ObjectName .
var M : MessageType . vars Atts Atts’ : AttributeSet .
var Url : URL . var OMS : ObjectMultiSet .
op ButtonHandleMessage : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op ButtonDoClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op ButtonClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
eq [handleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Button , Atts > OMS}
= [ButtonHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Button , Atts > OMS} .
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eq [doClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Button , Atts > OMS}
= [ButtonDoClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Button , Atts > OMS} .
eq [clickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Button , Atts > OMS}
= [ButtonClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Button , Atts > OMS} .
eq [ButtonHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL] .
rl [ButtonClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | container: O’ , className: Button , Atts >
< O’ | targetURL: Url , className: Form , Atts’ >
OMS}
=> [FollowHyperlink(Url) ; cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | container: O’ , className: Button , Atts >
< O’ | targetURL: Url , className: Form , Atts’ >
OMS} .
eq [ButtonClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | container: nil , className: Button , Atts >
OMS}
= [cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | container: nil , className: Button , Atts >
OMS} .
eq [ButtonDoClick(O) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementDoClick(O) ; AL ] .
endm
The Button works like the Anchor, in that it instantiates all actions to
its class-specific actions. Message handling is then left to the default version
of an abstract element, similarly for DoClick. A ClickAction triggers nav-
igation to the URL stored in the object associated to the button. If there is





var AL : ActionList . var O : ObjectName .
var M : MessageType . var Atts : AttributeSet .
var OMS : ObjectMultiSet .
op FormHandleMessage : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op FormDoClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op FormClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
eq [handleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Form , Atts > OMS}
= [FormHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Form , Atts > OMS} .
eq [doClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Form , Atts > OMS}
= [FormDoClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Form , Atts > OMS} .
eq [clickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Form , Atts > OMS}
= [FormClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Form , Atts > OMS} .
eq [FormHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL] .
eq [FormDoClick(O) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementDoClick(O) ; AL] .
eq [FormClickAction(O) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementClickAction(O) ; AL] .
endm






var AL : ActionList . vars O O’ : ObjectName .
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var M : MessageType . vars Atts Atts’ : AttributeSet .
var Url : URL . var OMS : ObjectMultiSet .
op ImageHandleMessage : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op ImageDoClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op ImageClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
eq [handleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Image , Atts > OMS}
= [ImageHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Image , Atts > OMS} .
eq [doClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Image , Atts > OMS}
= [ImageDoClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Image , Atts > OMS} .
eq [clickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Image , Atts > OMS}
= [ImageClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Image , Atts > OMS} .
eq [ImageDoClick(O) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementDoClick(O) ; AL] .
rl [ImageClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | container: O’ , className: Image , Atts >
< O’ | className: Anchor , targetURL: Url , Atts’ >
OMS}
=> [AnchorClickAction(O’) ; cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | container: O’ , className: Image , Atts >
< O’ | className: Anchor , targetURL: Url , Atts’ >
OMS} .
rl [ImageClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | container: nil , className: Image , Atts >
OMS}
=> [cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | container: nil , className: Image , Atts >
OMS} .
ceq [ImageHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [AL]
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if M =/= MOUSEOVER .
rl [ImageHandleMessage(O,MOUSEOVER) ; AL]
{< O | container: O’ , className: Image , Atts >
< O’ | className: Anchor , targetURL: Url , Atts’ >
OMS}
=> [setStatusText(Url) ; AL]
{< O | container: O’ , className: Image , Atts >
< O’ | className: Anchor , targetURL: Url , Atts’ >
OMS} .
rl [ImageHandleMessage(O,MOUSEOVER) ; AL]
{< O | container: nil , className: Image , Atts >
OMS}
=> [AL]
{< O | container: nil , className: Image , Atts >
OMS} .
endm
For an Image, the DoClick action defaults to the way of being handled
by the abstract element. The ClickAction either does nothing, if there
is no associated Anchor for the Image, or calls AnchorClickAction on the
associated anchor, if there is one. For message handling of anything but a
MOUSEOVER nothing happens. In case of a MOUSEOVER message being handled,
if there is an associated (i.e., containing) Anchor then the targetURL from





var AL : ActionList . vars O O’ : ObjectName .
var M : MessageType . vars Atts Atts’ : AttributeSet .
var Url : URL . var OMS : ObjectMultiSet .
op InputFieldHandleMessage : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op InputFieldDoClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op InputFieldClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
eq [handleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | className: InputField , Atts > OMS}
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= [InputFieldHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
{< O | className: InputField , Atts > OMS} .
eq [doClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: InputField , Atts > OMS}
= [InputFieldDoClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: InputField , Atts > OMS} .
eq [clickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: InputField , Atts > OMS}
= [InputFieldClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: InputField , Atts > OMS} .
eq [InputFieldHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL] .
As usual, for InputField elements the element-specific functions are
called. Message handling is left to the abstract element way of handling
the message. Note that in what follows we assume sane JavaScript which
does not change the DOM tree, similarly to what we required before, as we
are ultimately interested in static HTML for the status bar.
eq [InputFieldClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputButton ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS}
= [AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputButton ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS} .
eq [InputFieldClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputText ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS}
= [AbstractElementClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputText ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS} .
crl [InputFieldClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputImage , container: O’ ,
className: InputField , Atts >
< O’ | targetURL: Url , className: Form , Atts’ >
OMS}
=> [FollowHyperlink(Url) ; cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputImage , container: O’ ,
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className: InputField , Atts >
< O’ | targetURL: Url , className: Form , Atts’ >
OMS}
if O’ =/= nil .
eq [InputFieldClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputImage , container: nil ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS}
= [cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputImage , container: nil ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS} .
crl [InputFieldClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputSubmit , container: O’ ,
className: InputField , Atts >
< O’ | targetURL: Url , className: Form , Atts’ >
OMS}
=> [FollowHyperlink(Url) ; cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputSubmit , container: O’ ,
className: InputField , Atts >
< O’ | targetURL: Url , className: Form , Atts’ >
OMS}
if O’ =/= nil .
eq [InputFieldClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputSubmit , container: nil ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS}
= [cancelBubble ; AL]
{< O | inputType: htmlInputSubmit , container: nil ,
className: InputField , Atts > OMS} .
eq [InputFieldDoClick(O) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementDoClick(O) ; AL] .
endm
For the InputField in the case of a ClickAction there are many different
possible outcomes. First, if the inputType is that of a htmlInputButton it
is simply dropped. If the inputType is a htmlInputText then the abstract
elements handling is called.
In case of an htmlInputImage the way it is handled depends on whether
there is an associated Form, and in case there is one then navigation to the
URL of that Form is started. Without an associated Form, the bubble is
canceled. The same thing happens for the case of htmlInputSubmit, in that
208
an associated Form triggers navigation to the URL of that Form, with the
bubble being canceled otherwise.




var AL : ActionList . var O : ObjectName .
var M : MessageType . var Atts : AttributeSet .
var OMS : ObjectMultiSet .
op LabelHandleMessage : ObjectName MessageType
-> Action .
op LabelDoClick : ObjectName -> Action .
op LabelClickAction : ObjectName -> Action .
eq [handleMessage(O, M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Label , Atts > OMS}
= [LabelHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
{< O | className: Label , Atts > OMS} .
eq [doClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Label , Atts > OMS}
= [LabelDoClick(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Label , Atts > OMS} .
eq [clickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Label , Atts > OMS}
= [LabelClickAction(O) ; AL]
{< O | className: Label , Atts > OMS} .
ceq [LabelHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [cancelBubble ; AL]
if M == MOUSEOVER or M == MOUSELEAVE .
ceq [LabelHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementHandleMessage(O,M) ; AL]
if M == LBUTTONUP or M == LBUTTONDOWN or
M == MOUSEMOVE .
eq [LabelDoClick(O) ; AL]
= [AbstractElementDoClick(O) ; AL] .
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eq [LabelClickAction(O) ; AL]
= [FollowHyperlink(maliciousUrl) ; cancelBubble ; AL].
endm
Handling a MOUSEOVER or MOUSELEAVE message for a Label leads to a
canceling of the bubble mechanism, while button up and down, as well as
mouse moves, get relayed to the abstract element handling. The DoClick
gets passed to the abstract handler as well, but the ClickAction leads to
navigation to a malicious URL immediately. The reasoning for this is that
the URL of the Label is never set as a status text, and thus any URL the











var AL : ActionList . var O : ObjectName .
var M : MessageType .
eq [fireJScriptNonClick(O,M) ; AL] = [noOp ; AL] .
eq [fireJScriptClick(O) ; AL] = [noOp ; AL] .
endm
Here we have combined all the different element-handling mechanisms
into one module, and this is also the point where we define that any
JavaScript is simply ignored. Changing this here would lead to partial han-
dling of JavaScript by what is given here, but for full JavaScript handling
one would also need to take care to allow transformations of the whole DOM




subsort Nat < NatSet .
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op nil : -> NatSet .
op __ : NatSet NatSet -> NatSet [assoc comm id: nil] .
endfm
These are just the standard natural numbers with a set constructor that




var SMS : StateMultiSet . var C : ClassName .
var KO : [ObjectName] .
op wrap : StateMultiSet -> StateMultiSet [frozen] .
eq wrap(SMS) = SMS .
Let us first explain the intention and effects of this wrapper. As wrap
is declared to be frozen, no rewrite underneath is possible. Every possible
rewrite has to happen at the top-level, that is, on a term of the form wrap(X).
Also, note that the equation given requires the state multiset SMS to be of
the appropriate sort, and that the terms we use to generate (exhaustively!)
the search space are only of the kind, and not of the sort. That is, as long as
there is at least one Any... term (see directly below) inside, this equation
will not be applicable.
op AnyClassName : -> [ClassName] .
op AnyUrl : -> [URL] .
op AnyContainer : NatSet -> [ObjectName] .
op AnyInputType : -> [InputType] .
op e : Nat -> ObjectName .
ceq className: C, container: KO
= className: C
if C =/= Button /\ C =/= Image /\ C =/= InputField .
ceq className: C, targetURL: AnyUrl
= className: C
if C =/= Anchor /\ C =/= Form .
ceq className: C , inputType: AnyInputType
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= className: C
if C =/= InputField .
endm
The first four operators declared are all declared to go to the kind of
the sort they are there to create. This means that, until they have actually
been transformed to proper terms of their sort, the wrap cannot be dissolved.
The equations given here just remove irrelevant portions of the state, i.e., an
object that is neither a Button, an Image nor an InputField, then there is
no need to have a field for a container. Similarly, only Anchors and Forms
have a targetURL and only InputFieldss have an inputType.
The next module limits each connected component in the DOM tree to
have at most one anchor. To ensure at most one anchor per connected
component this module works on a copy of the DOM tree in which it checks
all elements the anchor in question have an upLink to (including transitively),
as well as walking down the graph. As there are no explicit links down, one is
added here and the DOM tree is obviously manipulated, which is no problem
as we are dealing with a copy.
mod ONE-ANCHOR-LIMIT is
including GENERAL-MOUSE-RULES .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] . var AL : ActionList .
vars U U’ : URL . vars O O’ O’’ : ObjectName .
vars KAtts KAtts’ : [AttributeSet] .
var KC : [ClassName] .
op noAnchorInCC : ObjectName StateMultiSet -> Bool .
op downLink:_ : ObjectName -> Attribute .
eq noAnchorInCC(O, [AL] {< O | KAtts > KOMS}
statusBar(U) memorizedUrl(U’))
= noAnchorInCC(O, {< O | downLink: O , KAtts > KOMS}).
eq noAnchorInCC(O, {< O | KAtts >}) = true .
First, everything that is not an object is dropped, as it is not relevant,
and a downLink to itself is added. That will be compared to other element’s
upLinks and thus used for a transitive descent. The next equation works if
there is only one element, then obviously there is no second anchor.
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eq noAnchorInCC(O, {< O | upLink: O’ , KAtts >
< O’ | className: Anchor , KAtts’ >
KOMS})
= false .
ceq noAnchorInCC(O, {< O | upLink: O’ , KAtts >
< O’ | className: KC ,
upLink: O’’ , KAtts’ >
KOMS})
= noAnchorInCC(O, {< O | upLink: O’’ , KAtts >
KOMS})
if KC =/= Anchor .
Here the DOM tree is manipulated, in that the upLink of the object in
question is changed to its transitive upLink, which is its grandfather or an
even earlier ancestor. At the same time that intermediate element is dropped
as it has no further use.
eq noAnchorInCC(O,
{< O | downLink: O’’ , KAtts >




{< O | downLink: O’’ , KAtts >
< O’ | upLink: O’’ , className: KC , KAtts’ >
KOMS})
= noAnchorInCC(O, {< O | downLink: O’ , KAtts >
KOMS})
if KC =/= Anchor .
eq noAnchorInCC(O, {< O’ | KAtts > KOMS})
= true [owise] .
endm
In the first equation, if an element has an upLink that is an Anchor and
matches the current descent level (downLink) of the object, then we found
a second anchor in the connected component. If on the other hand that
element is not an anchor, then we change the downLink to be that element,
and drop that element from the tree and continue.
If none of the equations before the last one applied, then we have searched
and discarded the whole connected component and there is no second an-
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chor in that connected component. Note how that equation is marked with
[owise], meaning it only applies if all other equations fail.
mod INPUTFIELD-ONLY-LEAF is
including GENERAL-MOUSE-RULES .
vars O O’ : ObjectName . var KAtts : [AttributeSet] .
var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] .
op isLeaf : ObjectName StateMultiSet -> Bool .
eq isLeaf(O, {< O’ | upLink: O , KAtts > KOMS} KSMS)
= false .
eq isLeaf(O, KSMS)
= true [owise] .
endm
The InputField elements are only allowed as leaves, so we check if there





var O : ObjectName . var KAtts : [AttributeSet] .
var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] .
crl wrap( {< O | className: AnyClassName , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: Anchor , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
if noAnchorInCC(O, {< O | className: AnyClassName ,
KAtts > KOMS} KSMS) .
rl wrap( {< O | className: Anchor ,
targetURL: AnyUrl , KAtts > KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: Anchor ,
targetURL: maliciousUrl , KAtts > KOMS}
KSMS) .
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rl wrap( {< O | className: Anchor ,
targetURL: AnyUrl , KAtts > KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: Anchor ,
targetURL: wantedUrl , KAtts > KOMS}
KSMS) .
endm
To create an anchor we allow an element that is not defined (className:
AnyClassName) to become an anchor only if there is no other anchor in the
connected component, shown in the first (conditional) rule. If we have an
anchor, we allow, by the second and third rule, for the undefined URL to
become maliciousURL or wantedURL.
mod BUTTON-CREATION is
including WRAPPING .
var N : Nat . var NS : NatSet . var O : ObjectName .
vars KAtts KAtts’ : [AttributeSet] .
var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] .
rl wrap(
{< O | className: AnyClassName ,
container: AnyContainer(N NS) , KAtts >




{< O | className: Button ,
container: e(N) , KAtts >




For an element that is not yet fixed in the DOM tree (see container:
AnyContainer(N NS)) we allow it to become a Button if there is already a
Form that we can connect it to directly (container: e(N)). Also note that
technically it has to connect to the closest Form, which we do not enforce,




var O : ObjectName . var KAtts : [AttributeSet] .
var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] .
rl wrap( {< O | className: AnyClassName , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: Form , KAtts > KOMS} KSMS) .
rl wrap( {< O | className: Form ,
targetURL: AnyUrl , KAtts > KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: Form ,
targetURL: maliciousUrl , KAtts > KOMS}
KSMS) .
rl wrap( {< O | className: Form ,
targetURL: AnyUrl , KAtts > KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: Form ,
targetURL: wantedUrl , KAtts > KOMS}
KSMS) .
endm
A Form can be created at any time, and naturally, its URL can be set to
maliciousUrl or wantedUrl, similar to an Anchor.
mod IMAGE-CREATION is
including WRAPPING .
var N : Nat . var NS : NatSet . var O : ObjectName .
vars KAtts KAtts’ : [AttributeSet] .
var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] .
rl wrap(
{< O | className: AnyClassName ,
container: AnyContainer(N NS) , KAtts >




{< O | className: Image ,
container: e(N) , KAtts >





For an Image, similarly to a button linking to a form, we require it to




var N : Nat . var NS : NatSet . var O : ObjectName .
vars KAtts KAtts’ : [AttributeSet] .
var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] .
crl wrap(
{< O | className: AnyClassName ,
container: AnyContainer(N NS) , KAtts >




{< O | className: InputField ,
container: e(N) , KAtts >
< e(N) | className: Form , KAtts’ >
KOMS}
KSMS)
if isLeaf(O, {< e(N) | className: Form , KAtts’ >
KOMS} KSMS) .
rl wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: AnyInputType , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: htmlInputButton , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS) .
rl wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: AnyInputType , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: htmlInputImage , KAtts >
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KOMS} KSMS) .
rl wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: AnyInputType , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: htmlInputSubmit , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS) .
rl wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: AnyInputType , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: InputField ,
inputType: htmlInputText , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS) .
endm
We allow creation of an InputField if there is already a Form it can be
linked to, and it has to be a leaf. Then, the remaining rules fix its inputType
to any one of the possibilities. Note that, technically, an InputField has to
connect to the nearest Form, but we relax this, potentially allowing false




var O : ObjectName . var KAtts : [AttributeSet] .
var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] .
rl wrap( {< O | className: AnyClassName , KAtts >
KOMS} KSMS)
=> wrap( {< O | className: Label , KAtts > KOMS} KSMS).
endm
The creation of a Label is allowed for any element in the DOM tree
without restriction.
Next we put together all the different element-creation mechanisms as











vars O O’ : ObjectName . var AL : ActionList .
var KOMS : [ObjectMultiSet] . vars N N’ : Nat .
var NS : NatSet . var KSMS : [StateMultiSet] .
op createAnyObject : Nat ObjectName NatSet -> [Object].
eq createAnyObject(N, O, NS)
= < e(N) | className: AnyClassName ,
targetURL: AnyUrl, inputType: AnyInputType,
container: AnyContainer(NS), upLink: O > .
This creates an object with the name e(N), an upLink of O and a container
that is any element of the set NS.
Then a try consists of having the mouse over an object O for which we
trigger MOUSEOVER, so it updates the status bar and then moving from that
object to another object (possibly the same one), doing a manual inspection
by the user (modeled as eyeInspection and then clicking that object by
pressing and releasing the mouse button.
op try : ObjectName ObjectName -> ActionList .
eq try (O,O’)
= pumpMessage(O , MOUSEOVER) ;





op try : NatSet -> ActionList .









We also allow a try from a set of naturals, which simply means to pick
two of them (or just one) and have a try from there.
For the initial state we hard code empty URLs into both the status bar
and the memorized URL. It uses a given list of actions on a given set of
objects.






Now let us look at an example and what it means. For simplicity let
us just take a DOM tree with two elements that are connected, on which
we move the mouse from anywhere to anywhere. We of course are search-
ing from that start state to a final state in which the navigation goes to a
maliciousUrl while the user memorized wantedUrl. The initial state con-
sists of the list of actions as given by try and the two objects being created









The result of that run is the following, which represents two possible
attacks that are very similar:




< e(1) | className: Anchor,
targetURL: wantedUrl,upLink: e(2) >
< e(2) | className: Label,upLink: nil >
Solution 2 (state 1752)
X:StateMultiSet -->
statusBar(wantedUrl)
< e(1) | className: Label,upLink: e(2) >
< e(2) | className: Anchor,
targetURL: wantedUrl,upLink: nil >
No more solutions.
states: 1765 rewrites: 20460 in 290ms cpu
(590ms real) (70551 rewrites/second)
The two possible states show the combination, in either order, of an
Anchor being a child or the parent of a Label.
Now, let us look at an example with three elements in one connected
component, which is created this way:
search
wrap(initialState(try(1 2 3),







There are actually 25 results, so let us pick one to explore in more detail:
Solution 20 (state 26386)
X:StateMultiSet -->
statusBar(wantedUrl)
< e(1) | className: InputField,upLink: e(2),
container: e(3),
inputType: htmlInputImage >
< e(2) | className: Anchor,
targetURL: wantedUrl, upLink: e(3) >
< e(3) | className: Form,
targetURL: maliciousUrl, upLink: nil >
221
This is actually the DOM tree layout that is presented in Figure 3.5, where
an InputField will take the click and navigate to its URL. On mousing over
though, the URL of the Anchor is being displayed.
For more examples, and their resulting output, please see the actual code,
respectively the results, in the files included in the code distribution.
A.2 Address Bar - Explained Specification
Whenever there is a boolean variable that, depending on its value, leads
to different possible outcomes we have modeled this not by including this
variable and setting it one way or the other, but rather by including two
rules: one that has the effect of the variable being true, the other having the
effect of the variable being false. As Maude will explore all possible paths
(via the search command), and the trace includes the names of the rules
used, we know which value was chosen for each variable relevant to an attack.
Then let us note that the parts of the code that are commented out
via ---(...) and inside they state **** We force this to be BOOL ****
because otherwise there is a bad trace. (where BOOL is TRUE or
FALSE) correspond to one of those choices. That means that the model
was first run with this code included and it allowed us to find attacks based
on this choice of value for the underlying boolean variable. We then removed
any thus identified attack causes, until the remaining model was safe and
no more attacks were found. Thus, we have found all possible attacks and
analyzing the associated traces as seen in Section 3.3 and shown in more
detail below is enough.
The file list-of-flags.txt includes all the variables, and its value,
which can lead to attacks.
We do not add a sort or wrapper for a BROWSERINSTANCE. As we are
only dealing with a single such instance, we can just include all its elements
directly into the state space as elements of sort StateElement. Similarly,







subsort Qid < Name .
op n : Nat -> Name .
op nil : -> Name .
sort Frame .
sort FrameName .
op f : Name -> FrameName .
sort Markup .
sort MarkupName .
op m : Name -> MarkupName .
First we define that all quoted identifiers, Qid, e.g., ’a and ’b are names,
as well as the indexed name n(X) with X a natural number. Then, Frame
and Markup have names.
sort Url .
subsort Qid < Url .
op noUrl : -> Url .
op someHistoryUrl : Nat -> Url .
sort DomTree .
op nil : -> DomTree .
op dl : Url -> DomTree .
We define a Url to be a quoted identifier, the empty URL, or some pre-
viously visited URL parametric on a natural number.
sort Attribute .
sort AttributeSet .
subsort Attribute < AttributeSet .
op nil : -> AttributeSet .
op _,_ : AttributeSet AttributeSet
-> AttributeSet [assoc comm id: nil] .
The state is made up of sets of attributes in the standard way.
sort ObjectName .
subsorts FrameName MarkupName < ObjectName .
sort Object .
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op <_|_> : ObjectName AttributeSet -> Object .
**** FRAME’s attributes
op currentMarkup:_ : MarkupName -> Attribute .
op pendingMarkup:_ : MarkupName -> Attribute .
**** MARKUP’s attributes
op url:_ : Url -> Attribute .
op frame:_ : FrameName -> Attribute .
op tree:_ : DomTree -> Attribute .
endfm
Both FrameNames and MarkupNames are object names, and an object is
the combination of a name and an attribute set. Potential attributes are the
current and pending markups, identified by name, the URL, the frame and





op startNavigation : Url FrameName -> Event .
op ready : MarkupName -> Event .
op ensure : -> Event .
op onPaint : -> Event .
op mark : Event -> Event .
endfm
Events are the start of navigation, the ready event for a specific markup,
and the painting on the screen. Note that we do single out events represen-
tative of downloading (by using mark on them), and allow other events to





subsort Event < EventQueue .
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op noq : -> EventQueue .
op _,_ : EventQueue EventQueue
-> EventQueue [assoc id: noq] .
endm





op FollowHyperlink : Url FrameName -> Method .
op PostMan : Url FrameName -> Method .
op SetInteractive : MarkupName -> Method .
op NavigationComplete : FrameName -> Method .
op FireNavigationComplete : FrameName -> Method .
All the expected function calls are listed as Method elements above, see
Figure 3.9 in Chapter 3.3.2.
op GetPidlForDisplay : -> Method .
op SwitchMarkup : MarkupName FrameName -> Method .
Switching the markup requires a new markup, identified by its name, and
the frame this switch happens on, also identified by its name.
op EnsureSize : -> Method .
op EnsureView : -> Method .
op RenderView : -> Method .
op HistoryBack : -> Method .
op BROWSERINSTANCE::Travel : Int -> Method .
op CTravelLog::Travel : Int -> Method .
op Invoke : -> Method .
op LoadHistory : -> Method .
op CreateMarkup : Bool -> Method .
op CreateFrameHelper : MarkupName -> Method .
All these are methods as seen in Figure 3.9 in Chapter 3.3.2.
sort HelpingMethod .
subsort HelpingMethod < Method .
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op SetInteractive-BoolExp : MarkupName
-> HelpingMethod .
op FireNavigationComplete-pidl : Url
-> HelpingMethod .
op FireNavigationComplete-!fViewActivated : Url
-> HelpingMethod .
op SetAddressBar : Url -> HelpingMethod .
op SwitchMarkup-PrimarySwitch : MarkupName FrameName
-> HelpingMethod .
op SwitchMarkup-AllButLastIf :
MarkupName FrameName Bool -> HelpingMethod .
op SwitchMarkup-SwapInNewMarkup :
MarkupName FrameName Bool -> HelpingMethod .
op Invoke-PostEvent : -> HelpingMethod .
op CreateMarkup-PrimaryFrame-pMarkup->frame :
MarkupName -> HelpingMethod .
endfm
Now, the methods above are not actual methods in the source code of
IE, but partial versions of them. Generally, the part before the “-” is the





subsort Method < MethodList .
op nop : -> MethodList .
op _;_ : MethodList MethodList
-> MethodList [assoc id: nop] .
endfm
The execution of methods happens in order, so we define lists of methods,







subsort StateElement < State .
op nil : -> State .
op __ : State State -> State [assoc comm id: nil] .
sort ObjectMultiSet .
subsort Object < ObjectMultiSet .
op nil : -> ObjectMultiSet .
op __ : ObjectMultiSet ObjectMultiSet
-> ObjectMultiSet [assoc comm id: nil] .
op {_} : ObjectMultiSet -> StateElement .
op [_] : EventQueue -> StateElement .
op [_] : MethodList -> StateElement .
The state consists of the event queue, and the list of methods being called
as well as all of the objects that are wrapped inside { }.
op freshNameCounter : Nat -> StateElement .
op historyAccesses : Nat -> StateElement .
op painted : Bool -> StateElement .
The first two elements are counters internal to the model that are used to
create new, fresh names. The painted element is used to remember whether
an onPaint has already been injected at the very end.
op primaryFrame : FrameName -> StateElement .
op urlOfView : Url -> StateElement .
The above two elements are modeling the primary frame we are looking
at as well as the URL of the current view. Technically speaking it should be
indirected twice, that is, the browser instance has view, and that view has
an associated URL. But, as we noted above that we are limiting ourselves to
just one browser instance with only one view, we can avoid the extra hassle.
op addressBar : Url -> StateElement .
op urlPaintedOnScreen : Url -> StateElement .
endm
Finally, this represents the content of the address bar, respectively the
URL where the content of the screen came from.
In the following, whenever there are two [] wrappers, the first will contain
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the method list, separated internally by ; while the second will be the event
queue, separated by , internally.
mod METHOD-CALLS is
including STATE .
vars S S’ : State . vars U U’ : Url .
vars Q Q’ : EventQueue . vars ML ML’ : MethodList .
vars F F’ : FrameName . vars N N’ : Nat .
vars Atts Atts’ : AttributeSet .
vars M M’ M’’ : MarkupName . vars D D’ : DomTree .
vars OMS OMS’ : ObjectMultiSet . vars B B’ : Bool .
vars I I’ : Int .
eq [FollowHyperlink(U, F) ; ML] [Q]
= [ML] [Q, startNavigation(U, F)] .
If the next method call is a FollowHyperlink then that is replaced by
adding a startNavigation event with the same arguments in the event
queue, see Figure 3.9 in Chapter 3.3.2.
eq [PostMan(U, F) ; ML] [Q] freshNameCounter(N)
{< F | pendingMarkup: M , Atts > OMS}
= [ML] [Q, mark(ready(m(n(N))))]
freshNameCounter(N + 1)
{< F | pendingMarkup: m(n(N)) , Atts >
< m(n(N)) | frame: F , url: U , tree: nil > OMS} .
A PostMan call requires an appropriate frame for which it will change
the pendingMarkup, increase the counter of fresh names, add a new markup,
with the specified URL, to the list of objects and put a ready event into
the queue. Note that that event is marked, meaning it can be delayed, to
simulate network transfer times.
---(
**** We force this to be FALSE








{< M | frame: F , Atts > OMS}
=> [SwitchMarkup(M, F) ; SetInteractive-BoolExp(M) ;
ML] {< M | frame: F , Atts > OMS} .
The first case simulates the possibility of immediately exiting method
SetInteractive, by simply dropping it from the method list. This would
happen in case of re-entry. It is commented out, as with that code active it is
possible to get an attack because primaryFrame->currentMarkup == NULL
is possible.
The other case is where the function properly executes, which leads to a
call of SwitchMarkup and SetInteractive-BoolExp.
rl [BOOLEXP1-TRUE] :
[SetInteractive-BoolExp(M) ; ML]
{< M | frame: F , Atts > OMS}
=> [NavigationComplete(F) ; ML]
{< M | frame: F , Atts > OMS} .
---(
**** We force this to be TRUE





In turn, SetInteractive-BoolExp goes to NavigationComplete in the
proper execution with BOOLEXP1 being true.
Alternatively, if BOOLEXP1 is false, the method aborts right away and
nothing happens. This can lead to a different potential attack scenario.
---(
**** We force this to be FALSE








=> [FireNavigationComplete(F) ; ML] .
Under the condition that BOOLEXP2 is true there is a silent return of
NavigationComplete, which leads to an attack; otherwise normal execution
continues and FireNavigationComplete is called as expected.
rl [bstrUrl-TRUE] :
[FireNavigationComplete(F) ; ML]
{< F | currentMarkup: M , Atts >
< M | url: U , Atts’ > OMS}
=> [GetPidlForDisplay ;
FireNavigationComplete-pidl(U) ; ML]
{< F | currentMarkup: M , Atts >
< M | url: U , Atts’ > OMS} .
---(
**** We force this to be TRUE





For the bstrURL condition we have a silent return if it is false, leading to
issues, and regular execution otherwise.
rl [pidl-TRUE] :
[FireNavigationComplete-pidl(U) ; ML]
=> [FireNavigationComplete-!fViewActivated(U) ; ML] .
---(
**** We force this to be TRUE





If the pidl condition is false, there is another silent return; otherwise the
FireNavigationComplete method is executed further. The decision about





=> [SetAddressBar(U) ; ML] .
---(
**** We force this to be TRUE





The !fViewActivated condition needs to be true for regular execution,
calling SetAddressBar, otherwise it returns silently, leading to an attack
and that is excluded here. Note that all of the above were rules, so Maude’s
search space exploration would explore all possibilities, until we took them
out.
eq [GetPidlForDisplay ; ML]
= [ML] .
rl [SetAddressBar] :
[SetAddressBar(U) ; ML] addressBar(U’)
=> [ML] addressBar(U) .
The SetAddressBar method actually does set the address bar, as ex-
pected.
---(
**** We force this to be FALSE
**** because otherwise there is a bad trace.
rl [!pMarkupNew->_fWindowPending-TRUE] :




[SwitchMarkup(M, F) ; ML]
=> [SwitchMarkup-PrimarySwitch(M, F) ; ML] .
For !pMarkupNew-> fWindowPending we remove the true case as that
silently returns from the SwitchMarkup method, leading to trouble. Oth-
erwise it continues execution, having passed the first condition check. The
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potential trouble in the first case is that with HistoryBack the case that
primaryFrame->currentMarkup == NULL is possible.
eq [SwitchMarkup-PrimarySwitch(M, F) ; ML]
primaryFrame(F)
= [SwitchMarkup-AllButLastIf(M, F, true) ; ML]
primaryFrame(F) .
ceq [SwitchMarkup-PrimarySwitch(M, F) ; ML]
primaryFrame(F’)
= [SwitchMarkup-AllButLastIf(M, F, false) ; ML]
primaryFrame(F’)
if F =/= F’ .
These equations just check if the SwitchMarkup method has been called
on the primary frame, and note that as true or false in a third argument
of SwitchMarkup-AllButLastIf.
---(
**** We force this to be FALSE
**** because otherwise there is a bad trace.
rl [someIfStopsSwitchMarkup-TRUE] :




[SwitchMarkup-AllButLastIf(M, F, B) ; ML]
=> [SwitchMarkup-SwapInNewMarkup(M, F, B) ; ML] .
The first case here represents the case when some of the remaining con-
ditions are responsible for making it silently return; otherwise the execution
continues.
eq [SwitchMarkup-SwapInNewMarkup(M, F, true) ; ML] [Q]
{< F | currentMarkup: M’ ,
pendingMarkup: M’’ , Atts > OMS}
= [ML] [Q , ensure]
{< F | currentMarkup: M ,
pendingMarkup: m(nil) , Atts > OMS} .
eq [SwitchMarkup-SwapInNewMarkup(M, F, false) ; ML]
{< F | currentMarkup: M’ ,
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pendingMarkup: M’’ , Atts > OMS}
= [ML]
{< F | currentMarkup: M ,
pendingMarkup: m(nil) , Atts > OMS} .
Switching in a new markup will add ensure to the event queue if it is
happening on the primary frame; otherwise it will not.
rl [IsActiveEnsureSize-TRUE] :
[EnsureSize ; ML] urlOfView(U) primaryFrame(F)
{< F | currentMarkup: M , Atts >
< M | url: U’ , Atts’ > OMS}
=> [ML] urlOfView(U’) primaryFrame(F)
{< F | currentMarkup: M , Atts >
< M | url: U’ , Atts’ > OMS} .
---(
**** We force this to be TRUE





Depending on IsActiveEnsureSize the EnsureSize method can silently
return, leading to an attack, or change the content that will be made visible
on screen shortly. In case you are wondering how this would lead to an
attack, then note that in the attack case the things displayed on screen are




=> [EnsureSize ; ML] .
---(
**** We force this to be TRUE






From EnsureView either EnsureSize gets called, or in the case that




=> [ML] urlOfView(U) urlPaintedOnScreen(U) .
---(
**** We force this to be TRUE





In RenderView the content of urlOfView will be painted on the screen,
or if pRenderSurface!=NULL is false it will just return. Again leading to the
attack mentioned just before and thus excluded.
eq [HistoryBack ; ML]










Here, HistoryBack becomes BROWSERINSTANCE::Trave(-1). Then,
there is two possible outcomes to BROWSERINSTANCE::Travel: it can either
execute and call CTravelLog::Travel or just abort.
rl [SUCCEEDED-TRUE] :
[CTravelLog::Travel(I) ; ML]





Depending on SUCCEEDED the travel will call Invoke or return.
rl [hGlobal!=NULL&&SUCCEEDED-TRUE] :
[Invoke ; ML]




To continue, Invoke can either call LoadHistory ; Invoke-PostEvent
or return.
eq [Invoke-PostEvent ; ML] [Q]
primaryFrame(F) historyAccesses(N)
= [ML] [Q , startNavigation(someHistoryUrl(N), F)]










Invoke-PostEvent will then add a new event StartNavigation to the
event queue. Depending on the relevant condition, LoadHistory will either












{< m(n(N)) | url: noUrl , frame: f(nil) ,
tree: nil > OMS} .
rl [!pMarkup-FALSE] :
[CreateMarkup(false) ; ML] freshNameCounter(N)
{OMS}
=> [ML] freshNameCounter(N + 1)
{< m(n(N)) | url: noUrl , frame: f(nil) ,
tree: nil > OMS} .
In the first rule above, !pMarkup being true, the system is out of memory,
so nothing has been created. In the second and third rule a new markup is
created. Only in the second rule a method is called that will create an asso-
ciated frame, and then the rest of the CreateMarkup method gets executed.
In the third rule there is just a return from that method.
eq [CreateMarkup-PrimaryFrame-pMarkup->frame(M) ; ML]
primaryFrame(F’)
{< M | frame: F , Atts > OMS}
= [ML] primaryFrame(F)
{< M | frame: F , Atts > OMS} .
This is the continuation of CreateMarkup, which simply changes the pri-
mary frame to that call’s argument.
---(
**** We force this to be FALSE






[CreateFrameHelper(M) ; ML] freshNameCounter(N)
{< M | frame: F , Atts > OMS}
=> [ML] freshNameCounter(N + 1)
{< M | frame: f(n(N)) , Atts >
< f(n(N)) | currentMarkup: m(nil) ,
pendingMarkup: M > OMS} .
236
endm
In the first rule we are out of memory, and thus an attack is possible as it
just silently returns. The second one is the creation of the frame associated
to the markup.
Now we have covered all the method calls, so it is time to switch over to
the handling of the events.
mod EVENT-HANDLING is
including STATE .
vars S S’ : State . vars U U’ : Url .
vars Q Q’ : EventQueue . vars ML ML’ : MethodList .
vars F F’ : FrameName . vars N N’ : Nat .
vars Atts Atts’ : AttributeSet .
vars M M’ : MarkupName . vars D D’ : DomTree .
vars OMS OMS’ : ObjectMultiSet . vars E E’ : Event .
eq [startNavigation(U, F) , Q] [nop] S
= [Q] [PostMan(U, F)] S .
The startNavigation event will call the PostMan method, if the method
call list is empty, and it is the first event in the queue.
eq [ready(M) , Q] [nop]
{< M | tree: D , url: U , Atts > OMS} S
= [Q] [SetInteractive(M)]
{< M | tree: dl(U), url: U , Atts > OMS} S .
eq [ensure , Q] [nop] S
= [Q] [EnsureView] S .
eq [onPaint , Q] [nop] S
= [Q] [RenderView] S .
When ready is the first event (and is not marked, see below) the DOM
tree associated to the markup parameter of ready will be downloaded from its
URL, shown as dl(U). The tree it gets put in has originally been initialized
with the empty DOM tree.
The ensure event calls the EnsureView method, while the onPaint event
triggers the RenderView method.
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rl [marked-event-delayed] :
[mark(E) , E’ , Q]
=> [E’ , mark(E) , Q] .
rl [marked-event-happens] :
[mark(E) , Q]
=> [E , Q] .
Marked events, shown by mark, can be delayed. This means that the
event following them can be moved in front of the marked event, or the mark
can be removed, which means the event is now ready for execution.
eq [nop] [noq] painted(false)
= [nop] [onPaint] painted(true) .
endm
When there are no more method calls and no more events in the event
queue, and the screen has not yet been painted, then the onPaint event is
added once.
Next we define the possible starting points for execution and define what




op goodState : State -> Bool .
op badState : State -> Bool .
vars S S’ : State . vars U U’ : Url .
vars Q Q’ : EventQueue . vars ML ML’ : MethodList .
vars F F’ : FrameName . vars N N’ : Nat .
vars Atts Atts’ : AttributeSet .
vars M M’ M’’ : MarkupName . vars D D’ : DomTree .
vars OMS OMS’ : ObjectMultiSet .
vars B B’ : Bool . vars I I’ : Int .
eq badState(S) = not(goodState(S)) .
eq goodState(addressBar(U) urlOfView(U)
urlPaintedOnScreen(U) primaryFrame(F)
{< F | currentMarkup: M , Atts >





= false [owise] .
More specifically, a good state is a state where the address bar matches
with what is painted on the screen, i.e., the content on the screen is down-
loaded from the URL in the address bar. Also, the internal urlOfView is the
same and the URL of the current markup of the primary frame matches it
as well.
In the following FH stands for “follow hyperlink” while HB stands for
“history back”.
op consistent-state : -> State .
op startFH : -> State .
op startHB : -> State .
op startFH-HB : -> State .
op startHB-FH : -> State .
op startFH-FH : -> State .
op startHB-HB : -> State .
eq consistent-state
= primaryFrame(f(’f0)) [noq]
{ < f(’f0) | currentMarkup: m(’m0) ,
pendingMarkup: m(nil) >
< m(’m0) | url: ’urlA , frame: f(’f0) ,




The consistent state from which all our experiments start is given above.










[FollowHyperlink(’urlB, f(’f0)) ; HistoryBack] .
eq startHB-FH
= consistent-state







[HistoryBack ; HistoryBack] .
endm
We either only give one command to the browser, like in the first case,
or two commands that can be any combination of following a hyperlink and
navigating back in the history.
Let us look back at Table 3.5 in Chapter 3.3.4 and let us pick the sce-
nario based on condition No. 2, which is a silent return of the method
FireNavigationComplete. We find it as an attack scenario in the first
search, with just one call to FollowHyperlink, as such:
search startFH =>! S:State such that badState(S:State).
This uses the rule we have labeled with bstrUrl-FALSE, which is the
condition triggering this silent return and is based on a bad format of the
URL. The search result we get is the following
state 0, State:
{< f(’f0) | currentMarkup: m(’m0),
pendingMarkup: m(n(0)) >
< m(’m0) | url: ’urlA,frame: f(’f0),tree: dl(’urlA) >







===[ rl [mark(E:Event),Q] => [E:Event,Q]
[label marked-event-happens] . ]===>
===[ rl {OMS < M | Atts,frame: F >}
[SetInteractive(M) ; ML] =>
{OMS < M | Atts,frame: F >}
[SwitchMarkup(M, F) ;
SetInteractive-BoolExp(M) ; ML]
[label _fIsInSetInteractive-FALSE] . ]===>
===[ rl [SwitchMarkup(M, F) ; ML] =>
[SwitchMarkup-PrimarySwitch(M, F) ; ML]
[label !pMarkupNew->_fWindowPending-FALSE] . ]===>
===[ rl [SwitchMarkup-AllButLastIf(M, F, B) ; ML] =>
[SwitchMarkup-SwapInNewMarkup(M, F, B) ; ML]
[label someIfStopsSwitchMarkup-FALSE] . ]===>
===[ rl {OMS < M | Atts,frame: F >}
[SetInteractive-BoolExp(M) ; ML] =>
{OMS < M | Atts,frame: F >}
[NavigateComplete(F) ; ML]
[label BOOLEXP1-TRUE] . ]===>
===[ rl [NavigateComplete(F) ; ML] =>
[FireNavigateComplete ; ML]
[label BOOLEXP2-FALSE] . ]===>
===[ rl [FireNavigateComplete ; ML] => [ML]
The next rule being applied (labeled bstrUrl-FALSE) simply drops the
FireNavigateComplete, which is a silent return that does not change the
address bar URL ultimately, while the content is changed. This is the crucial
step in this execution.
[label bstrUrl-FALSE] . ]===>
===[ rl [EnsureView ; ML] => [EnsureSize ; ML]
[label IsActiveEnsureView-TRUE] . ]===>
===[ rl {OMS < F | Atts,currentMarkup: M >
< M | Atts’,url: U’ >} [EnsureSize ; ML]
primaryFrame(F) urlOfView(U) =>
[ML] urlOfView(U’)
{< F | Atts, currentMarkup: M > OMS
< M | Atts’,url: U’ >} primaryFrame(F)
[label IsActiveEnsureSize-TRUE] . ]===>
===[ rl [RenderView ; ML]
urlOfView(U) urlPaintedOnScreen(U’) =>
[ML] urlOfView(U) urlPaintedOnScreen(U)
[label pRenderSurface!=NULL-TRUE] . ]===>
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state 22, State:
{< f(’f0) | currentMarkup: m(n(0)),
pendingMarkup: m(nil) >
< m(’m0) | url: ’urlA,frame: f(’f0),
tree: dl(’urlA) >







As you can see in the final state, the URL in the address bar has not
been updated according to the rest of the execution, but the content of the
page the user sees did update. Thus, changing the content and changing the




OF THE IBOS MODEL
In this chapter we list and describe the detailed specification of the Maude
model of the IBOS browser. All the data source files are available at [112].
We are using Maude 2.6 for all of these experiments.
First, we explain the model architecture of IBOS in Section B.1. Then we
explain the extension for and analysis of the display memory in Section B.3.
The analysis for the address bar and SOP will be described in Section B.4.
In this section, whenever we write kernel we are referring to the IBOS ker-
nel. We will refer to the underlying L4KA::Pistachio microkernel operating
system with more detail.
B.1 IBOS - Model Architecture
The code explained in this section is found in file ibos.maude. You can see
the overall state structure in Figure 4.2.
We start with process identifiers, which are given in module PROC-ID. As
there is only a single kernel, and a single web app manager, the process id
kernel-id, respectively webappmgr-id will be that one object’s id. On the
other hand, webapp-id and network-id are only place holders, which are
used in policies exclusively. Any actual web app or network process will have
a natural number as id, which is between 1024 and 1055 for web apps, and
between 256 and 1023 for network processes. Note that the limitation to 32






subsort Int < ProcId < Oid .
op kernel-id : -> ProcId .
op webappmgr-id : -> ProcId .
op webapp-id : -> ProcId .
op network-id : -> ProcId .
op cache-id : -> ProcId .
op cookie-id : -> ProcId .
op vesafb-server-id : -> ProcId .
op mouse-server-id : -> ProcId .
op network-server-id : -> ProcId .
op dns-server-id : -> ProcId .
op ui-id : -> ProcId .
op mouse-intr-id : -> ProcId .
op network-intr-id : -> ProcId .
op storage-id : -> ProcId .
Now all elements in our object soup are going to be processes, identified
by proc as their class id, with the exception of the kernel, addressed as <
kernel-id : kernel |, the NIC, which will be addressed as < 0 : nic
| as there is only one, and the DMA memory used for communication from
network process to NIC, addressed as < N : nic |, with N the process id of
that network process.
op proc : -> Cid [ctor] .
op kernel : -> Cid [ctor] .
op nic : -> Cid [ctor] .
op mem : -> Cid [ctor] .
endm
There are different types of messages as well as values for messages, shown





subsort Int < MsgVal .
op MSG-NEW-URL : -> MsgType .
op MSG-FETCH-URL : -> MsgType .
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op MSG-RETURN-URL : -> MsgType .
op MSG-FETCH-URL-ABORT : -> MsgType .
op MSG-SWITCH-TAB : -> MsgType .
op MSG-RETURN-URL-METADATA : -> MsgType .
op MSG-COOKIE-SET : -> MsgType .
op MSG-COOKIE-GET : -> MsgType .
op MSG-COOKIE-GET-RETURN : -> MsgType .
op MSG-DOM-COOKIE-SET : -> MsgType .
op MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET : -> MsgType .
op MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET-RETURN : -> MsgType .
op MSG-WRITE-FILE : -> MsgType .
op MSG-READ-FILE : -> MsgType .
op MSG-READ-FILE-RETURN : -> MsgType .
op MSG-DOWNLOAD-INFO : -> MsgType .
op MSG-WEBAPP-MSG : -> MsgType .
op MSG-UI-MSG : -> MsgType .
endm
The different types of system calls that are available due to using
L4Ka::Pistachio. The system call OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE is the
one that is used most often.
mod SYSCALL-TYPE is
sort SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-CREATE-PROCESS : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-REGISTER-IRQ-THREAD : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-GET-RESERVE-MEM : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-GET-SERVICE-TID : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-REGISTER-SERVICE : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-ALLOCATE-DMA-MEMORY : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-POLL : -> SyscallType .





op OPOS-SYSCALL-E1000-IF-UP : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-REGISTER-SUBSYSTEM : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-GET-FB-MEMORY : -> SyscallType .
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op OPOS-SYSCALL-IS-WINDOW-MGR : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-NET-IS-PORT-AVAILABLE : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-NET-ALLOCATE-PORT : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-NET-FREE-PORT : -> SyscallType .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-TOUCH : -> SyscallType .
endm
The module PAYLOAD includes the wrapper for browser level messages,
called payload, which takes seven arguments. The first two arguments are
of type Oid, representing the sender and receiver of the message. Note again
that the sender Oid is enforced to be correct by the kernel when the message
is passed on. In some cases the receiver Oid can be changed by the kernel as
well. The type of the message, of sort MsgType, is the next argument, with
a more specific message value MsgVal if needed. The String argument will
take, e.g., the URL of any message that has one. We are going to ignore







op mtTyped : -> typed [ctor] .
sort untyped .
op mtUntyped : -> untyped [ctor] .
sort Payload .
op payload : Oid Oid MsgType MsgVal String typed untyped
-> Payload [ctor] .
endm
We are using pipes for different objects to communicate with each other.
Each pipe is bidirectional between the two objects it connects. Note that for
all pipes one of those objects is always the kernel, as all communication is
forced to go through the kernel.
Therefore, pipe is an operator that is used as object class, Cid. Each
pipe will be identified by an id, which is the same as that of the process the
pipe is connecting to the kernel. The incoming messages are stored inside
the wrapper fromKernel, while outgoing messages are put into the wrapper
toKernel. Messages are stored in a list of messages, MessageList, while
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op pipe : -> Cid [ctor] .
op fromKernel : MessageList -> Attribute [ctor] .
op toKernel : MessageList -> Attribute [ctor] .
sort Message .
sort MessageList .
subsort Message < MessageList .
op msg : SyscallType Payload -> Message [ctor] .
op mt : -> Message [ctor] .
op _,_ : MessageList MessageList
-> MessageList [ctor assoc id: mt] .
A helper function is defined here, that given an identifier and a message
changes the sender identifier in that message’s payload to the given identifier.
op changeRecipient : Oid Message -> Message .
eq changeRecipient(Num’’:Nat,
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, N’:ProcId, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)))
= msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, Num’’:Nat, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)) .
endm
The web app manager is keeping track of the next unused process id num-
ber for a web app, wrapped in nextWAN. Note that web apps start at id 1024
and end at 1055, due to memory limits in the actual IBOS implementation.
Note that, even though this is defined in its own module, ultimately in our




op nextWAN : Int -> Attribute [ctor] .
endm
A URL is represented by a Label, wrapped inside l, made up of a proto-
col, a domain and a port. We subsort Label to String for practical reasons,
noting that obviously a string representation would be possible for the whole





op dom : String -> Domain [ctor] .
sort Port .
op port : Nat -> Port [ctor] .
sort Protocol .
op http : -> Protocol [ctor] .
op https : -> Protocol [ctor] .
sort Label .
op about-blank : -> Label [ctor] .
op l : Protocol Domain Port -> Label [ctor] .
subsort Label < String .
sort LabelList .
subsort Label < LabelList .
op mtLL : -> LabelList [ctor] .
op _,_ : LabelList LabelList
-> LabelList [ctor assoc id: mtLL] .
endm
Note that we represent data put on the screen only by its source, in the
form of an URL. Web apps are represented with a number of attributes. The
URL of the data that will be rendered on the screen (if this is the active web
app) is stored in rendered, the URL where the web app will load its data
from is stored in URL. The marker inside loading shows whether this web
app has already sent out the request for data, if it needs to refresh or has not
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yet loaded any data. A 0 represents that such a message was not yet sent.
The check isWebapp is used to see if the given Oid is the id of an actual web
app or the web app place holder, or not.
mod WEBAPP is
inc LABEL .
op rendered : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op URL : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op loading : Nat -> Attribute [ctor] .
op isWebapp : Oid -> Bool .
eq isWebapp(Num:Nat)
= (1024 <= Num:Nat) and (Num:Nat < 1056) .
eq isWebapp(webapp-id) = true .
eq isWebapp(O:Oid) = false [owise] .
The equation below sends the message to load the data from the given
URL L’, in case it has not yet been sent (loading(0)). The receiver of this
message is the Oid representing any network process network-id, the kernel
will find the right network process in this case.
The rule below changes the URL that is (or would be) rendered appropri-
ately with the return message. Note that the checks for whether this return
message is acceptable happen elsewhere, at checkConnection.
vars N N’ : Nat .
vars ML : MessageList .
vars L L’ : Label .
vars Att Att2 : AttributeSet .
eq < N : proc | rendered(L) , URL(L’) , loading(0) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML) , Att2 >
= < N : proc | rendered(L) , URL(L’) , loading(1) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML,
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(N, network-id, MSG-FETCH-URL, 0, L’,
mtTyped, mtUntyped))) , Att2 > .
rl < N : proc | rendered(L) , URL(L’) ,loading(1) , Att >
< N : pipe | fromKernel(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(N’, N, MSG-RETURN-URL, V:MsgVal,
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LL:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML) , Att2 >
=> < N : proc | rendered(LL:Label) , URL(L’) ,
loading(1) , Att >
< N : pipe | fromKernel(ML) , Att2 > .
endm
The network process receives messages and sends them out to the network
via the NIC. Part of the necessary steps can be found below in the actual
kernel, as they are done by the kernel. In this model, we do not include
latency or anything like that, but just allow each message sent by the NIC
to immediately trigger a response. Step by step it goes like this: (i) network
process gets a request, (ii) network process forms an ethernet frame, (iii)
kernel checks that frame and gives it to the NIC, (iv) NIC generates answer
immediately as an ethernet frame, (v) that return ethernet frame gets handed
to the (correct) network process again, (vi) which then returns it to the sender
of the original request.
Step by step, we first need to be able to identify network processes by
their ids which go from 256 to 1023 and the generic place holder network-id.
A network process has lists of labels in and out, representing incoming and




**** need to be able to check if it is a network process
op isNetProc : Oid -> Bool .
eq isNetProc(Num:Nat)
= (256 <= Num:Nat) and (Num:Nat < 1023) .
eq isNetProc(network-id) = true .
eq isNetProc(O:Oid) = false [owise] .
var N : Nat .
vars ML ML’ : MessageList .
vars Att Att2 : AttributeSet .
op returnTo : ProcId -> Attribute [ctor] .
op in : LabelList -> Attribute [ctor] .
op out : LabelList -> Attribute [ctor] .
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This rule is a request from a web app and how it is received by the network
process. Note that this has gone through the kernel before getting to this
point, as it is in the in-bound message queue for the network process. The
network process takes the URL to be fetched, L:Label, into its out-bound
queue.
**** request from a webapp:
crl < N : proc | returnTo(SomeProcNum:Nat) ,
out(Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML) , fromKernel(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(Num:Nat, N, MSG-FETCH-URL, V:MsgVal,
L:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML’) , Att2 >
=> < N : proc | returnTo(Num:Nat) ,
out(Ll:LabelList, L:Label) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML) , fromKernel(ML’) , Att2 >
if isNetProc(N) .
Then the network process writes the ethernet frame into the assigned
memory for pick-up by the NIC; note that the kernel will be involved in the
following step.
rl < N : proc | out(L:Label, Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : mem | out(mtLL) , Att2 >
=> < N : proc | out(Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : mem | out(L:Label) , Att2 > .
Looking at the general explanation above, the following step is missing
and can be found in the kernel. See this DMA related rule there. The NIC
will create a return message right away, but note that the order of returns is
not guaranteed.
rl < 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList , L:Label , Ll’:LabelList) ,
in(Ll’’:LabelList) , Att >
=> < 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList , Ll’:LabelList) ,
in(Ll’’:LabelList, L:Label) , Att > .
Again, there is another step missing now, to be found in the kernel, which
assigns the incoming ethernet frame to the appropriate network process, you
can see this DMA related rule below. Then the network process can just read
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the return from its memory for NIC contact, but remember it went through
the kernel and the appropriate check in the step before.
rl < N : proc | in(Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : mem | in(L:Label) , Att2 >
=> < N : proc | in(Ll:LabelList, L:Label) , Att >
< N : mem | in(mtLL) , Att2 > .
This equation now sends the return message from the network process to
the web app, which of course will be subject to all the usual checks by the
kernel later on.
ceq < N : proc | returnTo(Num:Nat) ,
in(L:Label, Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML) , fromKernel(ML’) , Att2 >
= < N : proc | returnTo(Num:Nat) , in(Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML,
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(N, Num:Nat, MSG-RETURN-URL, 0, L:Label,
mtTyped, mtUntyped))) ,
fromKernel(ML’) , Att2 >
if isNetProc(N) .
endm
The following module, KERNEL-POLICIES catches the vast majority of all
things the kernel is doing actually. First, we do deal with policies. Sets of
policies are defined as usual. The set of policies is wrapped by msgPolicy
and stored as an attribute of the kernel. A policy itself is a sender and
receiver Oid and a MsgType. Note that the sender and/or the receiver can









subsort Policy < PolicySet .
op mtPS : -> PolicySet .
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op _,_ : PolicySet PolicySet
-> PolicySet [assoc comm id: mtPS] .
op msgPolicy : PolicySet -> Attribute [ctor] .
op policy : Oid Oid MsgType -> Policy [ctor] .
The next available process id for a network process is wrapped by the op-
erator nextNetworkProc. The wrapper handledCurrently is the attribute
in the kernel that stores the message that the kernel is currently working
on. There is only ever going to be one message in there, or potentially no
message if the kernel is waiting for other processes.
**** the next available proc id for a network proc
op nextNetworkProc : Nat -> Attribute [ctor] .
**** the message currently handled by the kernel
op handledCurrently : Message -> Attribute [ctor] .
This is the mapping of web apps to URLs. It is stored as an attribute in
the kernel, called weblabels, and it is a set of process ids being mapped to
labels. The label given to a web app here, needs to match the first label of
the mapping for network processes.
sort WebappProcInfo .
op pi : ProcId Label -> WebappProcInfo [ctor] .
sort WebappProcInfoSet .
subsort WebappProcInfo < WebappProcInfoSet .
op mtWPIS : -> WebappProcInfoSet [ctor] .
op _,_ : WebappProcInfoSet WebappProcInfoSet
-> WebappProcInfoSet [assoc comm id: mtWPIS] .
op weblabels : WebappProcInfoSet -> Attribute [ctor] .
This is the mapping for network processes, called networklabels, which
is similarly stored as a set. It maps each process id to two labels, where the
first label has to match the label of the communicating web app, and the
second label is where messages are actually sent to in the network (or NIC
here).
sort NetworkProcInfo .
op pi : ProcId Label Label -> NetworkProcInfo [ctor] .
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sort NetworkProcInfoSet .
subsort NetworkProcInfo < NetworkProcInfoSet .
op mtNPIS : -> NetworkProcInfoSet [ctor] .
op _,_ : NetworkProcInfoSet NetworkProcInfoSet
-> NetworkProcInfoSet [assoc comm id: mtNPIS] .
op networklabels : NetworkProcInfoSet -> Attribute [ctor] .
Now we are getting back to the DMA rules that we could not put in the
network process. This rule checks that the target is what is allowed for the
network process by matching L’:Label in the outgoing DMA memory to the
destination stored in the kernel, before passing it on to the NIC. Similarly
for the second rule in reverse, for the return message in the NIC, the right
network process is found in the kernel stored mapping and then the incoming
data is given to that DMA block.
rl < N : mem | out(L’:Label) , Att >




< 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList) , Att3 >
=> < N : mem | out(mtLL) , Att >




< 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList, L’:Label) , Att3 > .
rl < N : mem | in(mtLL) , Att >




< 0 : nic | in(L’:Label, Ll:LabelList) , Att3 >
=> < N : mem | in(L’:Label) , Att >




< 0 : nic | in(Ll:LabelList) , Att3 > .
Once policy checking is completed, e.g., that a MSG-FETCH-URL can be sent
from a web app to a network process, a second step is needed which checks
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whether that web app and network process are allowed to communicate by
looking into the kernel stored mapping of processes to URLs. This operator
checkConnection is used to do just that. Its argument are two identifiers
and the message (3 argument version), and depending on the message, the
relevant URL is already extracted (4 argument version). In case a connection
can be found for an incoming message, from a network process to a web app,
witnessed by their first label matching, the check succeeds and the message
is forwarded.
op checkConnection : Oid Oid Message -> Message .
op checkConnection : Oid Oid Label Message -> Message .
eq < kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(checkConnection(Num:Nat, Num’:Nat, M)) ,




= < kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(M) ,




In the direction of an outgoing message, going to L’:Label, from a web
app to a network process, the given network process address is simply ignored.
If a matching network process, with the same first URL, and the actual target
L’:Label as its second URL, is found, then the message is passed onto that
destination. That is done by using operator changeRecipient (shown above)
with that network process id and the message.
eq < kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(checkConnection(
Num:Nat, Num’:Nat, L’:Label, M)) ,




= < kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(changeRecipient(Num’’:Nat, M)) ,
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The last possible case here is that no appropriate network process exists.
This is quite possible as the first message sent from a web app to the network
is what creates its associated network process. The network process, its DMA
memory and its pipe are all created in this step.
eq < kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(checkConnection(
Num:Nat, Num’:Oid, L’:Label, M)) ,




= < kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(changeRecipient(Num’’:Nat, M)) ,





< Num’’:Nat : proc | returnTo(Num:Nat) ,
in(mtLL) , out(mtLL) >
< Num’’:Nat : mem | in(mtLL) , out(mtLL) >
< Num’’:Nat : pipe | toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) >
[owise] .
This rule models the kernel receiving a message on some pipe. It subjects
the incoming OP message to the policy checking against the policy set MP,
and sets the sender’s process id correctly to ID, independent of the claimed
id N in the actual message payload.
var M : Message .
var MP : PolicySet .
vars Att Att2 Att3 : AttributeSet .
vars ID N N’ : ProcId .
var ML : MessageList .
rl [kernelReceivesOPMessage] :




< ID : pipe | toKernel(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)), ML) ,
Att2 >
=>
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)), MP)) ,
msgPolicy(MP), Att >
< ID : pipe | toKernel(ML) , Att2 > .
Once the policy checking has been completed, the OP message can be
forwarded by the kernel in this rule.
rl [kernelForwardsOPMessage] :
< kernel-id : kernel | handledCurrently(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped))) ,
Att >
< N’ : pipe | fromKernel(ML) , Att2 >
=>
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(mt) ,
Att >
< N’ : pipe | fromKernel(ML,
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped))) ,
Att2 > .
The Label stored in the displayedTopBar is the address bar that is
shown on the UI; it is an attribute of the kernel, to simplify it being part of
the secure UI. The actual content of the screen is modeled in the process with
the display-id identifier, which has the attribute displayedContent which
stores the URL of the currently displayed content. Only the active web app,
identified by the process id in activeWebapp, is able to change the content
that is displayed on screen. Initially it is empty, operator none is used for
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that. There is also one more wrapper for messages, called kernelDo, it is
used for messages that the kernel is handling, but where it has to do more
than just forward the message, but actually needs to take action instead.
op displayedTopBar : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op display-id : -> ProcId .
op activeWebapp : ProcId -> Attribute [ctor] .
op none : -> ProcId .
op displayedContent : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op kernelDo : Message -> Message .
This next rule is used after the policy checking completes, in case the
kernel has to do something. Here, the kernel switches the active tab. For
that, it changes the address bar representation displayedTopBar, it changes
the active web app in activeWebApp and it empties the displayed memory,
which the new owner will need to refresh.
rl [kernelHandlesTabSwitch] :
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(kernelDo(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ui-id, N’, MSG-SWITCH-TAB, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)))) ,
displayedTopBar(L:Label),
weblabels(pi(N’, L’:Label), WPIS:WebappProcInfoSet) ,
Att >





< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(mt) ,
displayedTopBar(L’:Label),
weblabels(pi(N’, L’:Label), WPIS:WebappProcInfoSet) ,
Att >





The currently active web app can change the display whenever it wants
to. The following rule models the abstract version; see the display mem-
ory modeling section, Section B.3, for a more concrete, but buggy, version
corresponding to a design error which is then corrected.












< N : proc |
rendered(L:Label),
Att3 >
if LOld:Label =/= L:Label .
For the creation of a new web app, after policy checking, the kernel does
all the required steps here. It changes the address bar, the display memory
access, clearing it out first, and then lets the new owner refresh it later. Note
that for any new URL a new web app is created, as the label of an existing
web app never changes.
rl [kernelHandlesNewUrl] :
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(kernelDo(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-NEW-URL, V:MsgVal,








< webappmgr-id : proc | nextWAN(NewWA:Nat) , Att3 >
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=>










< webappmgr-id : proc | nextWAN(s(NewWA:Nat)) , Att3 >




< NewWA:Nat : pipe |
fromKernel(mt),
toKernel(mt) > .
The operator policyAllows is responsible for checking whether a given
message is permissible with respect to a given set of policies. The set of
policies will be defined in the initial configuration for any model execution.
The first equation below allows a message through if the process identifiers
and message type have a match in the policy set.
op policyAllows : Message PolicySet -> Message .
eq policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(N, N’, M:MsgType), MP))
= msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)) .
In case a generic policy, e.g., for all web apps, see webapp-id, is used,
we check that the process id in that argument slot (the first one), namely
Num:Nat is indeed a web app process id. In this particular case, this is for




payload(Num:Nat, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(webapp-id, N’, M:MsgType), MP))
= msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped))
if isWebapp(Num:Nat) /\ not isNetProc(N’) .
This is for policies sending from a process that is not a network process
to a web app.
ceq policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, Num’:Nat, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(N, webapp-id, M:MsgType), MP))
= msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, Num’:Nat, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped))
if isWebapp(Num’:Nat) /\ not isNetProc(N) .
Similarly now for a network process communicating with a non-web app.
ceq policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(network-id, N’, M:MsgType), MP))
= msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped))
if isNetProc(Num:Nat) /\ not isWebapp(N’) .




payload(N, Num’:Nat, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(N, network-id, M:MsgType), MP))
= msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, Num’:Nat, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
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T:typed, U:untyped))
if isNetProc(Num’:Nat) /\ not isWebapp(N) .
And now for the connection between a web app and a network process.




payload(Num:Nat, Num’:Oid, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal,
L:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(webapp-id, network-id, M:MsgType), MP))
= checkConnection(Num:Nat, Num’:Oid, L:Label,
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, Num’:Oid, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal,
L:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)))
if isWebapp(Num:Nat) /\ isNetProc(Num’:Oid) .
For the reverse direction from a network process to a web app we have
this equation. This requires a check using checkConnection as well.
ceq policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, Num’:Nat, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(network-id, webapp-id, M:MsgType), MP))
= checkConnection(Num:Nat, Num’:Nat,
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(Num:Nat, Num’:Nat, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)))
if isNetProc(Num:Nat) /\ isWebapp(Num’:Nat) .
This equation is to allow the UI to tell a web app to switch the tab.
Ultimately the kernel executes this actually. Even though this looks like a




payload(ui-id, Num’:Nat, MSG-SWITCH-TAB, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-SWITCH-TAB), MP))
= kernelDo(msg(ST:SyscallType,
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payload(ui-id, Num’:Nat, MSG-SWITCH-TAB, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)))
if isWebapp(Num’:Nat) .
The UI can send a message to create a new web app with a new URL,
being allowed by this equation. Note that the requisite policy needs to be in
the initial configuration for this equation to be applicable, like above.
eq policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-NEW-URL, V:MsgVal,
URL:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
(policy(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-NEW-URL), MP))
= kernelDo(msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-NEW-URL, V:MsgVal,
URL:Label, T:typed, U:untyped))) .
If it is not explicitly allowed, it is implicitly disallowed. This equation
takes care of that, by deleting all messages that are not conformant with a
policy.
eq policyAllows(M, MP) = mt [owise] .
endm
The UI does not have a separate module. The relevant pieces of the UI are
the URL of what is on the screen, displayedContent, and the address bar,
displayedTopBar. Those are all included in the kernel as we saw already.
This module KERNEL collects all prior pieces, including specifically the







The module RUN contains the KERNEL and defines the initial state using a






op init-proc : -> Configuration .
op initialPS : -> PolicySet .
ops init-kernel init-display
init-webappmgr init-cache init-cookie init-vesafb-server
init-mouse-server init-network-server init-dns-server
init-ui init-mouse-intr init-network-intr init-nic :
-> Configuration .
The following is the whole set of initial processes, and each of the elements
is defined afterwards:
eq init-proc = init-display init-webappmgr init-cache
init-cookie init-vesafb-server init-mouse-server
init-network-server init-dns-server init-ui
init-mouse-intr init-network-intr init-nic .
eq init-display =
< display-id : proc | activeWebapp(none) ,
displayedContent(about-blank) > .
eq init-webappmgr =
< webappmgr-id : proc | nextWAN(1024) >
< webappmgr-id : pipe | toKernel(mt) , fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-cache =
< cache-id : proc | none >
< cache-id : pipe | toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-cookie =
< cookie-id : proc | none >
< cookie-id : pipe | toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-vesafb-server =
< vesafb-server-id : proc | none >
< vesafb-server-id : pipe |
toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-mouse-server =
< mouse-server-id : proc | none >
< mouse-server-id : pipe |
toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-network-server =
< network-server-id : proc | none >
< network-server-id : pipe |
toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-dns-server =
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< dns-server-id : proc | none >
< dns-server-id : pipe | toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-ui =
< ui-id : proc | none >
< ui-id : pipe | toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-mouse-intr =
< mouse-intr-id : proc | none >
< mouse-intr-id : pipe | toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-network-intr =
< mouse-intr-id : proc | none >
< mouse-intr-id : pipe | toKernel(mt), fromKernel(mt) > .
eq init-nic =
< 0 : nic | in(mtLL) , out(mtLL) > .
Now we define the initial set of policies, and each of the individual policies
thereafter.
eq initialPS = msg-webapp-ui , msg-webapp-cookie ,
msg-webapp-network , msg-webapp-storage ,
msg-ui-webapp , msg-network-cookie ,
msg-network-webapp , msg-cookie-webapp ,
msg-cookie-network , msg-storage-webapp ,
msg-storage-ui .
op msg-webapp-ui : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-webapp-ui = policy(webapp-id, ui-id, MSG-UI-MSG) .
op msg-webapp-cookie : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-webapp-cookie =
policy(webapp-id, cookie-id, MSG-DOM-COOKIE-SET) ,
policy(webapp-id, cookie-id, MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET) .
op msg-webapp-network : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-webapp-network =
policy(webapp-id, network-id, MSG-FETCH-URL) ,
policy(webapp-id, network-id, MSG-FETCH-URL-ABORT) .
op msg-webapp-storage : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-webapp-storage =
policy(webapp-id, storage-id, MSG-WRITE-FILE) ,
policy(webapp-id, storage-id, MSG-READ-FILE) .
op msg-ui-webapp : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-ui-webapp =
policy(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-WEBAPP-MSG) ,
policy(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-SWITCH-TAB) ,
policy(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-NEW-URL) .
op msg-network-cookie : -> PolicySet .
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eq msg-network-cookie =
policy(network-id, cookie-id, MSG-COOKIE-SET) ,
policy(network-id, cookie-id, MSG-COOKIE-GET) .
op msg-network-webapp : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-network-webapp =
policy(network-id, webapp-id, MSG-RETURN-URL) ,
policy(network-id, webapp-id, MSG-RETURN-URL-METADATA) .
op msg-cookie-webapp : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-cookie-webapp =
policy(cookie-id, webapp-id, MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET-RETURN) .
op msg-cookie-network : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-cookie-network =
policy(cookie-id, network-id, MSG-COOKIE-GET-RETURN) .
op msg-storage-webapp : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-storage-webapp =
policy(storage-id, webapp-id, MSG-READ-FILE-RETURN) .
op msg-storage-ui : -> PolicySet .
eq msg-storage-ui =
policy(storage-id, ui-id, MSG-DOWNLOAD-INFO) .
endm
Now we add the module TEST-INSTRUMENTATION that is useful for us to be
able to give test drive commands to the whole configuration, without needing
a mouse or keyboard model. Initially we define the sort Cmd to be one partic-
ular command, for which we also define lists. The whole instrumentation will
be inside the new object with object identifier testMsg and class identifier
testMsg. The actual commands are switch-tab, and new-url which takes





subsort Cmd < CmdList .
op mtCmdList : -> CmdList .
op _,_ : CmdList CmdList
-> CmdList [assoc comm id: mtCmdList] .
op cmd : CmdList -> Attribute [ctor] .
op testMsg : -> Cid .
op testMsg : -> Oid .
op new-url : Label -> Cmd .
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op switch-tab : -> Cmd .
We are defining a number of generic but fixed URLs. Then we define
further new URLs based on a natural number argument, i.e., new-url.
ops Url1 Url2 Url3 Url4 : -> Label .
vars Att Att2 Att3 : AttributeSet .
op url : Nat -> Label .
For a URL mis-match, two different URLs are enough, so we allow new-url
to expand in three different ways based on these rules, to be able to have two
URLs involved in a mis-match and an independent further URL. Note that
we are going to use search, so all possible combinations will be explored.
The inspect operator is a command that we use here to rewrite to
inspect(3), which means a three step inspection. It would be possible to
use a different number in this rule, or simply give the operator with an argu-
ment of the users choice right away. Then, each step will either be to switch
the tab, or get sent a new URL. Keeping with our modeling methodology
of a soup of objects, inspect-space creates that test driver object with the
three step inspection.
op inspect : -> Cmd .
op inspect : Nat -> Cmd .
rl inspect => inspect(3) .
rl inspect(0) => mtCmdList .
rl inspect(s(N:Nat)) => new-url(url(1)) , inspect(N:Nat) .
rl inspect(s(N:Nat)) => new-url(url(2)) , inspect(N:Nat) .
rl inspect(s(N:Nat)) => new-url(url(3)) , inspect(N:Nat) .
rl inspect(s(N:Nat)) => switch-tab , inspect(N:Nat) .
op inspect-space : -> Configuration .
eq inspect-space =
< testMsg : testMsg | cmd( inspect(3) ) > .
The new-url is resolved like this.
rl [testNewUrl] :
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(mt) ,
Att >




< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(kernelDo(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-NEW-URL, 0,
L:Label, mtTyped, mtUntyped)))) ,
Att >
< testMsg : testMsg | cmd( CMDList:CmdList ) >
.
And the switch-tab is resolved like this.
rl [testTabSwitch] :
< testMsg : testMsg | cmd( switch-tab , CMDList:CmdList ) >






< testMsg : testMsg | cmd( CMDList:CmdList ) >
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(kernelDo(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(ui-id, N’:Nat, MSG-SWITCH-TAB, 0,




The base for an initial kernel for tests is the following.
op init-simp-kernel : -> Configuration .
eq init-simp-kernel








An example initial kernel is defined like this.
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***** experimental driver for messages!
eq init-kernel







< 1050 : proc | rendered(about-blank) ,
URL(l(http, dom("test"), port(81))) , loading(1) >








< 0 : nic | in(mtLL) , out(mtLL) >
.
endm
Analysis of the above code happens at the very end of this chapter, in
Section B.4.
B.2 Internal Rules Termination
We are considering here the termination of the internal rules for our IBOS
model. This is needed for the reordering of the rewrite sequence into nor-
malizing with the internal rules between each single trigger rule execution to
be sensible. For this goal we will present the internal rules in a descending
order that leads to termination.
Let us present the order in which the rules will be executed in the system,
and let us note that each data transfer that has used one rule will never be
able to be used in that same rule (with the same argument, see the first rule’s
explanation), or any rule that is listed before, again. See Appendix B.1 for
the whole specification and the context and explanation of the rules, our
purpose here is to show the ordering of the rules.
The first rule shows how the kernel receives a browser related data transfer
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message and how it handles it. It gets passed to the policy checking and will
then be treated further in the rules below. Note that this rule can possibly
be used multiple times in a data transfer, but with different arguments (the
MsgType in particular will be another one).
rl [kernelReceivesOPMessage] :
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(mt) ,
msgPolicy(MP), Att >
< ID : pipe | toKernel(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(N, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)), ML) ,
Att2 >
=>
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(policyAllows(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped)), MP)) ,
msgPolicy(MP), Att >
< ID : pipe | toKernel(ML) , Att2 > .
After policy checking the message can be forwarded to the recipient. Po-
tentially one of the special cases below can apply instead.
rl [kernelForwardsOPMessage] :
< kernel-id : kernel | handledCurrently(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID, N’, M:MsgType, V:MsgVal, S:String,
T:typed, U:untyped))) ,
Att >
< N’ : pipe | fromKernel(ML) , Att2 >
=>
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(mt) ,
Att >
< N’ : pipe | fromKernel(ML,
msg(ST:SyscallType,




If the data transfer was supposed to lead to the creation of a new web
app, then the kernel does that. This rule will not be usable again after on
that data transfer. The potential follow-up messages in this data transfer
are based on the loading(0) property which will start the loading of that
web site’s content.
rl [kernelHandlesNewUrl] :
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(kernelDo(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ui-id, webapp-id, MSG-NEW-URL, V:MsgVal,








< webappmgr-id : proc | nextWAN(NewWA:Nat) , Att3 >
=>










< webappmgr-id : proc | nextWAN(s(NewWA:Nat)) , Att3 >




< NewWA:Nat : pipe |
fromKernel(mt),
toKernel(mt) > .
In case the message was a tab switch this is handled here and this rule
will not be re-used again for this data transfer as well.
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rl [kernelHandlesTabSwitch] :
< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(kernelDo(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ui-id, N’, MSG-SWITCH-TAB, V:MsgVal,
S:String, T:typed, U:untyped)))) ,
displayedTopBar(L:Label),
weblabels(pi(N’, L’:Label), WPIS:WebappProcInfoSet) ,
Att >





< kernel-id : kernel |
handledCurrently(mt) ,
displayedTopBar(L’:Label),
weblabels(pi(N’, L’:Label), WPIS:WebappProcInfoSet) ,
Att >




The remaining rules represent the chain of messages started for a data
transfer that loads data from a given web site, going through the NIC, getting
data back from the NIC, going back to the network process and ultimately
going to the web app for display purposes. Once a data transfer is at this
stage these rules will be applied consecutively, with the kernel handling rule
from above potentially involved, but due to the arguments the only further
processing from there is with the remaining rules below this point. Note that
of course each of these rules only applies once!
First, this is the request from a web app to a network process to get data
from a given URL.
crl < N : proc | returnTo(SomeProcNum:Nat) ,
out(Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML) , fromKernel(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(Num:Nat, N, MSG-FETCH-URL, V:MsgVal,
L:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML’) , Att2 >
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=> < N : proc | returnTo(Num:Nat) ,
out(Ll:LabelList, L:Label) , Att >
< N : pipe | toKernel(ML) , fromKernel(ML’) , Att2 >
if isNetProc(N) .
This is the network process writing that request into the memory for NIC
pickup, after kernel validation.
rl < N : proc | out(L:Label, Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : mem | out(mtLL) , Att2 >
=> < N : proc | out(Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : mem | out(L:Label) , Att2 > .
Kernel validating the network process data for the NIC in the next rule.
rl < N : mem | out(L’:Label) , Att >




< 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList) , Att3 >
=> < N : mem | out(mtLL) , Att >




< 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList, L’:Label) , Att3 > .
The NIC interaction with the outside world is given as an immediate
response from that outside world.
rl < 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList , L:Label , Ll’:LabelList) ,
in(Ll’’:LabelList) , Att >
=> < 0 : nic | out(Ll:LabelList , Ll’:LabelList) ,
in(Ll’’:LabelList, L:Label) , Att > .
The NIC’s return data is given to the memory accessible by the right
network process.
rl < N : mem | in(mtLL) , Att >





< 0 : nic | in(L’:Label, Ll:LabelList) , Att3 >
=> < N : mem | in(L’:Label) , Att >




< 0 : nic | in(Ll:LabelList) , Att3 > .
That appropriate network process fetches the data from the memory.
rl < N : proc | in(Ll:LabelList) , Att >
< N : mem | in(L:Label) , Att2 >
=> < N : proc | in(Ll:LabelList, L:Label) , Att >
< N : mem | in(mtLL) , Att2 > .
Between the above rule and the following rule there is the use of an equa-
tion, and then the passing mechanism of the first and second rule (labeled
kernelReceivesOPMessage and kernelForwardsOPMessage) at the top gets
used, but this time with a MSG-RETURN-URL instead of the MSG-FETCH-URL
argument in the payload, which leads to all the data fetching related rules
not applying. So, from here the first two rules will apply once each and then
the remaining rules below trigger in order.
rl < N : proc | rendered(L) , URL(L’) ,loading(1) , Att >
< N : pipe | fromKernel(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(N’, N, MSG-RETURN-URL, V:MsgVal,
LL:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML) , Att2 >
=> < N : proc | rendered(LL:Label) , URL(L’) ,
loading(1) , Att >
< N : pipe | fromKernel(ML) , Att2 > .
The above rule potentially changes the URL in rendered and thus the
next rule can apply to adjust the displayedContent, but it can only apply
a single time per change, due to the condition.













< N : proc |
rendered(L:Label),
Att3 >
if LOld:Label =/= L:Label .
At this point no further rule will apply to a data transfer that has taken
all the steps to get through the rules to this point.
Thus, we have shown the order in which the rules can be applied and we
note that this way we have explained that any sequence of steps using these
rules will actually terminate.
B.3 Display Memory Modeling
Next we are looking at the contents of the file memory.maude. This is a model
of the memory and page table interaction which finds a bug. Therefore
it is not integrated into the rest of the model but requires fixing in the
implementation of IBOS. Some simplification of processes from before have
been done for this.
First, we add three types of memory, which represent all memory we care
about. Specifically it is the empty memory, the current video memory, and
any kind of other memory. We also define a page table. Its entries map







op nullMemory : -> Memory [ctor] .
op videoMemory : -> Memory [ctor] .
op otherMemory : -> Memory [ctor] .
sort PGTE .
op pg-table-entry : ProcId Memory -> PGTE [ctor] .
sort PGTESet .
subsort PGTE < PGTESet .
op mtPGTEs : -> PGTESet .
op _,_ : PGTESet PGTESet
-> PGTESet [assoc comm id: mtPGTEs] .
op pg-table : PGTESet -> Attribute [ctor] .
op vidMem : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
This is our testing instrumentation. The initial-test is what we base
our further checking on.
op initial-test : -> Configuration .
eq initial-test












< 1050 : proc | rendered(Url1), URL(Url1), loading(1) >
< 1050 : pipe | toKernel(mt) ,
fromKernel(mt) >
.
The bug-trigger message is one that we have found through experimen-
tation to find the display memory bug of creating an empty display.
op bug-trigger : -> Configuration .
eq bug-trigger =




For the above to make sense we of course require the following definitions
for our test drivers. Similar to inspect from above we will define the elements
for explore here.
op new-tab : Label -> Cmd .
op update : Oid Label -> Cmd .
op tab-switch : Oid -> Cmd .
op url : Nat -> Label .
op new-tab : -> Cmd .
rl new-tab => new-tab(url(1)) .
rl new-tab => new-tab(url(2)) .
rl new-tab => new-tab(url(3)) .
op update : -> Cmd .
op update : Label -> Cmd .
rl update => update(url(1)) .
rl update => update(url(2)) .
rl update => update(url(3)) .
op tab-switch : -> Cmd .
These are the rules that show what each of the commands actually does.
Both of these only work with web apps.
rl < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( update(U:Label),
CMDList:CmdList) >
< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U’:Label),
URL(U’’:Label), loading(N’:Nat) >
=> < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( update(N:Nat, U:Label),
CMDList:CmdList) >
< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U’:Label),
URL(U’’:Label), loading(N’:Nat) > .
rl < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( tab-switch,
CMDList:CmdList) >
< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U’:Label),
URL(U’’:Label), loading(N’:Nat) >
=> < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( tab-switch(N:Nat),
CMDList:CmdList) >
< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U’:Label),
URL(U’’:Label), loading(N’:Nat) > .
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This is the similar exploration setting that will be complete expanded
due to the search commands we will run.
op explore : -> Cmd .
op explore : Nat -> Cmd .
rl explore => explore(3) .
rl explore(0) => mtCmdList .
rl explore(s(N:Nat)) => new-tab , explore(N:Nat) .
rl explore(s(N:Nat)) => update , explore(N:Nat) .
rl explore(s(N:Nat)) => tab-switch , explore(N:Nat) .
op explore-space : -> Configuration .
eq explore-space =
< testMsg : testMsg | cmd( explore(3) ) > .
This rule works with the new-tab command, to create a new process and
pipe and to make it the active web app.
rl < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( new-tab(U:Label),
CMDList:CmdList) >







< webappmgr-id : proc | nextWAN(N:Nat) >
=> < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( CMDList:CmdList) >








< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U:Label),
URL(U:Label), loading(1) >
< N:Nat : pipe | fromKernel(mt) , toKernel(mt) >
< webappmgr-id : proc | nextWAN(s(N:Nat)) > .
A web app is being updated which is not currently the active web app,
see the condition, so this web app will be assigned the memory otherMemory
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in the page table.
crl < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( update(N:Nat, U:Label),
CMDList:CmdList) >








< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U2:Label),
URL(U2:Label), loading(1) >
=> < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( CMDList:CmdList) >








< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U:Label),
URL(U:Label), loading(1) >
if N:Nat =/= N2:Nat .
In case the web app that is getting switched to is currently mapped to
the null memory, then there is a page fault, and it will be updated to point
at the actual video memory, which means the content of the display will get
refreshed and normal operation can continue.
crl < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( tab-switch(N:Nat),
CMDList:CmdList) >










< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U2:Label),
URL(U2:Label), loading(1) >
=> < testMsg : testMsg | cmd (CMDList:CmdList) >








< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U2:Label),
URL(U2:Label), loading(1) >
if N:Nat =/= N2:Nat .
endm
Now when the tab is switched to a web app for which a mapping to some
memory already exists, it is not re-mapped to the memory. This is actually
a crucial step to the bug we encounter. The video memory remapping is
based on page faults, but as there is no page fault, it does not get remapped.
Originally, this rule was part of the MEMORY module, but to make the error
more obvious and to be able to concisely present the fix below, we have
pushed this one rule into its own module, called CRUCIAL-RULE-BAD.
mod CRUCIAL-RULE-BAD is
inc MEMORY .
crl < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( tab-switch(N:Nat),
CMDList:CmdList) >









< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U2:Label),
URL(U2:Label), loading(1) >
=> < testMsg : testMsg | cmd (CMDList:CmdList) >










< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U2:Label),
URL(U2:Label), loading(1) >
if N:Nat =/= N2:Nat .
endm
This search finds the cause of the empty display issues by exploring the
whole space spanned due to explore-space. After seeing the output, we can
simplify this for the next search. That simpler search uses the bug-trigger
instead, which is enough to see the bug. When running these search com-
mands, finding any solution means there is a bug, if there were no solution




< kernel-id : kernel | Att:AttributeSet ,






< kernel-id : kernel | Att:AttributeSet ,
vidMem(about-blank) , activeWebapp(N:Nat) ,
pg-table(pg-table-entry(N:Nat, otherMemory),
pg:PGTESet) > .
The fix for this is to not depend on page faults, and the rest of our analysis
uses a model without this issue, see the next section for the fix.
B.3.1 Fixed Display Memory
Now we are looking at the contents of file memory-fixed.maude. We only
need to change the one rule in the module CRUCIAL-RULE-BAD, to fix the
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issue. Replacing that module with the module CRUCIAL-RULE-FIXED, where




crl < testMsg : testMsg | cmd ( tab-switch(N:Nat),
CMDList:CmdList) >









< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U2:Label),
URL(U2:Label), loading(1) >
=> < testMsg : testMsg | cmd (CMDList:CmdList) >









< N:Nat : proc | rendered(U2:Label),
URL(U2:Label), loading(1) >
if N:Nat =/= N2:Nat .
endm
Note that the difference is that N:Nat is always mapped to videoMemory
in this rule. Then we can run the exact search command from before, which
found errors when using the bad rule. It is the command looking for errors,





< kernel-id : kernel | Att:AttributeSet ,
vidMem(about-blank) , activeWebapp(N:Nat) ,
pg-table(pg-table-entry(N:Nat, otherMemory),
pg:PGTESet) > .
With this, we know that a solution not depending on page table faults
does work for the display memory as shown in the search.
B.4 IBOS Analysis
Now we are looking at the content of the file analysis.maude. All references
in this section are to elements in Chapter 4.










V:MsgVal, L:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML’:MessageList) , Att:AttributeSet >





Next we look at the address bar correctness from Section 4.3.2. If there






< kernel-id : kernel | Att:AttributeSet ,
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displayedTopBar(URL:Label) >
< display-id : proc |
displayedContent(URL’:Label),
Att2:AttributeSet >
such that URL:Label =/= URL’:Label
and URL:Label =/= about-blank
and URL’:Label =/= about-blank .
Now we are going into the code relevant for Section 4.3.3. This is the
check that all network requests from web page instances go to the proper
network process, property (1). This command will have no solution, so no











ML’:MessageList) , Att:AttributeSet >





such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label
or L1’:Label =/= L2’:Label .
This checks the property that an incoming ethernet frame gets handed
to the right network process memory, property (2). Again, this search will





< N:Nat : mem | in(L1:Label, Ll:LabelList),
Att:AttributeSet >





such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label .
The next search command checks that any ethernet frame that is given
by a network process to the NIC via the DMA memory matches the marking
of the network process, i.e., property (3). Again, there is no solution for this,





< N:Nat : mem | out(L1:Label) , Att:AttributeSet >




such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label .
The return message from a network process to a web page instance only
has data from an appropriate source, property (4). No solution is found,
there is thus no mismatch between the labeling of the web app, the network





< N:Nat : proc | rendered(Lll:Label) , URL(L’’:Label) ,
loading(1) , Att:AttributeSet >
< N:Nat : pipe | fromKernel(
msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(N’:Nat, N:Nat, MSG-RETURN-URL, V:MsgVal,
L2:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML:MessageList) , Att2:AttributeSet >
< kernel-id : kernel |




such that L1:Label =/= L2:Label
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.Last, we have the property (9), that is that the URL of the current tab
is displayed to the user. That means, there is never a mismatch between the
URL of the currently active web app and the address bar. As there is no





< kernel-id : kernel | Att:AttributeSet ,
displayedTopBar(URL:Label) >
< display-id : proc |
activeWebapp(W:ProcId),
Att2:AttributeSet >
< W:ProcId : proc |
URL(URL’:Label),
Att3:AttributeSet >
such that URL:Label =/= URL’:Label .
The correctness of the other properties has been argued in Section 4.3.3,
so there is no need to repeat those arguments here.
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